Europe in the Global AI Race

Given the recent developments in developed markets banking sectors, can Asia’s economic growth continue to outperform?----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley's Chief Asia Economist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be discussing why Asia remains better placed despite recent global financial developments. It's Wednesday, April 12, at 9 a.m in Hong Kong. With the recent issues in the Developed Markets banking sector, investors are asking if Asia could face similar funding challenges and if Asia will still be able to outperform on growth. On the funding challenge, a key point to keep in mind is that interest rates have not risen as much in Asia compared to the U.S.. Asia's inflation was more cost-push driven, i.e commodity prices driven, and has already started to decelerate, and so central banks did not have to hike rates as much as the Fed. For instance, on July 21, policy rates rose by 4.75% in the U.S., but in Asia, it has risen only by one percentage point on an average. In a similar vein, prior to recent developments, 10 year bond yields rose by 2.8 percentage points in the U.S., but have only risen by just 0.9% in Asia. Another important distinguishing factor has to do with the setup of the banking sector. In Asia, liquidity coverage ratios are well above 100%, loans tend to be more floating rather than fixed, and deposit franchises are more diversified. Turning to the second question on whether Asia can still outperform. We think that recent developments will pose downside risks to both developed markets and Asia's growth but on net, Asia will still be able to outperform. In the case of a meaningful slowdown or a mild technical recession in the U.S., there will be three mitigating factors for Asia's growth outlook. First, the impact from weaker trade would be partially offset by easier financial conditions from lower market pricing of Fed's path, as well as lower commodity prices, leading to an improvement in Asia's terms of trade. The more stable macroeconomic backdrop in Asia means central banks in the region do have more room to ease monetary policy. In our base case, we expect rate cuts starting from the first quarter of 2024, but if downside risks emerge, these rate cuts could come into play sooner than we anticipate. Second, we expect China's GDP to recover to 5.7% in 2023. Reopening is lifting economic activity in China and also helping to generate positive spillovers for the rest of the region. Third, the three of the other large economies in Asia, Japan, India and Indonesia all have economy specific factors driving domestic demand. Japan's accommodative macro policies should keep private sector demand supported. For India, balance sheets for the financial and non-financial private sector have been cleaned up over the years. The private sector is thus pricing with a healthy risk appetite for expansion. In Indonesia, macro stability risks have been well managed, hence, rates have not had to rise as much in other emerging markets, and domestic demand has therefore remained robust. However, we do think that the risks are skewed to the downside. In a hard landing scenario, which we would characterize as U.S. full year GDP contracting by 1% or more, Asia may not be able to escape the downdraft and could recouple on the downside, at least during the worst point of the shock. But once we see a stabilization of global financial conditions with policy response, we believe Asia will be able to recover faster than the U.S. and Europe and resume its growth outperformance. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.

12 Huhti 20233min

Banks and the Fed are winding down activity in the mortgage market amid recent funding challenges, signaling a potential new regime for the asset class. Co-Heads of Securitized Products Research Jim Egan and Jay Bacow discuss.----- Transcript -----Jim Egan: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Jim Egan, Co-Head of U.S. Securitized Products Research here at Morgan Stanley. Jay Bacow: And I'm Jay Bacow, the other Co-Head of U.S. Securitized Products Research. Jim Egan: And on this episode of the podcast, we'll be discussing mortgage markets. It's Tuesday, April 11th, at 11 a.m. in New York. Jim Egan: Now, Jay, there has been lots of news recently about bank funding challenges, and the FDIC put both Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in receivership. They just announced last week that $114 billion of their securities will be sold, over time, with those securities being primarily agency MBS. Now, that sounds like a pretty big number, can you tell us what the impact of this is? Jay Bacow: Sure. So, I think it's important first to realize that the agency mortgage market is the second most liquid fixed income market in the world after treasuries, and so the market is pretty easily able to quickly reprice to digest this news. And as a reminder, agency mortgages don't have credit risk, given the agency guarantee. Now, that $114 billion is a big number and about $100 billion of them are mortgages, and putting that $100 billion in context, we're only expecting about $150 billion of net issuance this year. So this is two thirds of the net supply of the market is going to come just from these portfolio liquidations. That's a lot, and that's before we even get into the composition of what they own. Jim Egan: Isn't a mortgage a mortgage? What do you mean by the composition of what they own? Jay Bacow: Well, yes, a mortgage is a mortgage, but what banks can do is that they can structure the mortgages to better fit the profile of what they want. And based on publicly disclosed data of when they bought, we assume that most of those mortgages right now have very low fixed coupons—in the context of 2%, well below the current prevailing rate for investors. Furthermore, about a third of the mortgages that the FDIC holds in receivership are these structured mortgages, they're still guaranteed, there's no credit risk, but these would be out of index investments for most money managers. Jim Egan: Well, can't banks buy them, though? Like, aren't these pretty typical bank bonds, two banks owned them in the first place? And if the bonds worked for a bank that time, why don't they work for a different bank now? Jay Bacow: So, part of what made them work for those banks is that they bought them around “par,” and given the low coupons that they have now, they're no longer at par. And for accounting reasons that we probably don’t need to get into right now, banks typically don't like to buy bonds that are far away from par. Furthermore, the recent events have made banks likely to need to revisit a lot of the assumptions that they're making on the asset and liability side. In particular, they probably going to want to revisit the duration of their deposits, which is going to bias them towards owning shorter securities. The regulators are probably also going to want to revisit a lot of assumptions as well. And we think what's likely to happen is that they're going to make a lot of the smaller banks have the mark-to-market losses on their available for sale securities flow through to regulatory capital, which in conjunction with some of the other changes probably means banks are going to further bias their security purchases shorter in duration and lowering capital charges. Jim Egan: Okay. So, if the banks aren't going to be active and the Fed is already winding down their portfolio, who's really left to buy? Jay Bacow: Basically, money managers and overseas. And while spreads have widened out some, we think they're biased a little wider from here. Effectively, this is going to be the first year since 2009 that neither domestic banks or the Fed were net buying mortgages. And when you take away the two largest buyers of mortgages, that is a problem for the asset class. And so we think we're in a new regime for mortgages and a new regime for bank demand. Jim Egan: Jay, thank you for that clear explanation, and it's always great talking to you. Jay Bacow: Great talking to you, too, Jim. Jim Egan: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review on the Apple Podcasts app and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

11 Huhti 20234min

China’s growth is expected to be strong this year. However, it is being driven by services more than goods, meaning the news for other economies may not be as good as it initially appears. ----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Diego Anzoategui from the Global Economics Team. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the global impact of China's reopening. It's Monday, April 10th, at 3 p.m. in New York. At the end of 2022, China scrapped all COVID zero policies and laid out a growth focused policy agenda for 2023. By mid-January, around 80% of the population had had COVID, but infections are now much lower, mobility is improving, and China's economy seems to be taking off. We estimate China's growth will reach 5.7% in 2023, primarily driven by a rebound in private consumption. This is the first time in four years that COVID, regulatory and economic policy are all pushing in the same direction. Since the Chinese Party Congress in October 2022, the administration has swung to a pro-business stance, and we expect fiscal and monetary support to continue. Furthermore, China's big tech regulation has entered an institutionalized and stable stage, and we don't expect new, aggressive measures any longer. Although China's growth is expected to be strong in 2023, it is off a low base and it will take time for private sentiment to come back. So we expect fiscal easing to continue at least through the first half of 2023. As for monetary policy, the People's Bank of China may continue to provide targeted support towards economic recovery while private demand gets on a surer footing. As growth becomes more self-sustaining in the second half of 2023, cyclical policy could start to normalize, but not turn to outright tightening. Against this macro backdrop, we believe that services such as tourism, transportation and food services will drive the recovery. During the pandemic, mobility restrictions and social distancing policies caused a much more serious drag on services compared to good producers- and China is no exception to this pattern. But the services versus goods distinction is also key for assessing the global implications of China's reopening. Investors often ask to what extent China's reopening will translate into higher economic growth elsewhere. Historically, the China economic acceleration typically acts as a demand shock to the global economy. China's higher aggregate demand means higher exports to China from the rest of the world and greater economic activity globally. And more global growth coming from a demand push usually contributes to higher commodity prices, a weaker dollar and potential higher risk appetite leading to lower interest rates in emerging markets. This, of course, is good news, especially for EM. But the devil is in the details, and China's recovery being primarily driven by services is a key factor. One perhaps underappreciated by the market. It's important to keep in mind that services are less tradable and therefore less relevant to international trade. If China's acceleration were to be goods driven, Asia and LatAm commodity exporters would be clear beneficiaries, particularly economies like Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. But the situation is different when services lead the way, and the relative advantage of manufacture-intensive Asian economies is less obvious in this case. Ultimately, our work suggests a more services driven rebound in China would be less relevant for the global economy. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

10 Huhti 20233min

While banking conditions seem to have stabilized for now, tighter credit conditions could still hit U.S. economic growth.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ellen Zentner, Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll discuss how recent developments in the banking sector could impact the U.S. economy. It's Thursday, April 6, at 10 a.m. in New York. Events over the past several weeks have led to disruptions in the financial system that we believe will leave a mark on the real economy. Our banking analysts here at Morgan Stanley Research see permanently higher funding costs for banks going forward, and that will likely lead to tighter credit conditions beyond what was already embedded in our previous baseline for the economy. At its March meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee explicitly added a reference to tightening credit conditions and the effects on growth and inflation. But in the press conference, Chair Powell also highlighted wide uncertainty around the magnitude of tightening. The lack of visibility into the extent and persistence of current bank funding pressures, as well as the banking systems response, are contributing to this uncertainty. Our banking analysts believe that higher operating costs should drive tougher standards for new loans and higher loan spreads. These drivers set the stage for an even sharper deceleration in credit growth over the course of this year. Put simply, when it's more difficult or expensive for businesses and consumers to borrow money, it creates challenges for economic growth. While our baseline forecast for the U.S. economy already included a meaningful slowdown in loan growth over the coming months, further tightening in lending standards and greater pullback in bank lending will weigh further on GDP. That said, our modeling shows the effects are likely to take some time to build, with a meaningful slowing starting in the third quarter of this year and the largest impact occurring across the fourth quarter of 2023, and the first quarter of 2024. We think the impact of tighter credit on consumption and business investment is roughly equal, though we expect that the effects on business investment will likely peak in the fourth quarter of this year, one quarter ahead of consumption. On the back of this analysis, we've lowered our forecast for U.S. GDP growth this year and now look for 0.3% growth on a Q4 over Q4 basis. That's 1/10 lower than where we had it prior to the emergence of these new bank funding pressures. For next year we took our GDP forecast down by 2/10 to just 1%. Again, because it takes time for the cumulative impacts to build, we see the largest impacts as we're moving into 2024. So to sum up, the risk to the U.S. economic growth outlook and the labor market are large and two sided. A quicker resolution of financial system troubles could help keep the economy on solid footing, in line with recent monthly payroll data, which has been resilient. On the other hand, more volatile financial conditions from here could see a larger and more rapid deterioration in growth and the labor market. For now, banking conditions seem to have stabilized, which has given investors a bit of relief. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

6 Huhti 20233min

With the deadline to raise the debt ceiling looming closer, will recent banking challenges reduce Congress's willingness to take risks with the economy?----- Transcript -----Welcome to the Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Global Head of Fixed Income research for Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, I'll be talking about the debt ceiling and financial markets. It's Wednesday, April 5th at 9 a.m. in New York. Markets have focused in recent weeks on key long term debates, such as sizing up the long term effects of Fed policy and bank liquidity challenges. But investors should be aware that there may be at least a temporary interruption for focus on the debt ceiling in the coming weeks. That's because tax receipts will soon start rolling in, which should give the government and markets a clearer assessment of the timing of the x-date, that's the date after which the Treasury no longer has cash on hand to pay all its bills as they come due. Said differently, it's the date that investors would focus on as a potential deadline for raising the debt ceiling in order to avoid a government bond default, or a messy workaround to such a default that could rattle markets. Some clients have suggested to us that there should be less concern about Congress raising the debt ceiling in a timely manner ahead of that x-date, the reason being that recent banking challenges and resulting economic fears may have reduced Congress's willingness to take risks with the economy. We disagree, and still expect Congress will at least take this negotiation down to the wire, perhaps even going past the x-date, which, to be clear, wouldn't necessarily cause a default, but it would up the risk meaningfully. So what's the basis for our argument? First, remember, Republicans have a very slim majority in the House, meaning only a handful of objectors to any legislation could potentially create gridlock. There was already public reticence by Republicans about raising the debt ceiling unless paired with spending cuts, something Democrats have not been interested in. That position appears unchanged, despite recent bank issues, with some Republicans linking government spending to banking sector challenges, drawing a line from spending to the increase in interest rates that drove mark-to-market losses in bank portfolios. And second, some lawmakers have publicly speculated that the Fed and Treasury's reassurances that the U.S will not default suggest that they would step in in any emergency. This dynamic of a perceived safety net could incentivize Congress to debate the debt ceiling for an uncomfortably long amount of time for markets. Where would such stress first show up? We’d watch the T-bills market, where recent history suggests that the shortest maturity Treasuries would come under above normal selling pressures as investors try to steer clear of maturities closest to the x-date. We'll of course be tracking this, and the broader debt ceiling dynamic carefully and keep you updated. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague, or leave us a review on Apple Podcasts. It helps more people find the show.

5 Huhti 20232min

As the economic growth spread between Asia and the rest of the world widens, China’s reopening is unlikely to spur growth that spills over globally.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the outlook for global economic growth. It's Tuesday, April 4th at 10 a.m. in New York. How is the outlook evolving after one quarter of 2023? The key trends in our year ahead outlook remain, but they're changing. The spread between Asian growth and the rest of the world is actually a bit wider now. And within developed market economies, downgrades to the U.S. forecast largely on the back of banking sector developments and upgrades to the euro area, largely on the back of stronger incoming data, now have Europe growing faster than the U.S. in 2023. In China, the data continue to reinforce our bullish call for about 5.7% GDP growth this year, and if anything, there are risks to the upside, despite the official growth target from Beijing coming in at about 5%. Had it not been for the banking sector dominating the market narrative, I suspect that China reopening would still be the most important story. But China's recovery has always had a critical caveat to it. We've always said that the rebound would be much more domestically focused than in the past and more weighted towards services than industry in the past. We don't think you can apply historical betas, that is the spillover from Chinese growth to the rest of the world, the way you could in the past. I want to highlight a recent piece that quantifies how China's global spillovers are different this time. Two main points deserve attention. First, the industrial economy never contracted as much as the services economy in China did, and that means that the rebound will be much bigger in services than it could be in the industrial economy. And second, we do try to estimate those betas, as they're called for the spillover from China to the global economy, excluding China. And what we conclude is that the effect is smaller the more important the services economy in China is for growth. Put differently, the three percentage point acceleration from last year to this year will not carry the same punch for the rest of the world that a three percentage point acceleration would have done years ago. The modest upgrade we've made to the euro area growth is not as a result supported by the China reopening, but instead is coming from stronger incoming data that we think reflect lower energy prices and more sustained fiscal impetus. The modestly stronger outlook, though, doesn't change the fact that the distribution of likely outcomes over the next year, it's skewed to the downside. Seven months from now Europe will be starting the beginning of another winter and with it the risk of exhausting gas inventories, and with core inflation in the euro area not yet at its peak, stronger real growth is simply a reason for more hiking from the ECB. In contrast, we have nudged down our already soft forecast for the U.S. for 2023. Funding costs for banks are higher, the willingness to lend is almost surely lower than before, but that restriction in loan supply is coming at a time where we are already expecting material slowing in the U.S. economy and therefore falling demand for credit. So the net effect is negative, but banks willingness to lend matters a lot less if there are fewer borrowers around. So where does this all leave us? The EM versus DM theme we have been highlighting continues and if anything it's a bit stronger. The China reopening story remains solid and the U.S. is softening. Within DM the stronger growth within Europe compared to the U.S. is notable both for its own sake, but also because it will mean that the ECB hiking will look closer to the Fed's hiking than we had thought just three months ago. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy this show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share thoughts on the market with a friend or colleague today.

4 Huhti 20233min

Recent increases in the Fed’s balance sheet may not have the same impact on money supply, growth and equities as in previous cycles.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Chief Investment Officer and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist for Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, I'll be talking about the latest trends in the financial marketplace. It's Monday, April 3rd at 11:30 a.m. in New York. So let's get after it. Over the past month, market participants have been focused on how the government will deal with the stress in the banking system and whether the economy can withstand this latest shock. After a rough couple of weeks, especially for regional banks, the major indices appear to be shrugging off these risks. Many are interpreting the sharp increase in bank reserves as another form of quantitative easing and are exhibiting the Pavlovian response that such programs are always good for equity prices. As we discussed in prior podcasts, we do not think that's the right interpretation of this latest increase in the Fed's balance sheet. In our view, all bank reserves are not created equal. True money supply as a function of reserves and the velocity of money which is difficult to measure in real time. As a comparison, inflation did not appear after the first wave of quantitative easing used during the great financial crisis because the velocity of money simultaneously collapsed. This was despite the fact that the percentage increase in the Fed's balance sheet dwarfed what we experienced during COVID. The primary difference was that the increase in reserves during the great financial crisis was simply filling holes left on bank balance sheets from the housing crisis. Therefore, the increase in reserves did not lead to a material increase in true money supply in the real economy. In contrast, during COVID, the increase in reserves are pushed directly into the economy via stimulus checks, PPP loans and other programs to keep the economy from shutting down. However, these fiscal programs were overdone and the result was money supply moved sharply higher because the velocity of money remained stable and even increased slightly. During this latest increase in Fed balance sheet reserves, the total liabilities in the US banking system have continued to fall. This suggests to us that the velocity of money is falling quite rapidly, more than offsetting the increase in bank reserves. In fact, these bank liabilities are falling at a rate of 7% year-over-year, the biggest decline in more than 60 years. Even during the Great Financial Crisis, money supply growth never went into negative territory. The kind of contraction we are witnessing today suggests this is not anything like the QE programs experienced during COVID or the 2009 to 2013 period. Secondarily, it also means that both economic and earnings growth are likely to remain under pressure until money supply growth reverses. This leads me to the second part of this podcast. Year to date, major U.S. stock indices have performed well, led by technology heavy NASDAQ. This is partially due to the snap back from such poor performance last year, led by the NASDAQ. But it's also the view that unlevered, high quality growth stocks are immune from the potential oncoming credit crunch. It's important to note that the rally to date in U.S. stocks has been very narrow, with just eight stocks accounting for 80% of the entire returns in the NASDAQ 100. Meanwhile, only ten stocks have accounted for 95% of the entire returns in the S&P 500, with all ten of those stocks being technology-related businesses. Such an erroneous performance is known as bad breadth, and it typically doesn't bode well for future prices. The counterargument is that technology already went through its own recession last year and it's taken its medicine now with respect to cost reductions and layoffs. Therefore, these stocks can continue to recover and carry the overall market, given their size. We would caution on such conclusions, given the increased risk of a credit crunch that suggests the risk of a broader economic recession is far from extinguished. Recessions are bad for technology companies, which are generally pro cyclical businesses. Instead, we continue to prefer more defensive sectors like consumer staples and health care.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us on the Apple Podcast app. It helps more people to find the show.

3 Huhti 20233min

Given recent signs of slowing in a previously strong economy, investors may want to look to history before wishing for weaker growth.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Chief Cross-Assets Strategist for Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, I'll be talking about trends across the Global Investment landscape and how we put those ideas together. It's Friday, March 31st at 2 p.m. in London. Here at Morgan Stanley Research, we are cautious on global equities relative to high grade bonds. So what would change our mind? We think the bull case for markets is better than expected growth, even if that means higher interest rates. On the other hand, investors should be careful about wishing for weaker growth, even if that would mean easier policy. Central to our thinking is the observation that a sharp slowing of a previously strong economy has repeatedly been poor for stocks relative to high grade bonds. And we think signs of such an environment of a hot economy that's slowing abound. Inverted yield curves, falling earnings expectations, high inflation, tight labor markets, weak commodity prices and tightening bank lending standards are all consistent with a strong economy that's slowing and are all present to an unusual degree. Historically, the-more of these factors one has seen, the worst the forward looking environment for stocks versus bonds. In short, much of our caution is driven by concerns around the growth outlook and its deceleration. So if growth is better than we expect, we think that's a positive surprise. But wouldn't better growth mean higher interest rates, which were bad for markets last year? Shouldn't investors be wishing for weaker growth that would bring back lower rates and policy easing? First, we would view 2022 as something of an outlier, the first time in 150 years that both U.S. stocks and long-term bonds fell by more than 10%. Today, the starting point for valuations in both equities and fixed income is better, leaving more room to absorb the impact of higher rates. Second, the way that stocks and bonds are moving relative to each other is shifting and different from last year. Throughout 2022, stocks generally fell if yields rose, implying higher rates were a concern. But over the last 60 days, stocks have generally fallen with lower yields. That pattern is more consistent with growth being the dominant concern of equity markets. But wouldn't weaker growth help if it meant central banks start to cut interest rates? Here, we think the historical evidence is less supportive than appreciated. In 1989, 2001, 2007, and 2022, the Federal Reserve eased policy as growth weakened. All saw stocks underperform bonds, consistent with our current recommendations. In addition, the amount of easing already expected by markets matters. U.S. markets are already expecting the Fed to cut rates by about 1.7% over the next two years. Such large easing doesn't match times when relatively smaller levels of rate cuts did boost markets like in ‘95, ‘97, ‘99 or 2019. In short, we think the bull case through markets lies through growth that's better than our economists expect. Hoping for weaker growth and lower interest rates that might go along with it has a more volatile track record. Be careful what you wish for. Thanks for listening. Subscribe to Thoughts on the Market on Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen, and leave us a review. We'd love to hear from you.

31 Maalis 20233min