Europe in the Global AI Race

Morgan Stanley Research looks at how the European defense industry might respond to military spending pressure from the Trump administration.----- Transcript -----Paul Walsh: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Paul Walsh, Morgan Stanley's Head of Europe Product.Ross Law: And I'm Ross Law, Head of the European Aerospace and Defense Team.Paul Walsh: Today, we're discussing the outlook for European defense amid renewed pressure for more military spending from the Trump administration.It's Monday, the 27th of January, at 9.30am in London.Now Ross, the new Trump administration is now in place, and shifting NATO's defense burden to Europe is a top priority for President Trump. In fact, President Trump has made several comments throughout his campaign and after taking office. He has suggested that Europe should increase defense spending to 5 per cent of GDP. And just for reference, right now, many European countries are at or above NATO's target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defense.What's your reaction? Are President Trump's demands of 5 percent realistic?Ross Law: In short, we don't think so. In a perfect world, yes, 5 per cent is exactly where Europe should be, to make up for the huge underspend that we've seen over the past three decades since the end of the Cold War, which we've calculated at around the $2 trillion mark. There's also a desire in Europe to reduce its reliance on the US, particularly under a Trump presidency. But we see the 5 per cent spending level as unrealistic on multiple fronts.Firstly, from an economic perspective, given the lack of fiscal headroom in Europe; and for reference, 5 per cent would require an additional $600 billion of spend annually. Secondly, from a political perspective, given multiple pockets of uncertainty, and the fact that a rise in defense spending may mean a cut to spending elsewhere. And lastly, from an industry perspective, given the multi-decade underspend I mentioned, we don't think the industry could absorb anywhere close to such a strong increase in demand, at least near-term.So, while we do see upside pressure to European defense spending, our base case is that 3 per cent could be a more reasonable target. Not only would this be a compromise between the current 2 per cent target and Trump's 5 per cent demands; it would also allow Europe to match the spending levels of the US, which is expected at around 3.1 per cent in 2024. Even still, this would represent a 50 per cent increase or around $200 billion per year in additional European spent. This would, of course, further improve industry fundamentals and why we remain very positive on the sector.Paul Walsh: And as of now, Europe is heavily dependent on the U.S. for its defense. According to various data sources, more than 50 per cent of European arms imports came from the U.S. in 2019 through 2023, and that's up from 35 per cent in 2014. Given this, what steps would Europe need to take to reduce its dependence on the U.S.?Ross Law: The first step is to invest in the defense industrial base. Europe buys equipment from the U.S. for several reasons. Firstly, because the U.S. develops some of the most advanced technologies in the world because it has consistently invested in its defense industry. Secondly, because the U.S. equipment is often cheaper due to the benefits of scale. And thirdly, because it supports the very unique relationship between Europe and the U.S., which has essentially provided a security umbrella for the past three decades.So, Europe needs to invest, both to develop capabilities and technologies to rival U.S. peers, and also to expand capacity so that we can meet our own equipment needs. This, of course, all requires investment and also time. So, Europe will remain reliant on the U.S. for many years to come. But if Europe is serious about wanting to be more sovereign, we need a more capable defense industry.Paul Walsh: So, you talked there, Ross, about investment and time. So now the big question, how would Europe fund this upward pressure on defense budgets?Ross Law: Well, this is the million-dollar question, or the 200-billion-dollar question, you might say. Unfortunately, this is part of the equation that is, so far, most unclear – and the basis for an ongoing series of reports we've entitled the “European Defense Dilemma” – essentially the very clear need to spend more on defense, but no clear way to fund it. So far, we've seen some creative ways to fund near-term spending plans, from off balance sheet special funds like in Germany, to using the interest received on frozen Russian assets.But these, in our view, all seem fairly temporary in nature. What we really need is structural change, and that requires political commitment. Clearly, there is a lot of political change happening right now in Europe. Germany is holding an election in a few weeks time. France doesn't yet have a budget. There's also fiscal issues here in the UK. But we're hoping that 2025 is the year in which we may get clearer political commitments to longer-term structural improvements in defense spending. The German election is a clear near-term catalyst for us, where the raising of the debt break may in part be used to fund higher defense spending. But we're also looking to the upcoming NATO summit in June as an opportunity to officially increase the NATO spending target, we think potentially to 3 per cent, to support a more structural increase in European defense spending.Paul Walsh: In light of all of this, what's your outlook for the European defense industry?Ross Law: We remain bullish. In fact, we turned even more bullish as part of our 2025 outlook published earlier this month. The pressure to raise spending even to 3 per cent of GDP should progressively benefit industry fundamentals.So, we see upside to both forecasts. Given these are currently premised on a 2 per cent of GDP assumption, as well as devaluation multiples, which we view today as very attractive, with the sector trading in line with this long-term average – despite the improving fundamentals I've just described.Paul Walsh: And finally, Ross, what developments if any might change your outlook?Ross Law: The key for us this year is seeing clear political commitments from governments on more structural increases in spending. So, we're going to be watching the German election and the outcome of the French budgetary process very carefully. It's unlikely to be plain sailing. There was a media article published just this morning suggesting the UK government may be unwilling to raise spending beyond the current 2.3 per cent level. But we are hoping that as a whole 2025 sees Europe make a stronger commitment to defending itself.Paul Walsh: Ross, fascinating as always. Thanks for taking the time to talk.Ross Law: Great speaking with you Paul.Paul Walsh: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy thoughts on the market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

27 Tammi 7min

Our Head of Corporate Credit Research Andrew Sheets argues that while investor hopes are running high, corporate confidence isn’t.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley. Today I’m going to talk about optimism, how we measure it, whether it’s overly excessive and what lies ahead. It's Friday January 24th at 2pm in London. A central tenet of investing, including credit investing, is to be on the lookout for excessive optimism. By definition, the highest prices in a market cycle will happen when people are the most convinced that only great things lie ahead. The lowest prices, when you’d love to buy, happen when investors have given up all hope. But identifying peak optimism, in real time, is tricky. It’s tricky because there is no generally agreed definition; and it's tricky because, sometimes, things just are good. Investors have been excited about the US Technology sector for more than a decade now. And yet this sector has managed to deliver extraordinary profit growth over this time – and extraordinarily good returns. Yet this debate does feel relevant. The US equity market has soared over 50 per cent in the last two years. Equity valuations are historically high, both outright and relative to bonds. Credit risk premiums are near 20-year lows. Speculative investor activity is increasing. And so, have we finally hit peak optimism, a level from which we can go no further? Our answer, for better or worse, is no. While we think investor optimism is elevated, corporate optimism is not. And corporations are really important in this debate, enjoying enormous financial resources that can invest in the economy or other companies. While we do think corporate confidence will pick up, it is going to take some time. One of our favorite measures of corporate confidence is merger and acquisition activity. Buying another company is one of the riskiest things management can do, making it a great proxy for underlying corporate confidence. Volumes of this type of activity rose about 25 per cent last year, but they are still well below historical averages. And it would be really unusual for a major market cycle to end without this sort of activity being above-trend. Another metric is the riskiness of new borrowing. Taking on new debt is another measure of corporate confidence, as you generally do something like this when you feel good about the future, and your ability to pay that debt off. But for the last three years the volume of low-rated debt in the US market has actually been shrinking, while the issuance of the riskiest grades of corporate borrowing is also down significantly from the 2017-2022 average. Again, these are not the types of trends you’d expect with excessive corporate optimism. Uncertainties around tariffs, or the policies from the new US administration could still hold corporate confidence back. But the low starting point for corporate confidence, combined with what we expect to be a deregulatory push, mean we think it is more likely that corporate activity and aggressiveness have room to rise – and that this continues throughout 2025. Such an increase usually does present greater risk down the line; but for now, we think it is too early to position for those more negative consequences of increasing corporate aggression. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

24 Tammi 3min

Morgan Stanley Research analysts Michelle Weaver, Michael Cyprys and Ryan Kenny discuss the resurgence in capital markets activity and how sponsors might deploy the $4 trillion that has been sitting on the sidelines. ----- Transcript -----Michelle Weaver: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michelle Weaver, U.S. Thematic and Equity strategist at Morgan Stanley.Michael Cyprys: I'm Mike Cyprys, Head of U.S. Brokers, Asset Managers and Exchanges Research.Ryan Kenny: And I'm Ryan Kenney, U.S. Mid-Cap Advisors Analyst at Morgan Stanley.Michelle Weaver: In this episode of our special miniseries covering Big Debates, we'll focus on the improving M&A and IPO landscape and whether retail investing can sustain in 2025.It's Thursday, January 23rd at 10am in New York.2023 saw the lowest level of global M&A activity in at least 30 years. But we've started to see activity pick up in 2024. Mike, what have been the key drivers behind this resurgence, and where are we now?Michael Cyprys: Look, I think it's been a combination of factors in the context of a lot of pent-up activity and a growing urge to transact after a very subdued period of, you know, call it four- to six quarters of quite limited activity. Key drivers as we see it ranging from equity markets that have expanded across much of the world, low levels of equity volatility. broad financing, availability with meaningful issuance as you look across investment grade and high yield bond markets, tight credit spreads, interest rates stabilizing in [20]24, and then the Fed began to cut.So, liquidity pretty robust, all of that helping reduce bid-ask spreads. In terms of where we are now, post election, think there's just a lot of excitement here around a new administration; where we could see some changes around the antitrust environment that can be helpful, as we think about unlocking greater M&A activity across sponsors as well as strategics, and helping improve corporate confidence.But look, the recent rout of market could delay some of the transactional activity uplift. But we view that as more of a timing impact, and we are quite positive here in [20]25 as we think about scope for continued surge of activity.Michelle Weaver: We've seen rates rising pretty substantially since December. Does that throw a wrench into this at all, or do you think we see more stabilization there?Michael Cyprys: I think it could be a little bit of a slowdown, right? That would be the risk here, but as we think about the path for moving forward, I do think that there are a lot of factors that can be very helpful in terms of driving a continued pickup in activity, which we're going to talk about -- and why that will be the case.Michelle Weaver: Great. And you mentioned financial sponsors earlier, I want to drill down there a little more. What do you think would get sponsor activity to pick up more meaningfully?Michael Cyprys: Well, as I think about it, activity is already starting to pick up clearly across strategics as well as sponsors. On the sponsor side, it's been lagging a bit relative to strategics. We think both of which will build, and Ryan will get to that on the strategic side. As we think about the sponsors -- they're sitting with $4 trillion of capital to put to work that's been sitting on the sidelines where you just haven't seen as much activity over the past couple of years.Overall activity in [20]24 was probably call it maybe around 20 per cent below peak levels, and this is burning a hole in the pockets of both sponsors as well as their clients. And so, we see a growing urge to transact here, which gets to some of your earlier questions there too.So why is that? Well, the return clock is ticking; the lack of deployment is hurting returns within funds. Some of this dry powder also expires by the end of [20]25; and so if it's not yet deployed, then sponsors won't get some of the performance fee economics that come through to them on that capital. So that's all, all on the deployment side.As we think about the realization or exit side, we think that's probably going to lag, but we'd still expect, a steady build through this year. Today sponsors are sitting on call it around $10 trillion of portfolio of investments that are in the ground, and they haven't really provided much in the way of liquidity back to their customers, the LPs and the funds. And so, this is putting a little bit of a strain not only on the client relationships that want more money back from their private investments that haven't received it, but it's also one of the causes of what has been a little bit of a challenging fundraising backdrop across private equity funds.Hence if sponsors can return more capital to their clients, that can be helpful in terms of healing the overall fundraising backdrop. So, look, putting all that together, we expect an expanding pace of transactional deal activity across the sponsors from both the buy side as well as the sell side in terms of our activity.Michelle Weaver: And Ryan, how about IPOs? Have they been part of a similar trend?Ryan Kenny: Yes, definitely. So, with IPOs, we're also expecting a significant resurgence off of a low base. So just to put some numbers on it. In 2024, announced M&A volumes relative to nominal GDP, we're around 40 per cent below three-decade averages; equity capital markets [ECM] or ECM was even more muted, 50 per cent below three decade averages. And the leading indicators for ECM are very similar to the leading indicators for M&A. You want a strong equity market, relatively low volatility so that companies have the confidence to go public and so that deals can price well. And those conditions are really starting to materialize already in 2024; and we saw a few big IPOs price well last year, and launch well. The fourth quarter also looks strong. We saw a significant acceleration in industry ECM activity in October, November, December. 4Q volumes tracking up over 50 per cent year-over-year.Michelle Weaver: Let's dig a little deeper into potential policies from the incoming Trump administration. What are your expectations around antitrust regulation and its impact on M&A?Ryan Kenny: So, Trump has announced his appointments to the FTC and to the DOJ antitrust division. And our expectation is a return to normal. And that's coming off of what was a more onerous and not-clear environment under Biden. The Biden administration's approach was to disincentivize M&A; and they did that by defining M&A market concentration in novel ways -- looking at things like labor markets, and looking at how competitiveness is defined in new ways. And these new ways of defining concentration decrease the clarity of whether a specific deal would be challenged.So, from a CEO and board perspective, you don't want to waste the time of your management team and your board going through a deal that might not go through; in addition to the risk of prolonging the deal, and the risk of higher legal expenses during the process. So now that we're returning more towards normal, that's our expectation. We expect there will still be some deals like a challenge, but it will operate under more historical norms and so that really checks the box of getting CEO confidence up to transact more.Michelle Weaver: And I know that dynamic you’re talking about with market concentration created quite a big drag on large M&A deals and large-cap M& A. Do you think we could start to see that come back as well?Ryan Kenny: Yeah, expect large-cap deals to rebound even more than small-cap deals. When we started to see the activity pick up in 2024, it was led by more mid-cap corporates. And now we expect to see large deals return in force at a time when financial sponsors, like what Mike was just talking about, coming back in force at the same time -- which drives up the animal spirits when all parts of the M&A market are returning at the same time.Michelle Weaver: And what are some other catalysts beyond the political side that investors should watch in 2025 around capital markets developments?Ryan Kenny: So, I categorize it as macro catalysts and structural catalysts The macro catalysts are clarity on tariff and immigration policies, how that will impact GDP. Clarity on the interest rate path. And look you don't need more rate cuts to get this market moving; you can still have a significant increase, even if there are no more rate cuts this year.But narrowing the range of outcomes is important. And I think we're already there, where maybe we get no cuts this year. Maybe we get two cuts. It's a much tighter environment than where we were over the last few years. And so that helps narrow the bid-ask spread between buyers and sellers.Structural catalysts that are really critical this cycle are the need for AI capabilities. Innovation in tech, innovation in biotech healthcare, the energy transition, reshoring and exploring your geographic footprint in a multipolar world -- are all really critical when you evaluate the types of companies that a board would want to acquire.Michelle Weaver: What’s your outlook for 2025? And then even beyond that when it comes to both M&A and IPO activity?Ryan Kenny: So, in 2025, we see a strong rebound in both ECM and M&A. ECM volumes in our base case, we expect to roughly double off of a low base. M&A announcements, we expect up over 50 per cent year-over-year in 2025. And importantly, that's our base case. Even in our bear case, we model an increase in both ECM and M& A volumes, given we're coming off of such low levels.We've had three years of light activity and pent-up demand, and pipelines have already begun to build. When we look forward beyond 2025, we think this is the beginning of a multi-year capital markets growth cycle -- with bigger deal sizes and more deal count than average, driven by three years of pent-up demand and an economy that's a third larger than 2021, which was the last time we had a capital markets cycle.Michelle Weaver: And then Mike, what does this rebound in capital markets activity, including M&A and IPOs means specifically for retail investing?Michael Cyprys: Overall, a supportive macro backdrop with a rebound in capital markets activity, we think should be helpful in terms of bringing more investors into the markets, including retail investors. Whether it's from corporate actions and IPOs, it helps in terms of more stocks to trade; also helps in terms of revising animal spirits.I think that's all helpful in terms of supporting engagement across both single stock volumes and equity markets as well as options. So, all of that together, we were expecting greater investor engagement here in [20]25. And confidence as well can help boost not just trading volumes but also margin lending and securities lending. And so, all of that can be helpful as we think about our forecast for our retail brokerage coverage group.Michelle Weaver: Mike, Ryan, thank you for taking the time to talk. And to our listeners, thanks for listening. If you enjoyed the podcast, please share it with a friend or colleague today.

23 Tammi 10min

On his first day in office, President Trump issued a series of executive orders, signaling his intent to deliver on campaign promises. Our Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Strategy Michael Zezas takes a closer look at economic impacts of Trump’s proposed policy path.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Michael Zezas, Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Strategy. On this episode of the podcast, we’ll discuss how trade policy uncertainty is creating volatility in markets.It’s Wednesday, January 22nd, at 10am in New York.Earlier this week, Donald Trump was again inaugurated as President of the United States. In the days that have followed, we’ve fielded tons of questions from investors, who are trying to parse the meaning of myriad executive orders and answers to press questions – looking through that noise for signals about the if, when, and how of policy changes around tariffs, taxes, and more. This effort is understandable because – as we’ve discussed here many times – the US public policy path will have substantial effects on the outlook for the global economy and markets. And while we’ve spent some time here explaining our assumptions for the US policy path, it's important for investors to understand this. Even if you correctly forecast the timing and severity of changes to trade, tax, immigration, and other policies, you shouldn’t expect markets to consistently track this path along the way. That’s because there’s bound to be a fair amount of confusion among investors, as President Trump and his political allies publicly speculate on their policy tactics and make a wide variety of outcomes seem plausible. Take tariff policy for example. On Monday, the President announced an America First Trade Policy, where the whole of government was instructed to come up with policy solutions to reduce goods trade deficits and related economic and national security concerns. Tariffs were cited as a tool to be used in furtherance of these goals, and instructions were given to develop authorities on a range of regional and product-specific tariff options. Said more simply, while new tariffs were not immediately implemented, the President appears to be maximizing his optionality to levy tariffs when and how he wants. That will mean that all public comments about tariffs and deadlines, including Trump’s comments to reporters on tariffs for Mexico, Canada, and China, must be taken seriously – even if they don’t ultimately come to fruition, which currently we don’t think they will for Mexico and Canada. For markets, that max optionality can drive all sorts of short term outcomes. In the US Treasury market, for example, our economists believe these tariffs and a variety of other factors ultimately make for slower economic growth in 2026; and so we expect Treasury yields will ultimately end the year lower. But along the way they could certainly move higher first. As my colleague Matt Hornbach points out, tariff threats can drive investor concerns about temporary inflation leading markets to price in a slower pace of Fed interest rate cuts, which helps push short maturity yields higher. So bottom line: investors should be carefully considering US public policy choices when thinking about the medium term direction of markets. But they should also expect considerable volatility along the way, because the short term path can look a lot different from the ultimate destination. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

22 Tammi 3min

Our Chief Asia Economist Chetan Ahya discusses how tariffs, the power of the U.S. dollar, and the strength of domestic demand will determine Asia’s economic growth in 2025.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Asia Economist. Today on the podcast: three critical themes that will shape Asia’s economy in 2025. It’s Tuesday, January 21, at 2 PM in Hong Kong. Let's start with the big picture: We foresee Asia's growth decelerating from 4.5 per cent last year to 4.1 per cent in 2025. The whole region faces a number of challenges and opportunities that could sway these numbers significantly. We highlight [the] following three key factors. First up, tariffs. They are our single biggest concern this year. The pace, scale and affected geographies will determine the magnitude of the growth drag. In our base case, within Asia, we expect tariffs to be imposed on China in a phased manner from the first half of 2025. As Mike Zezas, our Head of US Public Policy states, this will be about fast announcements and slow implementation. Given tariffs and trade tensions are not new, we think this means corporate confidence may not be as badly affected as it was in 2018-19. But the key risk is if trade tensions escalate. For instance, into more aggressive bilateral disputes outside of US-China or if [the] US imposes universal tariffs on all imports. Asia will be most affected, considering that seven out of [the] top ten economies that run large trade surpluses with the US are in Asia. If either of these risk scenarios materialize, it could bring a repeat of [the] 2018-19 growth shock. Next, let's consider the Fed and the US dollar. Asian central banks find themselves in a bind with the US Federal Reserve's hawkish shift – which we think will result in only two rate cuts in 2025. The Fed is taking a cautious approach, driven by worries over inflation concerns, which could be exacerbated by changes in trade and fiscal policy. This has led to strength in the US dollar and on the flipside, weakness in Asian currencies. This constrains Asian central banks from making aggressive rate reductions -- even though Asia’s inflation is in a range that central banks are comfortable with. Finally, with [the] external environment not likely to be supportive, domestic demand within key Asian economies will be an important anchor to [the[ region's growth outlook. We are constructive on the outlook for India and Japan but cautious on China. China has a deflation challenge, driven by excessive investment and excess capacity. Solving it requires policy makers to rely more on consumption as a means to meet its 5 per cent growth target. While some measures have been implemented and we think more are coming, we remain skeptical that these measures will be enough for China to lift consumption growth meaningfully. We see investment remaining the key growth driver and the implementation of tariffs will only exacerbate the ongoing deflationary pressures. In India and Japan, we think domestic demand tailwinds will be able to offset external headwinds. We expect a robust recovery in India fueled by government capital expenditure, monetary easing and acceleration in services exports. This should put GDP growth back on a 6.5 per cent trajectory. In Japan we expect real wage and consumption growth reacceleration, which will lead [the] Bank of Japan to be confident in the inflation outlook such that it hikes policy rates twice in 2025. This week marks the start of the new Trump administration. And together with my colleagues, we are watching closely and will continue to bring you updates on the impact of new policies on Asia.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

21 Tammi 4min

Government bond yields in the U.S. and Europe have risen sharply. Our Head of Corporate Credit Research Andrew Sheets explains why this surprising trend is not yet cause for concern.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley.With bond yields rising substantially over the last month, I’m going to discuss why we’ve been somewhat more relaxed about this development and what could change our mind. It's Friday January 17th at 2pm in London. We thought credit would have a good first half of this year as growth held up, inflation came down, and the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England all cut rates. That mix looked appealing, even if corporate activity increased and the range of longer-term economic outcomes widened with a new U.S. administration. We forecast spreads across regions to stay near cycle tights through the first half of this year, before a modest softening in the second half. Since publishing that outlook in November of last year, some of it still feels very much intact. Growth – especially in the U.S. – has been good. Core inflation in the U.S. and in Europe has continued to moderate. And the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank did lower interest rates back in December. But the move in government bond yields in the U.S. and Europe has been a surprise. They've risen sharply, meaning higher borrowing cost for governments, mortgages and companies. How much does our story change if yields are going to be higher for longer, and if the Fed is going to reduce interest rates less? One way to address this debate, which we’re mindful is currently dominating financial market headlines, is what world do these new bond yields describe? Focusing on the U.S., we see the following pattern. There’s been strong U.S. data, with Morgan Stanley tracking the U.S. economy to have grown to about 2.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of last year. Rates are rising, and they are rising faster than the expected inflation – a development that usually suggests more optimism on growth. We’re seeing a larger rise in long-term interest rates relative to shorter-term interest rates, which often suggests more confidence that the economy will stay stronger for longer. And we’ve seen expectations of fewer cuts from the Federal Reserve; but, and importantly, still expectations that they are more likely to cut rather than hike rates over the next 12 months. Putting all of that together, we think it’s a pattern consistent with a bond market that thinks the U.S. economy is strong and will remain somewhat stronger for longer, with that strength justifying less Fed help. That interpretation could be wrong, of course; but if it's right, it seems – in our view – fine for credit. What about the affordability of borrowing for companies at higher yields? Again, we’re somewhat more sanguine. While yields have risen a lot recently, they are still similar to their 24 month average, which has given corporate bond issuers a lot of time to adjust. And U.S. and European companies are also carrying historically high amounts of cash on their balance sheet, improving their resilience. Finally, we think that higher yields could actually improve the supply-demand balance in corporate bond markets, as the roughly 5.5 per cent yield today on U.S. Investment Grade credit attracts buyers, while simultaneously making bond issuers a little bit more hesitant to borrow any more than they have to. We now prefer the longer-term part of the Investment Grade market, which we think could benefit most from these dynamics. If interest rates are going to stay higher for longer, it isn’t a great story for everyone. We think some of the lowest-rated parts of the credit market, for example, CCC-rated issuers, are more vulnerable; and my colleagues in the U.S. continue to hold a cautious view on that segment from their year-ahead outlook. But overall, for corporate credit, we think that higher yields are manageable; and some relief this week on the back of better U.S. inflation data is a further support. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

17 Tammi 4min

The Federal Reserve’s shrinking balance sheet could have far-reaching implications for the banking sector, money markets and monetary policy. Global Head of Macro Strategy Matthew Hornbach and Martin Tobias from the U.S. Interest Rate Strategy Team discuss. ----- Transcript -----Matthew Hornbach: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Matthew Hornbach, Global Head of Macro Strategy.Martin Tobias: And I'm Martin Tobias from the U.S. Interest Rate Strategy Team.Matthew Hornbach: Today, we're going to talk about the widespread concerns around the dip in reserve levels at the Fed and what it means for banking, money markets, and beyond.It's Thursday, January 16th at 10am in New York.The Fed has been shrinking its balance sheet since June 2022, when it embarked on quantitative tightening in order to combat inflation. Reserves held at the Fed recently dipped below [$]3 trillion at year end, their lowest level since 2020. This has raised a lot of questions among investors, and we want to address some of them.Marty, you've been following these developments closely, so let's start with the basics. What are Fed reserves and why are they important?Martin Tobias: Reserves are one of the key line items on the liability side of the Fed balance sheet. Like any balance sheet, even your household budget, you have liabilities, which are debts and financial obligations, and you have assets. For the Fed, its assets primarily consist of U.S. Treasury notes and bonds, and then you have liabilities like U.S. currency in circulation and bank reserves held at the Fed.These reserves consist of electronic deposits that commercial banks, savings and loan institutions, and credit unions hold at Federal Reserve banks. And these depository institutions earn interest from the Fed on these reserve balances.There are other Fed balance sheet liabilities like the Treasury General Account and the Overnight Reversed Repo Facility. But, to save us from some complexity, I won't go into those right now. Bottom line, these three liabilities are inversely linked to one another, and thus cannot be viewed in isolation.Having said that, the reason this is important is because central bank reserves are the most liquid and ultimate form of money. They underpin nearly all other forms of money, such as the deposits individuals or businesses hold at commercial banks. In simplest terms, those reserves are a sort of security blanket.Matthew Hornbach: Okay, so what led to this most recent dip in reserves?Martin Tobias: Well, that's the good news. We think the recent dip in reserves below [$] 3 trillion was simply related to temporary dynamics in funding markets at the end of the year, as opposed to a permanent drain of cash from the banking system.Matthew Hornbach: This kind of reduction in reserves has far reaching implications on several different levels. The banking sector, money markets, and monetary policy. So, let's take them one at a time. How does it affect the banking sector?Martin Tobias: So individual banks maintain different levels of reserves to fit their specific business models; while differences in reserve management also appear across large compared to small banks. As macro strategists, we monitor reserve balances in the aggregate and have identified a few different regimes based on the supply of liquidity.While reserves did fall below [$]3 trillion at the end of the year, we note the Fed Standing Repo Facility, which is an instrument that offers on demand access to liquidity for banks at a fixed cost, did not receive any usage. We interpret this to mean, even though reserves temporarily dipped below [$]3 trillion, it is a level that is still above scarcity in the aggregate.Matthew Hornbach: How about potential stability and liquidity of money markets?Martin Tobias: Occasional signs of volatility in money market rates over the past year have been clear signs that liquidity is transitioning from a super abundancy closer to an ample amount. The fact that there has become more volatility in money market rates – but being limited to identifiable dates – is really indicative of normal market functioning where liquidity is being redistributed from those who have it in excess to those in need of it.Year- end was just the latest example of there being some more volatility in money market rates. But as has been the case over the past year, these temporary upward pressures quickly normalized as liquidity in funding markets still remains abundant. In fact, reserves rose by [$] 440 billion to [$] 3.3 trillion in the week ended January 8th.Matthew Hornbach: Would this reduction in reserves that occurred over the end of the year influence the Fed's future monetary policy decisions?Martin Tobias: Right. As you alluded to earlier, the Fed has been passively reducing the size of its balance sheet to complement its actions with its primary monetary policy tool, the Fed Funds Rate. And I think our listeners are all familiar with the Fed Funds Rate because in simplest terms it's the rate that banks charge each other when lending money overnight, and that in turn influences the interest you pay on your loans and credit cards. Now the goal of the Fed's quantitative tightening program is to bring the balance sheet to the smallest size consistent with efficient money market functioning.So, we think the Fed is closely watching when declines in reserves occur and the sensitivity of changes in money market rates to those declines. Our house baseline view remains at quantitative tightening ends late in the first quarter of 2025.Matthew Hornbach: So, bottom line, for people who invest in money market funds, what's the takeaway?Martin Tobias: The bottom line is money markets continue to operate normally, and even though the Fed has lowered its policy rates, the yields on money markets do remain attractive for many types of retail and institutional investors.Matthew Hornbach: Well, Marty, thanks for taking the time to talk.Martin Tobias: Great speaking with you, Matt.Matthew Hornbach: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, [00:06:00] please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

16 Tammi 6min

Our Global Head of Fixed Income & Public Policy Research Michael Zezas discusses how Morgan Stanley’s key themes – deglobalization, longevity, the future of energy, and artificial intelligence – will evolve in 2025 and beyond.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley’s Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research. Today I’ll discuss the key investment megatrends Morgan Stanley Research will be following closely in 2025. It’s Wednesday, January 15th, at 10am in New York. Short-term trends can offer investors valuable insights into immediate market dynamics. But it’s the long-term trends that truly shape the investment landscape. That’s why each year, Morgan Stanley Research identifies a short list of megatrends that we believe will provide long-term investment opportunities in an ever-changing world. Three of Morgan Stanley’s megatrends—artificial intelligence, longevity, and the future of energy—carry over from last year. A fourth—the rewiring of the global economy—returns to our list after a hiatus in 2024. While none of these megatrends is new, each has evolved in terms of how it applies to investment strategies. Let’s start with the rewiring of global commerce for a Multipolar World. As I mentioned, this theme rejoins our list of key megatrends after a year-long break. Why? In short, it’s clear that policymakers globally are poised to implement policies that will speed up the breakdown of the post-Cold War globalization trend. Simply put, policymakers are keen to promote their visions of national and economic security through less open commerce and more local control of supply chains and key technologies. Multinationals and sovereigns may have to accelerate their adaptation to this reality. Some will face tougher choices than others, while there are some who may still benefit from facilitating this transition. Knowing who fits into which category—and how this new reality may play out—will be critical for investors. Our next theme—Longevity—remains an essential long-term secular trend, and this year the focus will be on measurable impacts for governments, economies, and corporates. The ripple effects of an aging population, the drive for healthy longevity, and challenging demographics across many geographies continue to impact markets. And in 2025, we see investors focusing on several specific longevity debates: First, innovation across healthcare – especially in an AI world, with obesity medications remaining front and center. Second, impacts on consumer behavior – including the drive for affordable nutrition. Third, the need to reskill aging workforces – especially if retirement ages move higher. And, finally, there’s implications for financial planning and retirement – with a bull market for financial advice just starting. Our next theme centers around energy. When we think about the future of energy, our focus for 2025 shifts from decarbonization to the wide range of factors driving the supply, demand, and delivery of energy across geographies. And the common thread here is the potential for rapid evolution. We’ll be tracking four key dynamics: First, an increasing focus on energy security. Second, the massive growth in energy demand driven by trillions of dollars of AI infrastructure spend, to be met both by fossil fuel-powered plants and renewables. Third, innovative energy technologies such as carbon capture, energy storage, nuclear power, and power grid optimization. And fourth, increased electrification across many industries. We continue to believe that carbon emissions will likely exceed the targets in various nations’ climate pledges. So, we expect focus to shift toward climate adaptation and resilience technologies and business models. Our last key theme is artificial intelligence and tech diffusion. Although it’s been two years since the launch of ChatGPT, we’re still in the early innings of AI's diffusion across sectors and geographies. However, while 2024 was driven by AI enablers and infrastructure companies, in 2025 we expect the market to focus on early AI downstream use cases that drive efficiency and market share. As you heard yesterday, our Global Head of Thematic Research Ed Stanley, explained that there’s alpha in understanding this rate of change. Agentic AI will be center stage, with robust enterprise adoption, stock outperformance for early adopters, positive surprises in model capabilities, greater breadth of monetization, and thus less attention to return-on-investment debates. Before I close, it’s worth mentioning that you will likely see connections between these complex themes. As an example, the complexity of a multipolar world makes energy security all the more vital. The demand for energy connects with the enormous power requirements of AI. And AI is set to drive healthcare innovations which could help us lead longer healthier lives. We see these four themes not as static categories but as an interconnected roadmap for investing over the long-term – and we’ll be sharing more on specific debates throughout the year. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

15 Tammi 5min