The End of the U.S. Dollar’s Bull Run?

As traditional financial institutions tightened their lending standards last year, private credit stepped in to fill some of the gaps. But with rates now falling, public lenders are poised to compete again on the terrain that private credit has transformed.----- Transcript -----Vishy Tirupattur: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today we’ll have a conversation with Joyce Jiang, our US leveraged finance strategist, on the topic of private credit.It's Thursday, February 22nd at noon in New York.Joyce, thank you for joining. Private credit is all over the news. Let’s first understand – what is private credit. Can you define it for us?Joyce Jiang: There isn't a consensus on the definition of private credit. But broadly speaking, private credit is a form of lending extended by non-bank lenders. It's negotiated privately on a bilateral basis or with a small number of lenders, bypassing the syndication process which is standard with public credit.This is a rather broad definition and various types of debt can fall under this umbrella term; such as infrastructure, real estate, or asset-backed financing. But what's most relevant to leveraged finance – is direct lending loans to corporate borrowers.Private credit lenders typically hold deals until maturity, and these loans aren't traded in the secondary market. So, funding costs in private credit tend to be higher as investors need to be compensated for the illiquidity risk. For example, between 2017 and now, the average spread premium of direct lending loans is 250 basis points higher compared to single B public loans.Vishy Tirupattur: That’s very helpful Joyce. The size of the private credit market has indeed attracted significant attention due to its rapid growth. You often see estimates in the media of [the] size being around $1.5 to $1.7 trillion. Some market participants expect the market to reach $2.7 trillion by 2027. Joyce, is this how we should think about the market? Especially in the context of public corporate credit market?Joyce Jiang: I've seen these numbers as well. But to be clear, they reflect assets under management of global private debt funds. So not directly comparable to the market size of high yield bonds or broadly syndicated loans.In our estimate, the total outstanding amount of US direct lending loans is in the range of $630-710 billion. So, we see the direct lending space as roughly half the size of the high yield bonds or broadly syndicated loan markets in the US.Vishy Tirupattur: Understood. Can you provide some color on the nature of private credit borrowers and their credit quality in the private credit space?Joyce Jiang: Traditionally, private credit targets small and medium-sized companies that do not have access to the public credit market. Their EBITDA is typically one-tenth the size of the companies with broadly syndicated loans. However, this is not representative of every direct lending fund because some funds may focus on upper middle-market companies, while others target smaller entities.Based on the data that’s available to us, total leverage and EBITDA coverage in private credit are comparable to a single B to CCC profile in the public space. Additionally, factors such as smaller size, less diversified business profiles, and limited funding access may also weigh on credit quality.Given this lower quality skew and smaller size, there have been concerns around how these companies can navigate the 500 basis point of rate hikes. However, based on available data, two years into the hiking cycle, coverage has deteriorated – mainly due to the floating-rate heavy nature of these capital structures. But on the bright side, leverage generally remained stable. Similar to what we’ve seen in public credit.Now let me turn it around to you, Vishy. What about defaults in private credit and how do they compare to public credit markets?Vishy Tirupattur: So when it comes to defaults, unlike in the public markets, data that cover the entire private credit market is not really there. We have to depend on the experience of sample portfolios from a variety of sources. These data tend to vary a lot, given the differences in defining what a default is and how to calculate default rates, and so on. So, all of this is a little bit tricky. We should also keep in mind that the data we do have on private credit is over the last few years only. So, we should be careful about generalizing too much.That said, based on available data we can say that the private credit defaults have remained broadly in the same range as the public credit. In other words, not substantially higher default rates in the private credit markets compared to the public credit defaults.A few things we should keep in mind as we consider this relatively benign default picture. What contributes to this?First, private credit deals have stronger lender protections. This is in contrast to the broadly syndicated loan market – which is, as you know, predominantly covenant-lite market. Maintenance covenants in private credit can really act as circuit breakers, reining in borrower behavior before things deteriorate a lot. Second, private credit deals usually involve only a very small number of lenders. So it’s easier to negotiate a restructuring or a workout plan. All of this contributes to the default experience we’ve observed in private credit markets.Joyce Jiang: And finally, what are your thoughts on the future of private credit?Vishy Tirupattur: The rapid growth of private credit is really reshaping the landscape of leveraged finance on the whole. Last year, as banks retreated, private credit stepped in and filled the gap – attracting many borrowers, especially those without access to the public market. Now, as rate cuts come into view, we see public credit regaining some of the lost ground. So how private credit adapts to this changing environment is something we’ll be monitoring closely. With substantial dry powder ready to be deployed, the competition between public and private credit is likely to intensify, potentially impacting the overall market.Joyce, let's wrap it up here, Thanks for coming on the podcast.Joyce Jiang: Thanks for having me.Vishy Tirupattur: Thank you all for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

22 Helmi 20246min

Central banks in the U.S. and Europe are looking to cut rates this year, but the path to those cuts differs greatly. Our Global Chief Economist explains this stark dichotomy.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley’s Global Chief Economist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I’ll be talking about the challenges for monetary policy on both sides of the Atlantic.It’s Wednesday, Feb 21st at 10am in New York.The Fed, the Bank of England, and the ECB all hiked rates to fight inflation, and now we are looking for each of them to cut rates this year. For our call for a June Fed rate cut, both growth and inflation matter. But our call for a May and June start on the east side of the Atlantic depends only on inflation. “Data dependent” here has two different meanings.At the January Fed meeting, Chair Powell said continued disinflation like in prior months was needed to cut. But he also emphasized that disinflation needs to be sustainably on track; not simply touching 2 per cent. Until Thursday’s retail sales data, the market narrative began to flirt with a possible re-acceleration of the US economy, spoiling that latter condition of inflation going sustainably to target. January inflation data showed strength in services in particular, and payrolls showed a tight labor market that might pick up steam.The retail sales data pushed in the opposite direction, and we think that the slower growth will prevail over time. And for now, market pricing is more or less consistent with our call for 100 basis points of cuts this year, starting in June.Now the Fed’s situation is in stark contrast to that of the Bank of England. Last week’s UK data showed a technical recession in the second half of 2023. And while the UK economy is not collapsing, a strongly surging economy is not a risk either. But until the last print, inflation in the UK had been stubbornly sticky. The January print came in line with our UK economist’s call, but below consensus. But still, one swallow does not mean spring, and the recent inflation data do not guarantee our call for a May rate cut will happen. Rather, broader evidence that inflation will fall notably is needed; and for that reason, the risks to our call are clearly skewed to a later cut.For the ECB, the inflation focus is the same. And on Thursday, President Lagarde warned against cutting rates too soon – a particularly telling comment in light of the weak growth in the Euro area. Recent data releases suggest that not only did Germany’s GDP decline by three-tenths of a per cent in Q4 of 2023; the second largest economy, France, also experienced stagnation in the second half of the year. And with this weakness expected to persist – well, we forecast a weak half per cent growth this year and about only 1 per cent growth in 2025.So, why is this dichotomy so stark? The simple answer is the weak state of the economy in the UK and in Europe. More fundamentally, the drivers of inflation started with a jump in food and energy prices, and then surging consumer goods prices as disrupted supply chains met consumer spending shifting toward goods. That inflation has since abated but services inflation tends to be more tied to the real side of the economy. And for the US in particular, housing inflation is driven by the state of the labor market over time.The Bank of England and the ECB are waiting for services inflation to respond to the already weak economy, and there is little risk of a reacceleration of inflation if that happens. In contrast, the Fed cannot have conviction that inflation won’t reaccelerate because of the continued resilience on the real side of the economy. The retail sales data will help, but the pattern needs to continue.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple podcasts, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

21 Helmi 20244min

Our Head of Thematic Research in Europe previews the possible next phase of the AI revolution, and what investors should be monitoring as the technology gains adoption.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Edward Stanley, Morgan Stanley’s Head of Thematic Research in Europe. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I’ll discuss the latest developments around AI Adopters. It’s Tuesday, February the 20th, at 2pm in London.The current technology shift driven by AI is progressing faster than any tech shift that came before it. I came on the show at the beginning of the year to present our thesis – while 2023 was the “Year of the Enablers,” those first line hardware and software companies; 2024 is going to be the “Year of the Adopters,” companies leveraging the Enablers’ hardware and software to better use and monetize their own data for this generative AI world.And the market is still sort of treating this as a “show me” story. Enablers are still driving returns. Around half of the S&P’s performance this year can be attributed to three Enabler stocks. Yet, be it Consumer or – more importantly – Enterprise adoption, monthly data we’re tracking suggests AI adoption is continuing at a rapid pace.So let me paint a picture of what we’re actually seeing so far this year.There has been a widening array of consumer-facing chatbots. Some better for general purpose questions; some better at dealing with maths or travel itineraries; others specialized for creating images or videos for influencers or content creators. But those proving to be the stickiest, or more importantly leading to major behavioral day-to-day changes, are coding assistants, where the productivity upside is now a well-documented greater than 50 per cent efficiency gain.From a more enterprise perspective, open-source models are interesting to track. And we do, almost daily, to see what’s going on. The people and companies downloading these models are likely to be using them as a starting point – for fine-tuning their own models.Within that, text models which form the backbone of most chatbots you will have interacted with, now account for less than 50 per cent of all models openly available for download. What’s gaining popularity in its place is multi-modal models. This is: models capable of ingesting and outputting a combination of text, image, audio or video.Their applications can range from disruption within the music industry, personalized beauty advice, applications in autonomous driving, or machine vision in healthcare. The list goes on and on. The speed of AI diffusion into non-tech sectors is really bewildering.Despite all these data points, suggesting consumer and enterprise adoption is progressing at a rapid clip, Adopter stocks continue to underperform those picks-and-shovels Enablers I mentioned. The Adopters have re-rated modestly in the first month and a half of the year – but not the whole group. Of course, this is a rapidly changing landscape. And many companies have yet to report their outlook for the year ahead. We’ll continue to keep you informed of the newest developments as the years progress.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.

20 Helmi 20243min

Our Fixed Income Strategist outlines commercial real estate’s post-pandemic challenges, which could make regional bank lenders vulnerable. ----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market, I’m Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, I'll be talking about the challenges of the commercial real estate markets. It's Friday, Feb 16th at 3 pm in New York.Commercial real estate – CRE in short – is back in the spotlight in the aftermath of the loan losses and dividend cuts announced by New York Community Bancorp. Lenders and investors in Japan, Germany, and Canada have also reported sizable credit losses or write-downs related to US commercial real estate. The challenges in CRE have been on a slow burn for several quarters. In our view, the CRE issues should be scrutinized through the lenses of both lenders and property types. We see meaningful challenges in both of them.From the lenders’ perspective, we now estimate that about a trillion and a half of commercial real estate debt matures by the end of 2025 and needs to be refinanced; about half of this sits on bank balance sheets.The regulatory landscape for regional banks is changing dramatically. While the timeline for implementing these changes is not finalized, the proposed changes could raise the cost of regional bank liabilities and limit their ability to deploy capital; thereby pressuring margins and profitability. This suggests that the largest commercial real estate lender – the regional banking sector – might be the most vulnerable.Office as a property type is confronting a secular challenge. The pandemic brought meaningful changes to workplace practice. Hybrid work has now evolved into the norm, with most workers coming into the office only a few days a week, even as other outdoor activities such as air travel or dining out have returned to their pre-Covid patterns. This means that property valuations, leasing arrangements, and financing structures must adjust to the post-pandemic realities of office work. This shift has already begun and there is more to come.It goes without saying, therefore, that regional banks with office predominant in their CRE exposures will face even more challenges.Where do we go from here? Property valuations will take time to adjust to shifts in demand, and repurposing office properties for other uses is far from straightforward. Upgrading older buildings turns out to be expensive, especially in the context of energy efficiency improvements that both tenants and authorities now demand. The bottom line is that the CRE challenges should persist, and a quick resolution is very unlikely.Is it systemic? We get this question a lot. Whether or not CRE challenge escalates to a broader system-wide stress depends really on one’s definition of what systemic risk is. In our view, this risk is unlikely to be systemic along the lines of the global financial crisis of 2008. That said, strong linkages between the regional banks and CRE may impair these banks’ ability to lend to households and small businesses. This, in turn, could lead to lower credit formation, with the potential to weigh on economic growth over the longer term.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

16 Helmi 20243min

Michael Zezas, Global Head of Fixed Income and Thematic Research, gives his take on how the U.S. election may influence European policy on national security, with implications for the defense and cybersecurity sectors.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income and Thematic Research. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the impact of the US election on global security and markets. It's Thursday, February 15th at 3pm in New York.Last week I was in London, spending time with clients who – understandably – are starting to plan for the potential impacts of the US election. A common question was how much could change around current partnerships between the US and Europe on national security and trade ties, in the event that Republicans win the White House. The concern is fed by a raft of media attention to the statements of Republican candidate, Former President Trump, that are skeptical of some of the multinational institutions that the US is involved in – such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. Investors are naturally concerned about whether a new Trump administration could meaningfully change the US-Europe relationship. In short, the answer is yes. But there’s some important context to keep in mind before jumping to major investment conclusions.For example, Congress passed a law last year requiring a two-thirds vote to affirm any exit from NATO, which we think is too high a hurdle to clear given the bipartisan consensus favoring NATO membership. So, a chaotic outcome for global security caused by the dissolution of NATO isn’t likely, in our view.That said, an outcome where Europe and other US allies increasingly feel as if they have to chart their own course on defense is plausible even if the US doesn’t leave NATO. A combination of President Trump’s rhetoric on NATO, a possible shift in the US’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the very real threat of levying tariffs could influence European policymakers to move in a more self-reliant direction. While it's not the chaotic shift that might have been caused by a dissolution of NATO, it still adds up over time to a more multipolar world. For investors, such an outcome could create more regular volatility across markets. But we could also see markets reflect this higher geopolitical uncertainty with outperformance of sectors most impacted by the need to spend on all types of security – that includes traditional suppliers of military equipment as well companies providing cyber security. Thanks for listening. Subscribe to Thoughts on the Market on Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen, and leave us a review. We’d love to hear from you.

15 Helmi 20242min

Key developments in China and the U.S. will impact global trade and the growth outlook for Asia in 2024.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Asia Economist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I’ll discuss the risk of re-emerging trade tensions and how this might impact the growth outlook for Asia. It’s Thursday, Feb 15, at 9 AM in Hong Kong.Trade tensions took a back seat during the pandemic when supply-chain disruptions led to a mismatch in the supply-demand of goods and created inflationary pressures around the world. However, these inflationary pressures are now receding and, in addition, there are two developments that we think may cause trade tensions to emerge once again.First is China’s over-investment and excess capacity. China continues to expand manufacturing capacity at a time when domestic demand is weakening and its producers are continuing to push excess supply to the rest of the world.China’s role as a large end-market and sizeable competitor means it holds significant influence over pricing power in other parts of the world. This is especially the case in sectors where China’s exports represent significant market share.For instance, China is already a formidable competitor in traditional, lower value-added segments like household appliances, furniture, and clothing. But it has also emerged as a leading competitor in new strategic sectors where it is competing head-on with the Developed Market economies. Take sectors related to energy transition.China has already begun cutting prices for key manufactured goods, such as cars, solar cells, lithium batteries and older-generation semiconductors over the last two quarters.The second development is the upcoming US presidential election. The media is reporting that if reelected, former President Trump would consider trade policy options, such as imposing additional tariffs on imports from China, or taking 10 per cent across-the-board tariffs on imports from around the world, including China.Drawing on our previous work and experience from 2018, we believe the adverse impact on corporate confidence and capital expenditure will be more damaging than the direct effects of tariffs. The uncertainty around trade policy may reduce the incentive for the corporate sector to invest. Moreover, this time around, the starting point of growth is weaker than was the case in 2018, suggesting that there are fewer buffers to absorb the effects of this potential downside.Will supply chain diversification efforts help provide an offset? To some extent yes, in a scenario where the US imposes tariffs on just China. The acceleration of friend-shoring would help; but ultimately the lower demand from China would still be a net negative. However, in the event that the US imposes symmetric tariffs on all imports from all economies, the effects would likely be worse.Bottom line, if trade tensions do re-emerge, we think it will detract from Asia’s growth outlook.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.

15 Helmi 20243min

Our expert panel discusses how the Red Sea situation is affecting the global economy and equity markets, as well as key sectors and the shipping industry.----- Transcript -----Jens Eisenschmidt: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Jens Eisenschmidt, Morgan Stanley's Chief Europe Economist.Marina Zavolock: And I'm Marina Zavolock, Chief European Equity Strategist.Cedar Ekblom: And I'm Cedar Ekblom, Shipping and Logistics Analyst.Jens Eisenschmidt: And on this special episode of the podcast, we will discuss the ongoing Red Sea disruptions and the various markets and economic dislocations caused by it. It's Tuesday, February 13th, 6pm in Frankfurt.Marina Zavolock: And 5pm in London.Marina Zavolock: 12 per cent of global trade and 30 per cent of container trade passes through the Suez Canal in Egypt, which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Safety concerns stemming from the recent attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea have driven the majority of container liners to divert trade around the Cape of Good Hope, pushing up container freight rates more than 200 per cent versus December of last year on the Asia to Europe route.Last week, our colleague Michael Zezas touched briefly on the situation in the Red Sea. Now we'd like to dig deeper and examine this from three key lenses. The European economy, the impact on equity markets and industries, as well as on global container shipping in particular.Marina Zavolock: So Cedar, let's start with you. You’ve had a high conviction call since freight rates peaked in the middle of January – that container shipping rates overshot and were likely to decline. We've started to see the decline. How do you see this developing from here?Cedar Ekblom: Thanks, Marina. Well, if we take a step back and we think about how far container rates have come from the peak, we're about 15 per cent lower than where we were in the middle of January. But we're still nearly 200 per cent ahead of where we were on the 1st of December before the disruption started.Cedar Ekblom: The reason why we're so convicted that freight rates are heading lower from here really comes down to the supply demand backdrop in container shipping. We have an outlook of significant excess supply playing out in [20]24 and extending into [20]25. During the COVID boom, container companies enjoyed very high freight rates and generated a lot of cash as a result. And they've put that cash to use in ordering new ships. All of this supply is starting to hit the market. So ultimately, we have a situation of too much supply relative to container demand.Another thing that we've noticed is that ships are speeding up. We have great data on this. And since boats have been diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, we've seen an increase in sailing speeds, which ultimately blunts the supply impact from those ships being diverted.And then finally, if we look at the amount of containers actually moving through the Suez Canal, this is down nearly 80 per cent year over year.Sure, we're not at zero yet, and there is ultimately [a] downside to no ships moving through the canal. But we think we are pretty close to the point of maximum supply side tension. That gives us conviction that freight rates are going lower from here.Jens Eisenschmidt: Thank you, Cedar, for this clear overview of the outlook for the container shippers. Marina, let's widen our lens and talk about the broader impact of the Red Sea situation. What are the ripple effects to other sectors and industries and are they in any way comparable to supply chain disruptions we saw as a result of the COVID pandemic?Marina Zavolock: So what we've done in equity strategy is we've worked with over 10 different sector analyst teams where we've seen the most prominent impacts from the situation in the Red Sea. We've worked as well with our commodity strategy team. And what we were interested in is finding the dislocations in stock moves related to the Red Sea disruptions in light of Cedar's high conviction and differentiated view.And what we found is that if you take the stocks that are pricing in the most earnings upside, and you look at them on a ratio basis versus the stocks that have priced in the most earnings downside. That performance along with container freight rates peaked sometime in January and has been declining. But there's more to go in light of Cedar's view in that decline.We believe that these moves will continue to fade and the bottom group, the European retailers that are most exposed. They have fully priced in the bear case of Red Sea disruptions continuing and also that the freight rate levels more importantly stay at these recent peaks. So we believe that ratio will continue to fade on both sides.The second point is you have some sectors, like European Airlines, where there's also been an impact. Air freight yields have risen by 25 per cent in Europe. And we believe that there is the potential for more persistent spillover in demand for certain customers that look to speed up delivery times.The third point is that in case of an escalation scenario in the Red Sea, we believe that it's less the container shipping companies at this point that would be impacted and we actually see the European refiners as most exposed to any kind of escalation scenario.And lastly, and I think this is going to tie into Jens’ economics.We see a fairly idiosyncratic and broadly limited impact on Europe overall. Yes, Europe is the most exposed region of developed market regions globally – but this is nowhere near a COVID 2.0 style supply chain disruption in our view.Marina Zavolock: And Jens, if I could turn it back to you, how do you estimate the impact of these Red Sea disruptions on the European economy?Jens Eisenschmidt: That's indeed one thing we were sort of getting busy on and trying to find a way to get a handle on what has happened there and what would be the implications. And of course, the typical thing, what you do is you go back in time and look [at] what has happened last time. We were seeing changes to say delivery time. So basically disruptions in supply chains.And of course, the big COVID induced supply chain disruptions had [a] significant impact on both inflation and output. And so, it's of course a normal thing to ask yourself, could this be again happening and what would we need to see?And of course, we have to be careful here because that essentially is assuming that the underlying structure of the shock is similar to the one we have seen in the past, which of course it's not the case.But you know, again, it's instructive at least to see what the current level of supply chain disruptions as measurable in these PMI sub-indices. What they translate to in inflation? And so we get a very muted impact so far. We have 10 basis points for the EU area, 15 basis points for the UK. But again, that's probably an upper bound estimate because the situation is slightly different than it was back then.Back then under COVID, there was clearly a limit to demand. So demand was actually pushing hard against the limits of good supply. And so that has to be more inflationary than in the current situation where actually demand, if anything, is weakened by [the] central bank chasing inflation targets and also weak global backdrop.So, essentially we would say, yes, there could be some small uptick in inflation, but it's really limited. And that's talking about here, core goods inflation. The other point that you could sort of be worried about is commodity prices and here in particular energy commodities.But so far the price action here is very, very limited.If anything, so far, TTF prices are, you know, going in the other direction. So all, all in all, we don't really see a risk here for commodity prices, at least. If the tensions in the Red Sea are not persisting longer and intensify further – and here really, this chimes very well in the analysis of Cedar and also with Marina – what you just mentioned.That doesn't really look like any supply chain disruption we have seen on the COVID. And it also doesn't really look like that it would, sort of, last for so long. And we have the backdrop of a oversupply of containers. So all in all, we think the impact is pretty limited. But let's sort of play the devil's advocate and say, what would happen to inflation if this were to persist?And again, the backdrop would be similar to COVID. Then we could think of 70 basis points, both in the Euro area and the UK added to inflation. And of course that's sizable. And that's precisely why you have central bankers around the world, not particularly concerned about it – but certainly mentioning it in their public statements that this is a development to watch.Marina Zavolock: Thank you Jens, and thank you Cedar for taking the time to talk.Cedar Ekblom: Great speaking with you both.Jens Eisenschmidt: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

14 Helmi 20249min

Despite a likely softening of the labor market, U.S. consumer spending should remain healthy for 2024.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Sarah Wolfe from the US Economics Team. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives; today I’ll give you an update on the US consumer. It’s Monday, February 12, at 10 AM in New York.Lately, there's been a lot of mixed data on the health of the US consumer. We saw a very strong holiday spending in November and December; very strong jobs reports in recent months. But we’re forecasting somewhat softer data in January for retail sales. And we know that delinquencies have been rising for households.When we look towards the rest of 2024, we're still expecting a healthy US consumer based on three key factors. The first is the labor market. Obviously, the labor market has been holding up very well and we’ve actually been seeing a reacceleration in payrolls in the last few months. What this means is that real disposable income has been stronger, and it’s going to remain solid in our forecast horizon. We do overall expect some cooling in disposable income though, as the labor market softens. Overall, this is the most important thing though for consumer spending. If people have jobs, they spend money.The second is interest rates. This has actually been one of the key calls for why we did not expect the US consumer to be in a recession two and half years ago, when the Fed started raising interest rates. There’s a substantial amount of fixed rate debt, and as a result less sensitivity to debt service obligations. We estimate that 90 per cent of household debt is locked in at a fixed rate. So over the last couple of years, as the Fed has been raising interest rates, we’ve seen just that: less sensitivity to higher interest rates. Right now, debt service costs are still below their 2019 levels. We’re expecting to see a little upward pressure here over the course of this year – as rates are higher for longer, as housing activity picks up a bit; but we expect there will be a cap on it.The last thing is what’s happening on the wealth side. We’ve seen a 50 percent accumulation in real estate wealth since the start of the pandemic. And we’re expecting to see very little deterioration in housing wealth this year. So people are still feeling pretty good; still have a lot of home equity in their homes. So overall, good for consumer spending. Good for household sentiment.So to sum it up, this year, we’re seeing a slowing in the US consumer, but still relatively strong. And the fundamentals are still looking good.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

12 Helmi 20242min