Special Encore: Will US Tariffs Drive Mexico Closer to China?

Special Encore: Will US Tariffs Drive Mexico Closer to China?

Original Release Date November 22, 2024: Our US Public Policy Strategist Ariana Salvatore and Chief Latin America Equity Strategist Nikolaj Lippmann discuss what Trump’s victory could mean for new trade relationships.


----- Transcript -----


Andrew Sheets: 2024 was a year of transition for economies and global markets. Central banks began easing interest rates, U.S. elections signaled significant policy change, and Generative AI made a quantum leap in adoption and development.

Thank you for listening throughout 2024, as we navigated the issues and events that shaped financial markets, and society. We hope you'll join us next year as we continue to bring you the most up to date information on the financial world. This week, please enjoy some encores of episodes over the last few months and we'll be back with all new episodes in January. From all of us on Thoughts on the Market, Happy Holidays, and a very Happy New Year.

Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Morgan Stanley's US Public Policy Strategist.

Nikolaj Lippmann: And I'm Nik Lippmann, Morgan Stanley's Chief Latin American Equity Strategist.

Ariana Salvatore: Today, we're talking about the impact of the US election on Mexico's economy, financial markets, and its trade relationships with both the US and China.

It's Friday, November 22nd at 10am in New York.

The US election has generated a lot of debate around global trade, and now that Trump has won, all eyes are on tariffs. Nik, how much is this weighing on Mexico investors?

Nikolaj Lippmann: It’s interesting because there's kind of no real consensus here. I'd say international and US investors are generally rather apprehensive about getting in front of the Trump risk in Mexico; while, interestingly enough, most Mexico-based investors and many Latin American investors think Trump is kind of good news for Mexico, and in many cases, even better news than Biden or Harris. Net, net, Mexican peso has sold off. Mexico's now down 25 per cent in dollar terms year to date, while it was flat to up three, four, 5 per cent around May. So, we've already seen a lot being priced then.

Ariana, what are your expectations for Trump's trade policy with regards to Mexico?

Ariana Salvatore: So, Mexico has been a big part of the trade debate, especially as we consider this question of whether or not Mexico represents a bridge or a buffer between the US and China. On the tariff front, we've been clear about our expectations that a wide range of outcomes is possible here, especially because the president can do so much without congressional approval.

Specifically on Mexico, Trump has in the past threatened an increase in exchange for certain policy concessions. For example, back in 2019, he threatened a 5 per cent tariff if the Mexican government didn't send emergency authorities to the southern border. We think given the salience of immigration as a topic this election cycle, we can easily envision a scenario again in which those tariff threats re-emerge.

However, there's really a balance to strike here because the US is Mexico's main trading partner. That means any changes to current policy will have a substantial impact.

So, Nik, how are you thinking about these changes? Are all tariff plans necessarily a negative? Or do you see any potential opportunities for Mexico here?

Nikolaj Lippmann: Look, I think there are clear risks, but here are my thoughts. It would be very hard for the United States to de-risk from China and de-risk from Mexico simultaneously. Here it becomes really important to double-click on the differences in the manufacturing ecosystems in North America versus Southeast Asia and China.

The North American model is really very integrated. US companies are by a mile the biggest investor. In Mexico – and Mexican exports to the US kind of match the Mexican import categories – the products go back and forth. Mexico has evolved from a place of assembly to a manufacturing ecosystem. 25 years ago, it was more about sending products down, paint them blue, put a lid on it. Now there's much more value add.

The link, however, is still alive. It's a play on enhancing US competitiveness. You can kind of, as you did, call it a China buffer; a fender that helps protect US competitiveness. But by the end of the day, I think integration and alignment is going to be the key here.

Ariana Salvatore: But of course, it's not just the direct trade relationship between the US and Mexico. We need to also consider the global geopolitical landscape, and specifically this question of the role of China. What's Mexico's current trade policy like with China?

Nikolaj Lippmann: Another great question, Ariana, and I think this is the key. There is growing evidence that China is trying to use Mexico as a China bridge.

And I think this is an area where we will see the biggest adjustments or need for realignment. This is a debate we've been following. We saw, with interest, that Mexico introduced first a 25 per cent tariff and then a 35 per cent tariff on Chinese imports. And saw this as the initial signs of growing alignment between the two countries.

However, Mexican import from China never really dropped. So, we started looking at like the complicated math saying 35 per cent times $115 billion of import. You know, best case scenario, Mexico should be collecting $40 billion from tariffs; that's huge and almost unrealistic number for Mexico. Even half of that would go a long way to solve fiscal challenges in that country.

However, when we started looking at the actual tax collection from Chinese imports, it was closer to $3 billion, as we highlighted in a note with our Mexico economist just recently. There's just multiple discounts and exemptions to effective tariffs at neither 25 per cent nor 35 per cent, but actually closer to 2.5 [or] 3 per cent. I think there's a problem with Chinese content in Mexican exports, and I think it's likely to be an area that policymakers will examine more closely. Why not drive-up US or North American content?

Ariana Salvatore: So, it sounds like what you're saying is that there is a political, or rhetorical at least, alignment between the US and Mexico when it comes to China. But the reality is that the policy implementation is not yet there.

We know that there's currently nothing in the USMCA treaty that prevents Mexico from importing goods from China. But a lot has changed over the past four years, even since the pandemic. So, looking forward, do you expect Mexico's policy vis-a-vis China to change after Trump takes office?

Nikolaj Lippmann: I think, I certainly think so, and I think this is again; this is going to be the key. As you mentioned, there's nothing in the USMCA treaty that prevents Mexico from buying the stuff from China. And it's not a customs union. Mexican consumers, much like American consumers, like to buy cheap stuff.

However, the geopolitics that you refer to is important. And when I reflect, frankly, on the bilateral relationship between the two countries, I think Mexican policymakers need to perhaps pause and think a little bit about things like the spirit of the treaty and not just the letter of the treaty; and also about how to maintain public opinion support in the United States.

By the end of the day, when we see what has happened with regards to China after the pandemic, it has been a significant change in political consensus and public opinion. When I think Americans are not necessarily interested in just using Mexico as a China bridge for Chinese products.

During the first Trump administration, the NAFTA agreement was renegotiated as the US Mexico Canada agreement, the USMCA, that took effect or took force in mid 2020. This agreement will come under review in 2026.

Ariana, what are the expectations for the future of this agreement under the Trump administration?

Ariana Salvatore: So, I think this USMCA review that's coming up in 2026 is going to be a really critical litmus test of the US-Mexico relationship, and we're going to learn a lot about this China bridge or buffer question that you mentioned. Just for some very brief context, that agreement as you mentioned was signed in 2020, but it includes a clause that lets all parties evaluate the agreement six years into a 16-year time horizon.

So, at that point, they can decide to extend the agreement for another 16 years. Or to conduct a joint review on an annual basis until that original 16 years lapses. So, although the agreement will stay in force until at least 2036, the review period, which is around June of [20]26, provides an opportunity for the signing parties to provide recommendations or propose changes to the agreement short of a full-scale renegotiation.

We do see some overlapping objectives between the two parties. For example, things like updating the foundation for digital trade and AI, ensuring the endurance of labor protections, and addressing Mexico's energy sector. But Trump's approach likely will involve confronting the auto EV disputes and could possibly introduce an element of immigration policy within the revision. We also definitely expect this theme of Chinese investment in Mexico to feature heavily in the USMCA review discussions.

Finally, Nik, keeping in mind everything that we've discussed today, with global supply chains getting rewired post the pandemic, Mexico has been a beneficiary of the nearshoring trend. Do you think this is going to change as we look ahead?

Nikolaj Lippmann: So, look, we [are] still underweight Mexico, but I think risk ultimately biased with the upside over time with regards to trade.

We need evidence to be able to lay it out, these scenarios; Mexico could end up doing quite well with Trump. But much work needs to be done south of the border with regards to all the areas that we just mentioned there, Ariana.

When we reflect on this over the next couple of years, there's a couple of things that really stand out. Number one is that first wave of reshoring or nearshoring, which was really focused on brownfield. It was bringing our manufacturing ecosystems where we already had existing infrastructure.

What is potentially next, and what we're going to be watching in terms of sort of policy maker incentives and so on, will be some of the greenfield manufacturing ecosystems. That could involve things like IT hardware, maybe EV batteries, and a couple of other really important sectors.

Ariana Salvatore: And that's something we might get some insight into when we hear personnel appointments from President-elect Trump over the coming months. Nik, thanks so much for taking the time to talk.

Nikolaj Lippmann: Thank you very much, Arianna.

Ariana Salvatore: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen, and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

Jaksot(1539)

How a Potential Ukraine Peace Deal Could Impact Airlines

How a Potential Ukraine Peace Deal Could Impact Airlines

Our Hong Kong/China Transportation & Infrastructure Analyst Qianlei Fan explores how a potential peace deal in Ukraine could reshape the global airline industry.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Qianlei Fan, Morgan Stanley’s Hong Kong/China Transportation Analyst. Today’s topic is how a potential peace deal in Ukraine could affect global airlines. It’s Friday, February 21st, at 2pm in Hong Kong. The situation remains fluid, but we believe a potential peace deal in Ukraine could have broad implications for the global airline industry. From the reopening of Russian airspace to potential changes in fuel prices and flight routes, there are many variables at play. Russian airspace is currently off-limits due to the conflict, but a peace agreement could change that. The reopening of Russian airspace would be a significant catalyst for global airlines, reducing travel times and fuel consumption on routes between Europe, North America, and Asia. Fuel prices account for 20-40 per cent of airlines' costs, so any changes can have a significant impact on their bottom line. We believe a peace deal could lead to a moderate fall in fuel prices, benefiting all airlines, but particularly those with high-cost exposure and low margins. There could also be specific regional implications. The European air travel market could benefit significantly from an end to the Ukraine conflict. The reopening of Russian airspace would improve European airlines’ competitiveness on Asian routes, while a fall in fuel prices would reduce their operating costs. There would also be lower congestion in the intra-European market. Asian airlines, particularly Chinese ones, could experience a mixed impact. On the one hand, they could see an increase in wide-body utilization and passenger numbers if more direct flights to the U.S. are introduced. On the other hand, losing their advantage over European airlines of flying through Russian airspace would be negative. But, at the same time, Chinese airlines should remain competitive on pricing given meaningfully lower labor costs. U.S. airlines could also benefit in two significant ways. They could see a boost in revenues from adding back profitable routes such as U.S. to India or U.S. to South Korea that may have been suspended. Being able to fly directly over Russia would mean shorter, more direct flight paths resulting in less fuel burn and lower costs. U.S. airlines could also see a cost decrease from a moderate fall in jet fuel prices. Finally, Latin American carriers could also benefit from a peace deal. If global carriers reallocate capacity to China, it could tighten the market even further, creating an attractive capacity environment for the LatAm region. We’ll continue to bring you relevant updates on this evolving situation. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

21 Helmi 20253min

The Downside Risks of Reciprocal Tariffs

The Downside Risks of Reciprocal Tariffs

Our Global Chief Economist Seth Carpenter explains the potential domino effect that President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs could have on the U.S. and global economies.----- Transcript -----Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist, and today I'm going to talk about downside risks to the U.S. economy, especially from tariffs.It's Thursday, February 20th at 10am in New York.Once again, tariffs are dominating headlines. The prospect of reciprocal tariffs is yet one more risk to our baseline forecast for the year. We have consistently said that the inflationary risk of tariffs gets its due attention in markets but the adverse growth implications that's an underappreciated risk.But we, like many other forecasters, were surprised to the upside in 2023 and 2024. So maybe we should ask, are there some upside risks that we're missing?The obvious upside risk to growth is a gain in productivity, and frequent readers of Morgan Stanley Research will know that we are bullish on AI. Indeed, the level of productivity is higher now than it was pre-COVID, and there is some tentative estimate that could point to faster growth for productivity as well.Of course, a cyclically tight labor market probably contributes and there could be some measurement error. But gains from AI do appear to be happening faster than in prior tech cycles. So, we can't rule very much out. In our year ahead outlook, we penciled in about a-tenth percentage point of extra productivity growth this year from AI. And there is also a bit of a boost to GDP from AI CapEx spending.Other upside risks, though, they're less clear. We don't have any boost in our GDP forecast from deregulation. And that view, I will say, is contrary to a lot of views in the market. Deregulation will likely boost profits for some sectors but probably will do very little to boost overall growth. Put differently, it helps the bottom line far more than it helps the top line. A notable exception here is probably the energy sector, especially natural gas.Our baseline view on tariffs has been that tariffs on China will ramp up substantially over the year, while other tariffs will either not happen or be fleeting, being part of, say, broader negotiations. The news flow so far this year can't reject that baseline, but recently the discussion of broad reciprocal tariffs means that the risk is clearly rising.But even in our baseline, we think the growth effects are underestimated. Somewhere in the neighborhood of two-thirds of imports from China are capital goods or inputs into U.S. manufacturing. The tariffs imposed before on China led to a sharp deterioration in industrial production. That slump went through the second half of 2018 and into and all the way through 2019 as a drag on the broader economy. Just as important, there was not a subsequent resurgence in industrial output.Part of the undergraduate textbook argument for tariffs is to have more produced at home. That channel works in a two-economy model. But it doesn't work in the real world.Now, the prospect of reciprocal tariffs broadens this downside risk. Free trade has divided production functions around the world, but it's also driven large trade imbalances, and it is precisely these imbalances that are at the center of the new administration's focus on tariffs. China, Canada, Mexico – they do stand out because of their imbalances in terms of trade with the U.S., but the underlying driving force is quite varied. More importantly, those imbalances were built over decades, so undoing them quickly is going to be disruptive, at least in the short run.The prospect of reciprocity globally forces us as well to widen the lens. The risks aren't just for the U.S., but around the world. For Latin America and Asia in particular, key economies have higher tariff supply to U.S. goods than vice versa.So, we can't ignore the potential global effects of a reciprocal tariff.Ultimately, though, we are retaining our baseline view that only tariffs on China will prove to be durable and that the delayed implementation we've seen so far is consistent with that view. Nevertheless, the broad risks are clear.Thanks for listening. And if you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

20 Helmi 20254min

A Rollercoaster Housing Market

A Rollercoaster Housing Market

Our co-heads of Securitized Products Research, James Egan and Jay Bacow, explain how the increase in home prices, a tight market supply and steady mortgage rates are affecting home sales.----- Transcript -----James Egan: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Jim Egan, co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley.Jay Bacow: And I'm Jay Bacow, the other co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley.Today, a look at the latest trends in the mortgage and housing market.It's Wednesday, February 19th, at 11am in New York.Now, Jim, there's been a lot of headlines to kick off the year. How is the housing market looking here? Mortgage rates are about 80 basis points higher than the local lows in September. That can't be helping affordability very much.James Egan: No, it is not helping affordability. But let's zoom out a little bit here when talking about affordability. The monthly payment on the medium-priced home had fallen about $225 from the fourth quarter of 2023 to local troughs in September. About a 10 percent decrease. Since that low, the payment has increased about $150; so, it's given back most of its gains.Importantly, affordability is a three-pronged equation. It's not just that payment. Home prices, mortgage rates, and incomes. And incomes are up about 5 percent over the past year. So, affordability has improved more than those numbers would suggest, but those improvements have certainly been muted as a result of this recent rate move. Jay Bacow: Alright. Affordability is up, then it’s down. It’s wrong, then it’s right. It sounds like a Katy Perry song. So, how have home sales evolved through this rollercoaster?James Egan: Well, you and I came on this podcast several times last year to talk about the fact that home sales volumes weren't really increasing despite the improvement in affordability. One point that we made over and over again was that it normally takes 9 to 12 months for sales volumes to increase when you get this kind of affordability improvement. And that would make the fourth quarter of 2024 the potential inflection point that we were looking for. And despite this move in mortgage rates, that does appear to have been the case. Existing home sales had a very strong finish to last year. And in the fourth quarter, they were up 8 percent versus the fourth quarter of 2023. That's the first year-over-year increase since the second quarter of 2021.Jay Bacow: All right. So that's pretty meaningful. And if looking backward, home sales seem to be inflecting, what does that mean for 2025?James Egan: So, there's a number of different considerations there. For one thing, supply – the number of homes that are actually for sale – is still very tight, but it is increasing. It may sound a little too simplistic, but there do need to be homes for sale for homes to sell, and listings have reacted faster than sales. That strong fourth quarter in existing home sales that I just mentioned, that brought total sales volumes for the year to 1 percent above their 2023 levels. For sale inventory finished the year up 14 percent.Jay Bacow: Alright, that makes sense. So, more people are willing to sell their home, which means there's a little bit more transaction volume. But is that good for home prices?James Egan: Not exactly. And it is those higher listings and our expectation that listings are going to continue to climb that's been the main factor behind our call for home price growth to continue to slow. Ultimately, we think that you see home sales up in the context of about 5 percent in 2025 versus 2024.Our leading indicators of demand have softened, a little, in December and January, which may be a result of this sharp increase in rates. But ultimately, when we look at turnover in the housing market, and we're talking about existing sales as a share of the outstanding homes in the U.S. housing market, we think that we're kind of at the basement right now. If we're wrong in our sales volume call, I would think it's more likely that there are more sales than we think. Not less.Jay Bacow: Let me ask you another easy question. How far would rates have to fall to really incentivize more supply and/or demand in the housing market?James Egan: That's the $45 trillion question. We think the current housing market presents a fascinating case study in behavioral economics. Even if mortgage rates were to decline to 4.5 percent, only 35 percent of people would be in the money. And that's still over 200 basis points from where we are today.That being said, we think it's unlikely that mortgage rates need to fall all the way to that level to unlock the housing market. While the lack of any historical precedent makes it difficult for us to identify a specific threshold at which activity could increase meaningfully, we recently turned to Morgan Stanley's AlphaWise to conduct a consumer pulse survey to get a better sense of how people were feeling about their housing options.Jay Bacow: I like data. How are those people feeling?James Egan: All right, so 31 percent of people anticipate buying a home over the next two years, and almost half are considering buying over the next five. Interestingly, only 21 percent are considering selling their home over the next two years. In other words, perceived demand is about 50 percent greater than marginal supply, at least in the immediate future, which we think could be a representation of that lock-in effect.Current homeowners’ expectations of near-term listings are depressed because of how low their mortgage rate is. But we did ask: What if mortgage rates were to fall from 6.8 percent today to 5. 5 percent? In that world, 85 to 90 percent of the people planning to buy a home in the next two years stated that they would be more likely to execute on that purchase.So, we think it's safe to say that a decline in mortgage rates could accelerate purchase decisions. But Jay, are we going to see that decline?Jay Bacow: Well, our interest rate strategists do think that rates are going to rally from here. They've updated their 10-year forecast to expect the tenure note ends 2025 at 4 percent. If the tenure note's at 4 percent, mortgage rate should come down from here, but not to that 4.5 percent, or probably even that 5.5 percent level that you quoted. You know, honestly, you don't really want to stay, you don't really want to go. We're probably talking about like a 6 percent mortgage rate. Not quite that level.But Jim, this is a national level, a national mortgage rate, and housing markets about location and location and location. Are there geographical nuances to your forecast?James Egan: People all over the country are asking, should they stay or should they go now, and that answer is different depending on where you live, right? If you look at the top 100 MSAs in the country, 8 of the top 11 markets showing the largest increases in inventory over the past year can be found in Florida.So, we would expect Florida to be a little bit softer than our national numbers. On the other hand, inventory growth has been most subdued in the Northeast and the Midwest, with several markets continuing to see inventory declines.Jay Bacow: All right, well selfishly, as somebody that lives in the Northeast, I am a little bit happy to hear that. But otherwise, Jim, it's always a pleasure listening to you.James Egan: Pleasure talking to you too, Jay. Thanks for listening, and if you enjoy this podcast, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.DISCLAIMERJay Bacow: So, Jim, the lock-in effect is: You don’t really want to stay. No. But you don’t really want to go.James Egan: That is exactly; that is perfect! Wow. That is the whole issue with the housing market.

19 Helmi 20257min

Finding Opportunity in an Uncertain U.S. Equity Market

Finding Opportunity in an Uncertain U.S. Equity Market

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategy Mike Wilson suggests that stock, factor and sector selection remain key to portfolio performance.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief US Equity Strategist. Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing equities in the context of higher rates and weaker earnings revisions. It's Tuesday, Feb 18th at 11:30am in New York. So let’s get after it.Since early December, the S&P 500 has made little headway. The almost unimpeded run from the summer was halted by a few things but none as important as the rise in 10-year Treasury yields, in my view. In December, we cited 4 to 4.5 percent as the sweet spot for equity multiples assuming growth and earnings remained on track. We viewed 4.5 percent as a key level for equity valuations. And sure enough, when the Fed leaned less dovish at its December meeting, yields crossed that 4.5 percent threshold; and correlations between stocks and yields settled firmly in negative territory, where they remain. In other words, yields are no longer supportive of higher valuations—a key driver of returns the past few years. Instead, earnings are now the primary driver of returns and that is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. While the Fed was already increasingly less dovish, the uncertainty on tariffs and last week’s inflation data could further that shift with the bond market moving to just one cut for the rest of the year. Our official call is in line with that view with our economists now just looking for just one cut–in June. It depends on how the inflation and growth data roll in. Our strategy has shifted, too. With the S&P 500 reaching our tactical target of 6100 in December and earnings revision breadth now rolling over for the index, we have been more focused on sectors and factors. In particular, we’ve favored areas of the market showing strong earnings revisions on an absolute or relative basis.Financials, Media and Entertainment, Software over Semiconductors and Consumer Services over Goods continue to fit that bill. Within Defensives, we have favored Utilities over Staples, REITs and Healthcare. While we’ve seen outperformance in all these trades, we are sticking with them, for now. We maintain an overriding preference for Large-cap quality unless 10-year Treasury yields fall sustainably below 4.5 percent without a meaningful degradation in growth. The key component of 10-year yields to watch for equity valuations remains the term premium – which has come down, but is still elevated compared to the past few years. Other macro developments driving stock prices include the very active policy announcements from the White House including tariffs, immigration enforcement, and cost cutting efforts by the Department of Government Efficiency, also known as DOGE. For tariffs, we believe they will be more of an idiosyncratic event for equity markets. However, if tariffs were to be imposed and maintained on China, Mexico and Canada through 2026, the impact to earnings-per-share would be roughly 5-7 percent for the S&P 500. That’s not an insignificant reduction and likely one of the reasons why guidance this past quarter was more muted than fourth quarter results. Industries facing greater headwinds from China tariffs include consumer discretionary goods and electronics. Lower immigration flow and stock is more likely to affect aggregate demand than to be a wage cost headwind, at least for public companies. Finally, skepticism remains high as it relates to DOGE’s ability to cut Federal spending meaningfully. I remain more optimistic on that front, but realize greater success also presents a headwind to growth before it provides a tailwind via lower fiscal deficits and less crowding out of the private economy—things that could lead to more Fed cuts and lower long-term interest rates as term premium falls. Bottom line, higher backend rates and growth headwinds from the stronger dollar and the initial policy changes suggest equity multiples are capped for now. That means stock, factor and sector selection remains key to performance rather than simply adding beta to one’s portfolio. On that score, we continue to favor earnings revision breadth, quality, and size factors alongside financials, software, media/entertainment and consumer services at the industry level. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

18 Helmi 20254min

Trump 2.0 and the Potential Economic Impact of Immigration Policy

Trump 2.0 and the Potential Economic Impact of Immigration Policy

Our Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research, Michael Zezas, joins our Chief U.S. Economist, Michael Gapen, to discuss the possible outcomes for President Trump’s immigration policies and their effect on the U.S. economy.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research.Michael Gapen: And I'm Michael Gapen, Chief U.S. Economist for Morgan Stanley.Michael Zezas: Our topic today: President Trump's immigration policy and its economic ramifications.It's Friday, February 14th at 10am in New York.Michael, migration has always been considered an important feature of the global economy. In fact, you believe that strong immigration flows were an important element in the supply side rebound that set the stage for a U.S. soft landing. If we think back to the time before President Trump took office almost a month ago, how would you categorize immigration trends then?Michael Gapen: So, we saw a very sharp increase in immigration coming out of the pandemic. I would say, if you look at longer term averages, say the 20 years leading up to the pandemic, normally we'd get about a million and a half immigrants, per year into the United States. A lot of variation around that number, but that was the long-term average.In 2022 through 2024, we saw immigration surge to about 3 million per year. So about twice as fast as we saw normally. And that happened at a very important time. It allowed for very significant and rapid growth in the labor force, just at a time when the economy was emerging from the pandemic and demand for labor was quite high.So, it filled that labor demand. It allowed the economy to grow rapidly, while at the same time helping to keep wages lower and inflation starting to come down. So, I do think it was a major underpinning force in the ability of the U.S. economy to soft land after several years of above target inflation.Michael Zezas: Got it. And so now, with a second President Trump term, are we set up for a reversal of this immigration driven boost to the economy?Michael Gapen: Yeah, I think that's the key question for the outlook, and our answer is yes. That if we are going to significantly restrict immigration flows, the risk here is that we reverse the trends that we've just seen in the previous year.So, I certainly believe one of the main goals of the Trump administration is to harden the border and initiate greater deportations. And these steps in my mind come on the back of steps that the Biden administration already took around the middle of last year that began to slow immigration flows.So yes, I do think we should look for a reversal of the immigration driven boost to the economy. But Mike, I would actually throw this question back to you and say on the first day of his presidency, Trump issued a series of executive orders pertaining to immigration. Where are we now in that process after these initial announcements? And what do you expect in terms of policy implementation?Michael Zezas: Well, I think you hit on it. There's two levers here. There's stepped up deportations and removals and there's working with Mexico on border enforcement. Things like the remain in Mexico policy where Mexico agrees to keep those seeking asylum on their side of the border; and to facilitate that, they've stepped up their military presence to do that.Those are really kind of the two levers that the U.S. is pushing on to try and reduce the flow of migrants coming into the U.S. Still to be determined how much these actually have an impact, but I think that's the direction of policy travel.Michael Gapen: And are there any catalysts specifically that you're watching for? I mean, recently the administration proposed tariffs on Mexico and Canada around border control, but those have been delayed. Is there anything on the horizon we should look for this time around?Michael Zezas: Yeah. So obviously the president tied the potential for tariffs on Mexico and Canada to the idea that there should be some improvement on border enforcement. It's going to be difficult for investors, I think, to assess in real time how much progress has been made there. Mostly it's a data challenge here. There are official government statistics which have a good amount of detail about removals and folks stopped at the border and demographics in terms of age and, and whether or not they were working. That might really kind of help us piece together the story in terms of whether or not there's going to be future tariffs – and Michael, probably for you, to what extent there's an impact on the economy if folks are already in the labor force.But that data is on a lag, it'll be really difficult to tell what's happening now for at least several months. Maybe we're going to get some hints about what's going on for comments coming in earnings calls, for example, from companies that deal in construction and food service and hospitality. But I don't know that those anecdotes would be sufficient to really draw substantial conclusions. So, I think we're a bit in a fog for the next couple months on exactly what's happening.But based on all this, Michael, what's your outlook for immigration this year and beyond?Michael Gapen: Yeah, so we, as I mentioned, we were getting about 3 million immigrants per year between 2022 and 2024; long run averages before the pandemic were more like a million and a half a year. Our outlook is that immigration flows should slow below pre- COVID averages to about 1 million this year and about 500,000 in 2026. And again, that would be the well below the long run average of about a million and a half per year.Now, as you mentioned, understanding these flows in real time is hard and there's a lot of uncertainty around this and how effective policies may be. So, I think people should consider ranges around this baseline, if you will. On one hand, we could see a reduction in unauthorized immigration replaced by more authorized immigration. So maybe there's a benign scenario where immigration slows back to its one and a half million per year. But it's more through legal and formal channels than unauthorized channels.Alternatively, it could be the case that some of the policies, you mentioned in terms of, say, stepped up deportations or other measures, and maybe there's a chilling effect. That there's just like an externality on immigration behavior. And in fact, we slow maybe to about 500,000 this year and see a decline in about 250,000 next year.So, I think there's a lot of uncertainty about it. We think immigration slows below its longer run averages, which would represent a major shift from what we've seen over the last three years.Michael Zezas: Got it. So, lots of crosscurrents here, about how the actual labour supply is impacted. But bottom line, if we do arrive at a point where there’s a significant reduction in immigration, what’s the expectation about what that means for the U.S. economy?Michael Gapen: Yeah, so a lot of cross currents here. Number one, I think with a high degree of confidence, we can say reduced immigration should lead to slower potential growth, right? So, a slower growth in the labor force should mean slower growth in trend hours, right? Potential GDP is really only the sum of growth in trend hours and trend productivity.So, the surge in immigration we saw really boosted potential growth up to 2.5 per cent to 3 per cent in recent years. So, if we reduce immigration, potential growth should slow. I think back towards, say, 2 per cent this year, maybe even 1 to 1.5 per cent next year. So, you slow down growth in the labor force, potential should moderate.Second, and I think the more difficult question is, well, okay, if you also reduce growth in the labor force, you're going to get less employment, and that's a demand side effect. So, which dominates here, the supply side or the demand side? And here, I think to go back to your first question – yeah, I do think we're going to get a reversal of the outcome that we just saw.So, I think it'll moderate both potential and actual growth. So, I think actual growth slows. The amount of employment we see should decline and soften. We're not saying the level of employment will decline, but the growth rate of employment should slow. But it should coincide with a low unemployment rate, so it's going to be a very different labor market. A lot less employment growth, but still a tight labor market in terms of low unemployment.That should keep wages firm, particularly in the service sector where a lot of immigrants work, and we think it'll also help keep inflation firm. So, it could keep the Fed on the sideline for a significant period of time, for example.And I'd just like to close, Mike, by saying I think this is an underappreciated risk for financial markets. I think investors have digested trade policy uncertainty, but I'm not convinced that risks around immigration and their effect on the economy are well understood.Michael Zezas: Got it. Well Michael, thanks for taking the time to talk.Michael Gapen: Thank you.Michael Zezas: Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

14 Helmi 20259min

How Do Tariffs Affect Currencies?

How Do Tariffs Affect Currencies?

Our Head of Foreign Exchange & Emerging Markets Strategy James Lord discusses how much tariff-driven volatility investors can expect in currency markets this year.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m James Lord, Morgan Stanley’s Head of Foreign Exchange & Emerging Markets Strategy. Today – the implications of tariffs for volatility on foreign exchange markets. It’s Thursday, February 13th, at 3pm in London. Foreign exchange markets are following President Trump’s tariff proposals with bated breath. A little over a week ago investors faced significant uncertainty over proposed tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China. In the end, the U.S. reached a deal with Canada and Mexico, but a 10 per cent tariff on Chinese imports went into effect. Currencies experienced heightened volatility during the negotiations, but the net impacts at the end of the negotiations were small. Announced tariffs on steel and aluminum have had a muted impact too, but the prospect of reciprocal tariffs are keeping investors on edge. We believe there are three key lessons investors can take away from this recent period of tariff tension. First of all, we need to distinguish between two different types of tariffs. The first type is proposed with the intention to negotiate; to reach a deal with affected countries on key issues. The second type of tariff serves a broader purpose. Imposing them might reduce the U.S. trade deficit or protect key domestic industries.There may also be examples where these two distinct approaches to tariffs meld, such as the reciprocal tariffs that President Trump has also discussed. The market impacts of these different tariffs vary significantly. In cases where the ultimate objective is to make a deal on a separate issue, any currency volatility experienced during the tariff negotiations will very likely reverse – if a deal is made. However, if the tariffs are part of a broader economic strategy, then investors should consider more seriously whether currency impacts are going to be more long-lasting. For instance, we believe that tariffs on imports from China should be considered in this context. As a result, we do see sustained dollar/renminbi upside, with that currency pair likely to hit 7.6 in the second half of 2025. A second key issue for investors is going to be the timing of tariffs. April 1st is very likely going to be a key date for Foreign Exchange markets as more details around the America First Trade Policy are likely revealed. We could see the U.S. dollar strengthen in the days leading up to this date, and investors are likely to consider where subsequently there will be a more significant push to enact tariffs. A final question for investors to ponder is going to be whether foreign exchange volatility would move to a structurally higher plane, or simply rise episodically. Many investors currently assume that FX volatility will be higher this year, thanks to the uncertainty created by trade policy. However, so far, the evidence doesn’t really support this conclusion. Indicators that track the level of uncertainty around global trade policy did rise during President Trump's first term, specifically around the period of escalating tariffs on China. And while this was associated with a stronger [U.S.] dollar, it did not lead to rising levels of FX volatility. We can see again, at the start of Trump's second term, that rising uncertainty over trade policy has been consistent with a stronger U.S. dollar. And while FX volatility has increased a bit, so far the impact has been relatively muted – and implied volatility is still well below the highs that we’ve seen in the past ten years. FX volatility is likely to rise around key dates and periods of escalation; and while structurally higher levels of FX volatility could still occur, the odds of that happening would increase if tariffs resulted in more substantial macro economic consequences for the U.S. economy.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.

13 Helmi 20254min

The Credit Upside of Market Uncertainty

The Credit Upside of Market Uncertainty

The down-to-the-deadline nature of Trump’s trade policy has created market uncertainty. Our Head of Corporate Credit Research Andrew Sheets points out a silver lining. ----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley. Today I’m going to talk about a potential silver lining to the significant uptick in uncertainty around U.S. trade policy. It's Wednesday, February 12th at 2pm in London. One of the nuances of our market view is that we think credit spreads remain tight despite rising levels of corporate confidence and activity. We think these things can co-exist, at least temporarily, because the level of corporate activity is still so low, and so it could rise quite a bit and still only be in-line with the long-term trend. And so while more corporate activity and aggression is usually a negative for lenders and drives credit spreads wider, we don’t think it’s quite one yet. But maybe there is even less tension in these views than we initially thought. The first four weeks of the new U.S. Administration have seen a flurry of policy announcements on tariffs. This has meant a lot for investors to digest and discuss, but it’s meant a lot less to actual market prices. Since the inauguration, U.S. stocks and yields are roughly unchanged. That muted reaction may be because investors assume that, in many cases, these policies will be delayed, reversed or modified. For example, announced tariffs on Mexico and Canada have been delayed. A key provision concerning smaller shipments from China has been paused. So far, this pattern actually looks very consistent with the framework laid out by my colleagues Michael Zezas and Ariana Salvatore from the Morgan Stanley Public Policy team: fast announcements of action, but then much slower ultimate implementation. Yet while markets may be dismissing these headlines for now, there are signs that businesses are taking them more seriously. Per news reports, U.S. Merger and Acquisition activity in January just suffered its lowest level of activity since 2015. Many factors could be at play. But it seems at least plausible that the “will they, won’t they” down-to-the-deadline nature of trade policy has increased uncertainty, something businesses generally don’t like when they’re contemplating big transformative action. And for lenders maybe that’s the silver lining. We’ve been thinking that credit in 2025 would be a story of timing this steadily rising wave of corporate aggression. But if that wave is delayed, debt levels could end up being lower, bond issuance could be lower, and spread levels – all else equal – could be a bit tighter. Corporate caution isn’t everywhere. In sectors that are seen as multi-year secular trends, such as AI data centers, investment plans continue to rise rapidly, with our colleagues in Equity Research tracking over $320bn of investment in 2025. But for activity that is more economically sensitive, uncertainty around trade policy may be putting companies on the back foot. That isn’t great for business; but, temporarily, it could mean a better supply/demand balance for those that lend to them. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

12 Helmi 20253min

The Rising Risk of Trade Tensions in Asia

The Rising Risk of Trade Tensions in Asia

Our Chief Asia Economist Chetan Ahya discusses the potential impact of reciprocal U.S. tariffs on Asian economies, highlighting the key markets at risk.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Asia Economist. Today: the possibilities of reciprocal tariffs between the U.S. and Asian economies. It’s Tuesday, February 11, at 2pm in Singapore.President Trump’s recent tariff actions have already been far more aggressive than in 2018 and 2019. And this time around, multiple trade partners are simultaneously facing broad-based tariffs, and tariffs are coming at a much faster pace. The risk of trade tensions escalating has risen, and the latest developments may have kicked that risk up another notch. The U.S. president is pushing a sweeping tariff of 25 per cent on all foreign steel and aluminum products. Trump has also indicated that he would propose reciprocal tariffs on multiple countries – to match the tariffs levied by each country on U.S. imports. This potential reciprocal tariff proposal suggests that Asia ex China may be more exposed to possible tariff hikes. As of now, Asia’s tariffs on US imports are, for the most part, slightly higher than US tariffs on Asian imports. And based on [the] latest available data, six economies in Asia do impose [a] higher weighted average tariff on the U.S. than the U.S. does on individual Asia economies. The tariff differentials are most pronounced for India, Thailand, and Korea. These three economies may face a risk of a hike in tariffs by 4 to 6 percentage points on a weighted average basis, if the U.S. imposes reciprocal tariffs. Individual products may yet face higher tariffs rates but we think [the] overall impact from steel, aluminum and reciprocal tariffs will be manageable. But look, trade tensions may still rise further given that 7 out of 10 economies with the largest trade surplus with the U.S. are in Asia. Against this backdrop, policy makers may have to look for ways to address the demands from the U.S. administration. For instance, Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba has committed to increasing investment in the U.S. and is looking to raise energy imports from the U.S. This is seen as a positive step to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. Meanwhile, ahead of the meeting between President Trump and India’s Prime Minister Modi later this week, India has already taken steps to lower tariffs on the U.S., and may propose [an] increase in imports of oil and gas, defense equipments and aircrafts to narrow its trade surplus with the U.S. However, as regards China is concerned, the wide scope of issues in the bilateral relationship suggests that [the] U.S. administration would cite a variety of reasons for expanding tariffs. As things stand, China has been the only economy so far where tariff hikes have stayed in place. Indeed, the recent 10 percent increase in tariffs has already matched the increase in the weighted average tariffs that transpired in 2018 and 2019. And we still expect that tariffs on imports from China will continue to rise over the course of 2025. To sum it up, there has been a constant stream of tariff threats from the U.S. administration. While the direct effects of [the] tariffs appear manageable, the bigger concern for us has been that this policy uncertainty will potentially weigh on corporate sector confidence, CapEx and growth cycle.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

11 Helmi 20254min

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