Matthew Hatami - Deepwater Horizon and the Lessons Still Being Missed

In part one of my conversation with Matthew Hatami, we get into a detailed discussion on Deepwater Horizon, Macondo and well control. Matthew shares the research he has carried out over the years into the disaster, including his views on why the accident happened, why failed negative pressure tests can be so deceptive, and why he believes one of the biggest lessons is still being missed across the industry. He also speaks about the role of mechanical barriers, the SEDCO 711 incident in the North Sea, and why information sharing matters far more than many people realise. 0:00 Introduction 0:25 Matthew Hatami introduces himself 1:12 Starting an exploration company and raising private equity 2:47 Quick message to like and subscribe 2:48 Matthew’s early career in petroleum engineering 3:40 Working for Halliburton in the Permian Basin 4:08 International work in North Africa 4:45 Seeing the industry from service companies and operators 7:50 Writing The Oilfield Survivor’s Guide 9:17 Writing his second book on shale oil and gas operations 11:10 Why controlling costs matters in oil and gas 12:40 How companies reduce well costs 13:21 Operational decisions that become expensive mistakes 15:04 Deepwater Horizon discussion begins 16:00 Matthew’s research into the disaster 17:00 Why he believes the cause is misunderstood 18:40 Similar North Sea incident before Deepwater Horizon 19:30 Failed pressure test example from field experience 21:10 What pressure testing is actually meant to prove 23:05 How communication failures happen during operations 24:40 Why small decisions can lead to major incidents 26:20 Safety culture and decision making offshore 28:05 The pressure engineers face during high value operations 29:40 When engineers have to challenge decisions 31:15 Learning lessons from major offshore incidents 33:05 Why the industry sometimes repeats the same mistakes 35:10 Cost pressure versus operational safety 37:00 The importance of experienced leadership offshore 39:20 How operations can drift away from best practice 41:10 Lessons from decades in the oil and gas industry 43:05 Advice for engineers early in their careers 45:00 What separates good operations from bad ones 47:15 Reflections on the current state of the industry 49:30 What Matthew hopes the industry learns going forward 51:20 Final thoughts from Matthew Hatami 53:10 Closing remarks

00:00 Introduction to Matthew Hatami

00:11 Matthew’s career in oil and gas and major companies he worked for

00:50 Starting his own exploration company

02:05 From Halliburton to Hess, Chesapeake and beyond

04:36 Why Matthew wrote Oilfield Survival Guide

06:02 Writing his second book on shale oil and gas operations

07:56 Why cost reduction is critical in the oil industry

10:07 Small operational decisions that become expensive later

11:48 Deepwater Horizon and why Matthew researched the disaster

14:19 What he believes really caused the Macondo disaster

15:45 Why failed negative pressure tests can be deceptive

19:05 The key mistake he believes happened on Deepwater Horizon

20:50 Why “massive flow” is not always the first warning sign

22:17 A real failed pressure test from Matthew’s own experience

24:40 Pressure from investors and making decisions in the field

27:10 How wells can give misleading warning signs

29:24 Why the industry still has not fully learned from Macondo

32:48 The most important lesson from Deepwater Horizon

35:13 Why adding more barriers is not always the answer

37:38 How well control events can build slowly

40:05 Experience gaps and critical decision making

41:59 The Sedco 711 incident in the North Sea

42:21 Why lessons from earlier incidents were not shared

44:44 Leadership responsibility and information sharing

46:44 Why even experienced engineers can miss warning signs

49:10 Why nobody in the industry has seen everything