Who’s Disrupting — and Funding — the AI Boom

Who’s Disrupting — and Funding — the AI Boom

Live from Morgan Stanley’s European Tech, Media and Telecom Conference in Barcelona, our roundtable of analysts discusses tech disruptions and datacenter growth, and how Europe factors in.

Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.


----- Transcript -----


Paul Walsh: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Paul Walsh, Morgan Stanley's European Head of Research Product.

Today we return to my conversation with Adam Wood. Head of European Technology and Payments, Emmet Kelly, Head of European Telco and Data Centers, and Lee Simpson, Head of European Technology.

We were live on stage at Morgan Stanley's 25th TMT Europe conference. We had so much to discuss around the themes of AI enablers, semiconductors, and telcos. So, we are back with a concluding episode on tech disruption and data center investments.

It's Thursday the 13th of November at 8am in Barcelona.

After speaking with the panel about the U.S. being overweight AI enablers, and the pockets of opportunity in Europe, I wanted to ask them about AI disruption, which has been a key theme here in Europe. I started by asking Adam how he was thinking about this theme.

Adam Wood: It’s fascinating to see this year how we've gone in most of those sectors to how positive can GenAI be for these companies? How well are they going to monetize the opportunities? How much are they going to take advantage internally to take their own margins up? To flipping in the second half of the year, mainly to, how disruptive are they going to be? And how on earth are they going to fend off these challenges?

Paul Walsh: And I think that speaks to the extent to which, as a theme, this has really, you know, built momentum.

Adam Wood: Absolutely. And I mean, look, I think the first point, you know, that you made is absolutely correct – that it's very difficult to disprove this. It's going to take time for that to happen. It's impossible to do in the short term. I think the other issue is that what we've seen is – if we look at the revenues of some of the companies, you know, and huge investments going in there.

And investors can clearly see the benefit of GenAI. And so investors are right to ask the question, well, where's the revenue for these businesses?

You know, where are we seeing it in info services or in IT services, or in enterprise software. And the reality is today, you know, we're not seeing it. And it's hard for analysts to point to evidence that – well, no, here's the revenue base, here's the benefit that's coming through. And so, investors naturally flip to, well, if there's no benefit, then surely, we should focus on the risk.

So, I think we totally understand, you know, why people are focused on the negative side of things today. I think there are differences between the sub-sectors. I mean, I think if we look, you know, at IT services, first of all, from an investor point of view, I think that's been pretty well placed in the losers’ buckets and people are most concerned about that sub-sector…

Paul Walsh: Something you and the global team have written a lot about.

Adam Wood: Yeah, we've written about, you know, the risk of disruption in that space, the need for those companies to invest, and then the challenges they face. But I mean, if we just keep it very, very simplistic. If Gen AI is a technology that, you know, displaces labor to any extent – companies that have played labor arbitrage and provide labor for the last 20 - 25 years, you know, they're going to have to make changes to their business model.

So, I think that's understandable. And they're going to have to demonstrate how they can change and invest and produce a business model that addresses those concerns. I'd probably put info services in the middle. But the challenge in that space is you have real identifiable companies that have emerged, that have a revenue base and that are challenging a subset of the products of those businesses. So again, it's perfectly understandable that investors would worry. In that context, it's not a potential threat on the horizon. It's a real threat that exists today against certainly their businesses.

I think software is probably the most interesting. I'd put it in the kind of final bucket where I actually believe… Well, I think first of all, we certainly wouldn't take the view that there's no risk of disruption and things aren't going to change. Clearly that is going to be the case.

I think what we'd want to do though is we'd want to continue to use frameworks that we've used historically to think about how software companies differentiate themselves, what the barriers to entry are. We don't think we need to throw all of those things away just because we have GenAI, this new set of capabilities. And I think investors will come back most easily to that space.

Paul Walsh: Emett, you talked a little bit there before about the fact that you haven't seen a huge amount of progress or additional insight from the telco space around AI; how AI is diffusing across the space. Do you get any discussions around disruption as it relates to telco space?

Emmet Kelly: Very, very little. I think the biggest threat that telcos do see is – it is from the hyperscalers. So, if I look at and separate the B2C market out from the B2B, the telcos are still extremely dominant in the B2C space, clearly. But on the B2B space, the hyperscalers have come in on the cloud side, and if you look at their market share, they're very, very dominant in cloud – certainly from a wholesale perspective.

So, if you look at the cloud market shares of the big three hyperscalers in Europe, this number is courtesy of my colleague George Webb. He said it's roughly 85 percent; that's how much they have of the cloud space today. The telcos, what they're doing is they're actually reselling the hyperscale service under the telco brand name.

But we don't see much really in terms of the pure kind of AI disruption, but there are concerns definitely within the telco space that the hyperscalers might try and move from the B2B space into the B2C space at some stage. And whether it's through virtual networks, cloudified networks, to try and get into the B2C space that way.

Paul Walsh: Understood. And Lee maybe less about disruption, but certainly adoption, some insights from your side around adoption across the tech hardware space?

Lee Simpson: Sure. I think, you know, it's always seen that are enabling the AI move, but, but there is adoption inside semis companies as well, and I think I'd point to design flow. So, if you look at the design guys, they're embracing the agentic system thing really quickly and they're putting forward this capability of an agent engineer, so like a digital engineer. And it – I guess we've got to get this right. It is going to enable a faster time to market for the design flow on a chip.

So, if you have that design flow time, that time to market. So, you're creating double the value there for the client. Do you share that 50-50 with them? So, the challenge is going to be exactly as Adam was saying, how do you monetize this stuff? So, this is kind of the struggle that we're seeing in adoption.

Paul Walsh: And Emmett, let's move to you on data centers. I mean, there are just some incredible numbers that we've seen emerging, as it relates to the hyperscaler investment that we're seeing in building out the infrastructure. I know data centers is something that you have focused tremendously on in your research, bringing our global perspectives together. Obviously, Europe sits within that. And there is a market here in Europe that might be more challenged. But I'm interested to understand how you're thinking about framing the whole data center story? Implications for Europe. Do European companies feed off some of that U.S. hyperscaler CapEx? How should we be thinking about that through the European lens?

Emmet Kelly: Yeah, absolutely. So, big question, Paul. What…

Paul Walsh: We've got a few minutes!

Emmet Kelly: We've got a few minutes. What I would say is there was a great paper that came out from Harvard just two weeks ago, and they were looking at the scale of data center investments in the United States. And clearly the U.S. economy is ticking along very, very nicely at the moment. But this Harvard paper concluded that if you take out data center investments, U.S. economic growth today is actually zero.

Paul Walsh: Wow.

Emmet Kelly: That is how big the data center investments are. And what we've said in our research very clearly is if you want to build a megawatt of data center capacity that's going to cost you roughly $35 million today.

Let's put that number out there. 35 million. Roughly, I'd say 25… Well, 20 to 25 million of that goes into the chips. But what's really interesting is the other remaining $10 million per megawatt, and I like to call that the picks and shovels of data centers; and I'm very convinced there is no bubble in that area whatsoever.

So, what's in that area? Firstly, the first building block of a data center is finding a powered land bank. And this is a big thing that private equity is doing at the moment. So, find some real estate that's close to a mass population that's got a good fiber connection. Probably needs a little bit of water, but most importantly needs some power.

And the demand for that is still infinite at the moment. Then beyond that, you've got the construction angle and there's a very big shortage of labor today to build the shells of these data centers. Then the third layer is the likes of capital goods, and there are serious supply bottlenecks there as well.

And I could go on and on, but roughly that first $10 million, there's no bubble there. I'm very, very sure of that.

Paul Walsh: And we conducted some extensive survey work recently as part of your analysis into the global data center market. You've sort of touched on a few of the gating factors that the industry has to contend with. That survey work was done on the operators and the supply chain, as it relates to data center build out.

What were the key conclusions from that?

Emmet Kelly: Well, the key conclusion was there is a shortage of power for these data centers, and…

Paul Walsh: Which I think… Which is a sort of known-known, to some extent.

Emmet Kelly: it is a known-known, but it's not just about the availability of power, it's the availability of green power. And it's also the price of power is a very big factor as well because energy is roughly 40 to 45 percent of the operating cost of running a data center. So, it's very, very important. And of course, that's another area where Europe doesn't screen very well.

I was looking at statistics just last week on the countries that have got the highest power prices in the world. And unsurprisingly, it came out as UK, Ireland, Germany, and that's three of our big five data center markets. But when I looked at our data center stats at the beginning of the year, to put a bit of context into where we are…

Paul Walsh: In Europe…

Emmet Kelly: In Europe versus the rest. So, at the end of [20]24, the U.S. data center market had 35 gigawatts of data center capacity. But that grew last year at a clip of 30 percent. China had a data center bank of roughly 22 gigawatts, but that had grown at a rate of just 10 percent. And that was because of the chip issue. And then Europe has capacity, or had capacity at the end of last year, roughly 7 to 8 gigawatts, and that had grown at a rate of 10 percent.

Now, the reason for that is because the three big data center markets in Europe are called FLAP-D. So, it's Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam, Paris, and Dublin. We had to put an acronym on it. So, Flap-D. Good news. I'm sitting with the tech guys. They've got even more acronyms than I do, in their sector, so well done them.

Lee Simpson: Nothing beats FLAP-D.

Paul Walsh: Yes.

Emmet Kelly: It’s quite an achievement. But what is interesting is three of the big five markets in Europe are constrained. So, Frankfurt, post the Ukraine conflict. Ireland, because in Ireland, an incredible statistic is data centers are using 25 percent of the Irish power grid. Compared to a global average of 3 percent.

Now I'm from Dublin, and data centers are running into conflict with industry, with housing estates. Data centers are using 45 percent of the Dublin grid, 45. So, there's a moratorium in building data centers there. And then Amsterdam has the classic semi moratorium space because it's a small country with a very high population.

So, three of our five markets are constrained in Europe. What is interesting is it started with the former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. The UK has made great strides at attracting data center money and AI capital into the UK and the current Prime Minister continues to do that. So, the UK has definitely gone; moved from the middle lane into the fast lane. And then Macron in France. He hosted an AI summit back in February and he attracted over a 100 billion euros of AI and data center commitments.

Paul Walsh: And I think if we added up, as per the research that we published a few months ago, Europe's announced over 350 billion euros, in proposed investments around AI.

Emmet Kelly: Yeah, absolutely. It's a good stat. Now where people can get a little bit cynical is they can say a couple of things. Firstly, it's now over a year since the Mario Draghi report came out. And what's changed since? Absolutely nothing, unfortunately. And secondly, when I look at powering AI, I like to compare Europe to what's happening in the United States. I mean, the U.S. is giving access to nuclear power to AI. It started with the three Mile Island…

Paul Walsh: Yeah. The nuclear renaissance is…

Emmet Kelly: Nuclear Renaissance is absolutely huge. Now, what's underappreciated is actually Europe has got a massive nuclear power bank. It's right up there. But unfortunately, we're decommissioning some of our nuclear power around Europe, so we're going the wrong way from that perspective. Whereas President Trump is opening up the nuclear power to AI tech companies and data centers.

Then over in the States we also have gas and turbines. That's a very, very big growth area and we're not quite on top of that here in Europe. So, looking at this year, I have a feeling that the Americans will probably increase their data center capacity somewhere between – it's incredible – somewhere between 35 and 50 percent. And I think in Europe we're probably looking at something like 10 percent again.

Paul Walsh: Okay. Understood.

Emmet Kelly: So, we're growing in Europe, but we're way, way behind as a starting point. And it feels like the others are pulling away. The other big change I'd highlight is the Chinese are really going to accelerate their data center growth this year as well. They've got their act together and you'll see them heading probably towards 30 gigs of capacity by the end of next year.

Paul Walsh: Alright, we're out of time. The TMT Edge is alive and kicking in Europe. I want to thank Emmett, Lee and Adam for their time and I just want to wish everybody a great day today. Thank you.

(Applause)

That was my conversation with Adam, Emmett and Lee. Many thanks again to them. Many thanks again to them for telling us about the latest in their areas of research and to the live audience for hearing us out. And a thanks to you as well for listening.

Let us know what you think about this and other episodes by living us a review wherever you get your podcasts. And if you enjoy listening to Thoughts on the Market, please tell a friend or colleague about the podcast today.

Jaksot(1506)

What Could the Dockworkers’ Strike Mean for Growth and Inflation?

What Could the Dockworkers’ Strike Mean for Growth and Inflation?

Thousands of U.S. dockworkers have gone on strike along the East Coast and Gulf Coast. Our Global Head of Fixed Income and Thematic Research Michael Zezas joins U.S. economist Diego Anzoategui to discuss the potential consequences of a drawn-out work stoppage.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Global Head of Fixed Income and Thematic Research for Morgan Stanley.Diego Anzoategui: And I'm Diego Anzoategui from the US Economics team.Michael Zezas: And today, we'll be talking about the implications of this week's US dockworker strike on the US economy.It's Wednesday, October 2nd, at 11am in New York.Diego, as most of our listeners likely know, yesterday roughly 45,000 US dockworkers went on strike for the first time in perhaps decades at 36 US ports from Maine to Texas. And so, I wanted to get your initial read on the situation because we're obviously getting a lot of questions from clients concerned about what this could mean for growth and inflation.Diego Anzoategui: Yeah, of course, there's a lot of uncertainty about this situation because we don't know how long the strike is going to last. But the strike can in principle hit economic growth and boost inflation -- but only if it is long lasting, right. Local producers and retailers, they typically have inventories of final and intermediate goods, so the disruption needs to be long enough so that those inventories go down to critical levels in order to see a meaningful macroeconomic impact.But if the strike is long enough, we might see an important impact on economic activity and inflation. If we look at trade flows data, roughly 30 per cent of all goods imports and exports are handled by the East and Gulf ports.Michael Zezas: So then let's drill down on that a bit. If the strike continues long enough and inventories decline, what are the shocks to economic growth that you're considering?Diego Anzoategui: Yeah, I would think that there are two main channels through which the strike might hit economic activity. The first one is a hit to local production because of disruptions in the supply of capital goods and intermediate goods used for domestic production. We not only use the ports to bring final goods, but also intermediate and capital goods like machinery, basic metals, plastic, to name a few.And the second channel is directly through exports. The East Coast and Gulf ports channel 84 per cent of exports by water. Industries producing energy, chemicals, machinery, cars, might be affected by these bottlenecks.Michael Zezas: Right, so fewer potential imports of goods, and fewer potential productive capacity as a consequence. Does that have an impact on inflation from your perspective?Diego Anzoategui: Yes, it can have an impact on inflation. Again, assuming that the strike is long lasting, right? I would expect acceleration in goods prices, in particular key inputs coming from the Eastern Gulf ports. And these are cars, electronics, clothes, furniture and apparel. All these categories roughly represent 13 per cent of the core PCE basket, the price index.Also, you know, a meaningful share of food and beverages imports come through water. So, I would also expect an impact there in those prices. And in terms of what prices might react faster, I think the main candidate is food and beverages -- and especially perishable food that typically have lower inventory to sales ratios.And if we start seeing an increase in those prices, I think that would be a good early signal that the disruptions are starting to bite.Michael Zezas: That makes sense. And last question, what about the impact to the US workforce? What would be the impact, if any, on payroll data and unemployment data, reflecting workforce impact -- the types of data that investors really pay close attention to.Diego Anzoategui: Yeah. So, we will likely see an impact on nonfarm payrolls, NFP, and the unemployment rate if the strike is long lasting. But even if there are not important disruptions, the strike itself can mechanically affect October's nonfarm payrolls print. They want to be released in November. Remember that strikers don't get paid, and they are not on the payroll; so they are not be[ing] counted by the establishment survey.But a necessary condition to see this downward bias in the NFP reading is that the strike needs to continue next week, that is the second week of October, right. But know that The Fed tends to look through these short run fluctuations in NFP due to strikes -- because any drag we see in the October sprint will likely be followed by payback in November if the strike is short lived.Michael Zezas: Got it. That makes a lot of sense. Diego, thanks for making the time to talk with us as this unfolds. Let's hope for a quick resolution here.Diego Anzoategui: Thanks, Michael. Great speaking with you.Michael Zezas: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please be sure to rate and review us on the Apple Podcasts app. It helps more people find the show.

2 Loka 20245min

The Potential Domino Effect of US Tariffs

The Potential Domino Effect of US Tariffs

Our US public policy and global economics experts discuss how an escalation of US tariffs could have major domestic and international economic implications.----- Transcript -----Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Morgan Stanley's US Public Policy Strategist. Arunima Sinha: And I’m Arunima Sinha, from the Global Economics team. Ariana Salvatore: Today we're talking tariffs, a major policy issue at stake in the US presidential election. We'll dig into the domestic and international implications of these proposed policies. It's Tuesday, October 1st at 10am in New York. In a little over four weeks, Americans will be going to the polls. And as we've noted on this podcast, it's still a close race between the two presidential candidates. Former president Donald Trump's main pitch to voters has to do with the economy. And tariffs and tax cuts are central to many of his campaign speeches. Arunima Sinha: You're right, Ariana. In fact, I would say that tariffs have been the key theme he keeps on coming back to. You've recently written a note about why we should take the Republicans proposed policies on tariffs seriously. What's your broad outlook in a Trump win scenario? Ariana Salvatore: Well, first and foremost, I think it's important to note that the President has quite a bit of discretion when it comes to trade policy. That's why we recommend that investors should take seriously a number of these proposals. Many of the authorities are already in place and could be easily leveraged if Trump were to win in November and follow through on those campaign promises. He did it with China in 2018 to 2019, leveraging Section 301 Authority, and many of that could be done easily if he were to win again.Arunima Sinha: And could you just walk us through some of the specifics of Trump's tariff proposals? What are the options at the President's disposal? Ariana Salvatore: Sure. So, he's floated a number of tariff proposals -- whether it be 10 per cent tariffs across the board on all of our imports, 60 per cent specifically on China or targeted tariffs on certain goods coming from partners like Mexico, for example. Targeted tariffs are likely the easiest place to start, especially if we see an incrementalist approach like we saw during the first Trump term over the course of 2018 to 2019. Arunima Sinha: And how quickly would these tariffs be implemented if Trump were to win? Ariana Salvatore: The answer to that really depends on the type of authorities being leveraged here. There are a few different procedures associated with each of the tariffs that I mentioned just now. For example, if the president is using Section 301 authorities, that usually requires a period of investigation by the USTR -- or the US Trade Representative --before the formal recommendation for tariffs.However, given that many of these authorities are already in place, to the extent that the former president wants to levy tariffs on China, for example, it can be done pretty seamlessly. Conversely, if you were to ask his cabinet to initiate a new tariff investigation, depending on the authority used, that could take anywhere from weeks to months. Section 232 investigations have a maximum timeline of 270 days. There's also a chance that he uses something called IEEPA, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to justify quicker tariff imposition, though the legality of that authority hasn't been fully tested yet. Back in 2019, when Trump said he would use IEEPA to impose 5 per cent tariffs on all Mexican imports, he called off those plans before the tariffs actually came into effect. Arunima Sinha: And could you give us a little more specific[s] about which countries would be impacted in this potential next round of tariffs -- and to what extent? Ariana Salvatore: Yeah, in our analysis, which you'll get into in a moment, we focus on the potential for a 10 per cent across the board tariff that I mentioned, in conjunction with the 60 per cent tariff on Chinese goods. Obviously, when you map that to who our largest trading partners are, it's clear that Mexico and China would be impacted most directly, followed by Canada and the EU.Specifically on the EU, we have those section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs coming up for review in early 2025, and the US-MCA or the agreement that replaced NAFTA is set for review later in 2026. So, we see plenty of trade catalysts on the horizon. We also see an underappreciated risk of tariffs on Mexico using precedent from Trump's first term, especially if immigration continues to be such a politically salient issue for voters. Given all of this, it seems that tariffs will create a lot of friction in global trade. What's your outlook, Arunima? Arunima Sinha: Well, Arianna, we do expect a hit to growth, and a near term rise in inflation in the US. In the EU, our economists also expect a negative impact on growth. And in other economies, there are several considerations. How would tariffs impact the ongoing supply chain diversification? The extent of foreign exchange moves? Are bilateral negotiations being pursued by the other countries? And so on.Ariana Salvatore: So, a natural follow up question here is not only the impact to the countries that would be affected by US tariffs, but how they might respond. What do you see happening there? Arunima Sinha: In the note, we talked with our China economists, and they expect that if the US were to impose 60 per cent tariffs on Chinese goods, Beijing may impose retaliatory tariffs and some non-tariff measures like it did back in 2018-19. But they don't expect meaningful sanctions or restrictions on US enterprises that are already well embedded in China's supply chain. On the policy side, Beijing would likely resort less to Chinese currency depreciation but focus more on supply chain diversifications to mitigate the tariff shock this time round. Our economists think that the risk of more entrenched deflationary pressures from potential tariff disruptions may increase the urgency for Beijing to shift its policy framework towards economic rebalancing to consumption.In Europe, our economists expect that targeted tariffs will be met with challenges at the WTO and retaliatory tariffs on American exports to Europe, following the pattern from 2018-19, along with bilateral trade negotiations. In Mexico, our economists think that there could be a response with tariffs on agricultural products, mainly corn and soybeans.Ariana Salvatore: So, bringing it back to the US, what do you see the macro impact from tariffs being in terms of economic growth or inflation? Arunima Sinha: We did a fairly extensive analysis where we both looked at the aggregate impacts on the US as well as sectoral impacts that we'll get into. We think that a pretty reasonable estimate of the effect of both a 60 per cent tariff on China and a 10 per cent blanket tariff on the rest of the world is an increase of 0.9 per cent in the headline PCE prices that takes into effect over 2025, and a decline of 1.4 percentage points in real GDP growth that plays out over a longer period going into 2026. Ariana Salvatore: So, your team is expecting two more Fed cuts this year and four by the first half of 2025. Thinking about how tariffs might play into that dynamic, do you see them influencing Fed policy at all? Arunima Sinha: Well, under the tariff scenario, we think that it's possible that the Fed decides to delay cuts first and then speed up the pace of easing. So, in theory, the effect of a tariff shock is really just a level shift in prices. And in other words, it's a transitory boost to inflation that should fade over time.Because it's a temporary shock. The Fed can, in principle look through it as long as inflation expectations remain anchored. And this is what we saw in the FOMC minutes from the 2018 meetings. In a scenario of increased tariffs, we think that the uncertainty about the length of the inflationary push may slow down the pace of cuts in the first half of 2025. And then once GDP deceleration becomes more pronounced, the Fed might then cut faster in the second half of [20]25 to avoid that big, outsized deceleration and economic activity.Ariana Salvatore: And what about second order effects on things like business investment or employment? We talked about agriculture as a potential target for retaliatory tariffs, but what other US sectors and industries would be most affected by these type of plans? Arunima Sinha: That's something that we have leaned in on, and we do expect some important second round effects. So, if you have lower economic activity, that would lower employment, that lowers income, that lowers consumption further -- so that standard multiplier effect. So overall, in that scenario, with the 60 per cent tariffs on China, 10 per cent on the rest of the world that are imposed fully and swiftly, we model that real consumption would decline by 3 per cent, business investment would fall by 3.1 per cent, and monthly job gains would fall by between 50- and 70, 000. At the sectoral level, this combination of tariffs have potential to increase average tariffs to the 25 to 35 per cent range for almost 50 per cent of the NAICS industries in the United States when first put into place. And we expect the biggest impacts on computers and electronics, apparel, and the furniture sectors; but this does not take into account any potential exclusion lists that might be put into place. Ariana Salvatore: Finally, what does all this boil down to in terms of a direct impact to the US consumer wallet? Arunima Sinha: So, the impact of higher tariffs on consumer spending would depend on many factors, and one of the most important ones is the price elasticity of demand. So how willing would consumers be to take on those higher prices from tariffs, or do we see a pullback in real demand? What we think will happen is that higher prices could reduce real consumption by as much as 2. 5 per cent. The impact on goods consumption is much more meaningful because imported goods are directly affected by tariffs, and we would expect to see a drag on real goods consumption of 5 per cent. But then you have lower labor income and higher production costs and services prices that is also going to bring down services consumption by 1.3 per cent.Ariana Salvatore: So, it's important to keep in mind here that US tariff policy would undoubtedly have far reaching consequences. That means it's something that we're going to continue to follow very closely. Arunima, thanks so much for taking the time to talk.Arunima Sinha: Great speaking with you, Ariana. Thank you, Ariana Salvatore: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

1 Loka 202410min

The Impact of Central Bank Pivots

The Impact of Central Bank Pivots

Our CIO and Chief US Equity Strategist Mike Wilson takes a closer look at the potential ramifications of the sharp central bank policy shifts in the U.S., Japan and China.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief US Equity Strategist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about what to expect from the sharp pivot in global monetary and fiscal policy. It's Monday, Sept 30th at 11:30am in New York. So let’s get after it. Over the past few months, Fed policy has taken on a more dovish turn. To be fair, bond markets have been telling the Fed that they are too tight and in many respects this pivot was simply the Fed getting more in line with market pricing. However, in addition to the 50 basis point cut from the Fed, budget deficits are providing heavy support; with August’s deficit nearly $90b higher than expected. Meanwhile, financial conditions continue to loosen and are now at some of the most stimulative levels seen over the past 25 years. Other central banks are also cutting interest rates and even the Bank of Japan, which recently raised rates for the first time in years, has backed off that stance – and indicated they are in no hurry to raise rates again. Finally, this past week the People’s Bank of China announced new programs specifically targeting equity and housing prices. After a muted response from markets and commentators, the Chinese government then followed up with an aggressive fiscal policy stimulus. Why now? Like the US, China is highly indebted but it has entered full blown deflation with both credit and equity markets trading terribly for the past several years. There is an old adage that markets stop panicking when policy makers start panicking. On that score, it makes perfect sense why China equity and credit markets have responded the most favorably to the changes made last week. European equity markets were also stronger than the US given European economies and companies have greater exposure to China demand. On the other hand, Japan and India traded poorly which also makes sense in my view since they were the two largest beneficiaries of investor outflows from China over the past several years. Such trends are likely to continue in the near term. For US equity investors, the real question is whether China’s pivot on policy will have a material impact on US growth. We think it’s fairly limited to areas like Industrial spending and Materials pricing and it’s unlikely to have any impact on US consumers or corporate investment demand. In fact, if commodities rally due to greater China demand, it may hurt US consumer spending. As usual, oil prices will be the most important commodity to watch in this regard. The good news is that oil prices were down last week due to an unrelated move by Saudi Arabia to no longer cap production in its efforts to get oil prices back to its $100 target. If prices reverse higher again and move toward $80/bbl due to either China stimulus or the escalation of tensions in the Middle East, it would be viewed as a net negative in my view for US equities. As discussed last week the most important variables for the direction of US equities is the upcoming labor market data and third quarter earnings season. Weaker than expected data is likely to be viewed negatively by stocks at this point and good news will be taken positively. In other words, investors should not be hoping for worse news so the Fed can cut more aggressively. At this point, steady 25 basis point cuts for the next several quarters in the context of growth holding up is the best outcome for stocks broadly. Meanwhile individual stocks will likely trade as much on idiosyncratic earnings and company news rather than macro data in the absence of either a hard landing or a large growth acceleration; both of which look unlikely in the near term. In such a scenario, we think large cap quality growth is likely to perform the best while there could be some pockets of cyclical strength in companies that can benefit from greater China demand. The best areas for cyclical outperformance in that regard remain in the Industrial and materials sectors. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

30 Syys 20244min

Keeping the Faith For A Soft Landing

Keeping the Faith For A Soft Landing

Credit likes moderation, and the Fed’s rate cut indicates its belief that the economy is heading for a soft landing. Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist warns that markets still need to keep an eye on incoming data.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the implications of the Fed’s 50 basis points interest rate cut for corporate credit markets. It's Friday, Sep 27th at 10 am in New York. For credit markets, understanding why the Fed is cutting is actually very critical. Unlike typical rate cutting cycles, these cuts are coming when the economic growth is still decelerating but not falling off the cliff. Typically, rate cuts have come in when the economy is already in a recession or approaching recession. Neither is the case this time. So the US expanded by 3 per cent in the second quarter; and the third quarter, it is tracking well over 2 per cent. So, these cuts do not aim to stimulate the economy but really to acknowledge that there’s been significant progress on inflation, and move the policy towards a much more normalized policy stance. In some way, this really reflects the Fed’s confidence in the inflation path. So that means, not cutting now would mean restraining the economy further through high real interest rates. So, this cut really reflects a growing faith by the Fed in achieving a soft landing. Also, the size of the cut, the 50 basis point cut as opposed to 25 basis points, shows the Fed’s willingness to go big in response to weaker data, especially in labor markets. So since the beginning of the year, we have been pretty constructive on spread products across the board, particularly corporate credit and securitized credit, even though valuations have been tightening. Our stance is based on the idea that credit fundamentals will stay reasonably healthy even if economic growth decelerates, as long as it doesn’t fall off the cliff. Further, we also believe that credit fundamentals will improve with rate cuts because stress in this cycle has mainly come from higher interest expenses weighing on both corporations and households. This is in stark contrast to other recent periods of stress in credit markets – such as 2008/09 when we had the financial crisis, 2015/16 we had the challenges in the energy sector and then 2020, of course, we faced COVID. So the best point of illustrating this would be through leveraged loans, which are floating-rate instruments. As the Fed started tightening in 2022, we saw increasing pressures on interest coverage ratios for leveraged loan borrowers. That led to a pick-up in downgrades and defaults in loans. As rate hikes ended, we started seeing stabilization of these coverage ratios, and the pace of downgrades and defaults slowed. And now, with rate cutting ahead of us and the dot plot implying 150 basis points more of cuts for the rest of this year and the next year to come, the pressure on interest coverage ratios are going to be easing, especially if the economy stays in soft landing mode. This suggests that while spreads are today tight, the fundamentals could even improve with rate cuts – that means the spreads could remain around these levels, or even tighten a bit further. After all, if you remember the mid-1990s, which was the the last time that the Fed achieved a soft landing, investment grade corporate credit spreads were about 30 basis points tighter relative to where we are today. That 'if' is a big if. If we are wrong on the soft landing thesis, our conviction about the spread products being valuable will prove to have been misplaced. Really the challenge with any landing is that we can’t be certain of the prospect until we actually land. Till then, we are really looking at incoming data and hypothesizing: are we heading into a soft or hard landing? So this means incoming data pose two-sided risks to the path ahead for credit spreads. If incoming data are weak – particularly employment data are weak – it is likely that faith in this soft landing construct will dim and spreads could widen. But if they are robust, we can see spreads tightening even further from the current tight levels. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

27 Syys 20244min

How Long Until Consumers Feel Rate Cut Benefits?

How Long Until Consumers Feel Rate Cut Benefits?

Our US Consumer Economist Sarah Wolfe lays out the impact of the Federal Reserve’s rate cut on labor market and consumers, including which goods could see a rise in spending over the next year.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Sarah Wolfe, from the Morgan Stanley US Economics Team. Today, a look at what the Fed cut means for US consumers. It’s Thursday, September 26, at 2 PM in Slovenia. Earlier this week, you heard Mike Wilson and Seth Carpenter talk about the Fed cut and its impact on markets and central banks around the world. But what does it actually mean for US consumers and their wallets? Will it make it easier to pay off credit card debt and secure mortgages? We explore these questions in this episode. Looking back to last week, the FOMC cut rates by a larger chunk than many anticipated as risks from inflation have come down significantly while labor market risks have risen. Now, with inflation wrangled in, it’s time to start reducing the restrictiveness of policy to prevent a rise in the unemployment rate and a slump in economic growth. In fact, my colleague Mike Wilson believes the US labor data will be the most important factor driving US equities for the next three to six months. Despite potential risks, the current state of the U.S. labor market is still solid and that’s where the Fed wants it to stay. The health of the labor market, in my opinion, is best reflected in the health of consumer spending. If we look at this quarter, we’re tracking over 3 per cent growth in real consumption, which is a strong run rate for consumption by all measures. And if we look at how the whole year has been tracking, we’ve only seen a very modest slowdown in real consumer spending from 2.7 per cent last year to 2.5 per cent today. For a bit of perspective, if we go back to 2018 and 2019, when rates were much lower than they are today, and we had a tight labor market, consumption was running closer to 2 to 2.3 per cent. So we can definitively say, consumption is pretty solid today. What is most notable, however, is the slowdown in nominal consumption which takes into account unit growth and pricing. This has slowed much more notably this year from 5.6 per cent last year to 4.9 per cent today. It’s reflected by the significant progress we’ve seen in inflation this year across goods and services, despite solid unit growth – as reflected by stronger real consumer spending. Our US Economics team has been stressing that the fundamentals that drive consumption – which are labor income, wealth, and credit – would be cooler this year but still support healthy spending. When it comes to consumption, in my opinion, I think what matters most is labor income. A slowdown in job growth has stoked fears of slower consumer spending, but if you look at aggregate labor income growth and household wealth, across both equities and real estate, those factors remain solid. So, then we ask ourselves, what has driven more of the slowdown in consumer spending this past year?And with that, let’s go back to interest rates. Rates have been high, and credit conditions have been tight – undeniably restraining consumer spending. Elevated interest rates have pushed banks to pull back on lending and have curbed household demand for credit. As a result, if you look at consumer loan growth from banks, it’s fallen from about 12 per cent in 2022 to 7 per cent last year, and just 3 per cent in the first half of this year. Tight credit is dampening consumption. When interest rates are high, people buy less -- especially on credit. And this is a key principle of monetary policy and it's used to lower inflation. But it can have adverse effects. The brunt of the pain has been borne by the lowest-income households which rely heavily on revolving credit for basic spending needs and more easily max out on their credit limits and fall delinquent. As such, as the Fed begins to lower interest rates, the rates charged on consumer loan products have started to moderate. And with a lag, we expect credit conditions to ease up as well, allowing households across the income distribution to begin to access more credit. We should first see a rebound in durable goods spending – like home furnishing, electronics, appliances, and autos. And then that should all be further supported by more activity in the housing market. While interest rates are on their way down, they are still relatively elevated, which means the rebound in consumption will take time. The good news, however, is that we do think we are moving through the bottom for durable goods consumption – with pricing for goods likely to stabilize next year and unit growth to pick back up.Thank you for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

26 Syys 20244min

US Elections: The Wait for Clarity

US Elections: The Wait for Clarity

With the US presidential race being as closely contested as it is, Michael Zezas explains why patience may be a virtue for investors following Election Day. ----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income and Thematic Research. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about why investors should prepare to wait to get clarity on the US election result. It's Wednesday, September 25th at 10:30am in New York. As we all know, markets dislike uncertainty; and one of the biggest potential catalysts between now and the end of the year is the results of the US presidential election. So it’s important for investors to know that the timing of knowing the outcome may not be what you expect. On most U.S. presidential election days, the outcome is known within hours of polls closing in the evening. That’s because while all votes may not yet have been counted, enough have to make a reasonable projection about the winner. But that’s not what happened in 2020. Vote counts were tight across many states. A condition that was compounded by the slowness of counting mail in ballots, which was a style of voting more widely adopted during the pandemic. As a result, news networks didn’t make a formal outcome projection until about four days after election day.Rather than a reversion to the norm of quickly knowing the result for the 2024 election, we expect an outcome similar to 2020. It could be days before we reliably know a result.The same dynamics as 2020 are in play. Polls show a very close race. And while more voters are likely to show up in person this year, voting by mail is still expected to represent a substantial chunk of ballots cast this cycle. That’s because many states' rules automatically send mail-in ballots to those who voted by that method in the last election. And some recent news out of Georgia underscores the potential for a slower result. The state just adopted a rule requiring all its votes to be hand-counted.Now, this may not matter if either candidate has enough votes without Georgia to win the electoral college. But if Georgia is the deciding or tipping point state then a longer wait becomes possible. Per the 538 election forecast model, there’s about an 11 per cent chance that Georgia plays this role.So, bottom line, investors may have to be patient this November. It could take days, or weeks, to reliably project an election outcome, and therefore start seeing its market effects.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

25 Syys 20242min

One Rate Cut, Many Effects

One Rate Cut, Many Effects

From stock price fluctuations to concerns about deflation, the reactions to the Fed rate cut have been varied. But we still need to keep an eye on labor data, says Mike Wilson, our CIO and Chief US Equity Strategist.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief US Equity Strategist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the Fed’s 50 basis point rate cut last week, and the impact on markets.It's Tuesday, Sept 24th at 11:30am in New York.So let’s get after it. As discussed last week, I thought that the best short-term case for equities was that the Fed could deliver a 50 basis point cut without prompting growth concerns. Chair Powell was able to thread the needle in this respect, and equities ultimately responded favorably. However, I also believe the labor data will be the most important factor in terms of how equities trade over the next three to six months. On that score, the next round of data will be forthcoming at the end of next week. In my view, that data will need to surprise on the upside to keep equity valuations at their currently elevated level. More specifically, the unemployment rate will need to decline and the payrolls above 140,000 with no negative revisions to prior months. Meanwhile, I am also watching several other variables closely to determine the trajectory of growth. Earnings revision breadth, the best proxy for company guidance, continues to trend sideways for the overall S&P 500 and negatively for the Russell 2000 small cap index. Due to seasonal patterns, this variable is likely to face negative headwinds over the next month.Second, the ISM Purchasing Managers Index has yet to reaccelerate after almost two years of languishing. And finally, the Conference Board Leading Economic Indicator and Employment Trends remain in downward trends; this is typical of a later cycle environment.Bottom line, the Fed's larger than expected rate cut can buy more time for high quality stocks to remain expensive and even help lower quality cyclical stocks to find some support. The labor and other data now need to improve in order to justify these conditions though, through year end.It's also important to point out that the August budget deficit came in nearly $90 billion above forecasts, bringing the year-to-date deficit above $1.8 trillion. We think this fiscal policy has been positive for growth but has resulted in a crowding out within the private economy and financial markets. This is another reason why a recession is the worst-case scenario even though some argue a recession is better than high price levels or inflation for 80-90 per cent of Americans. A recession will undoubtedly bring debt deflation concerns to light, and once those begin, they are hard to reverse. The Fed understands this dynamic better than anyone as first illustrated in Ben Bernanke's famous speech in 2002 entitled “Deflation, Making Sure It Doesn’t Happen Here.” In that speech, he highlighted the tools the Fed could use to avoid deflation including coordinated monetary and fiscal policy.We note that gold continues to outperform most stocks including the high-quality S&P 500. Specifically, gold has rallied from just $300 at the time of Bernanke’s speech in 2002 to $2600 today. The purchasing power of US dollars has fallen much more than what conventional measures of inflation would suggest.As a result, gold, high-quality real estate, stocks and other inflation hedges have done very well. In fact, the newest fiat currency hedge, crypto, has done the best over the past decade. Meanwhile, lower quality cyclical assets like commodities, small cap stocks and commercial real estate have done poorly in both absolute and relative terms; and are losing serious value when adjusted for purchasing power.The bottom line, we expect this to continue in the short term until something happens to change investors' view about the sustainability of these policies. In order to reverse these trends, either organic growth in the private economy needs to reaccelerate and we’ll see a rotation back to the lower quality cyclical assets; or recession arrives, and we finish the cycle and reset all asset prices to levels from which a true broadening out can occur.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

24 Syys 20244min

As the Fed Recalibrates, What’s Ahead for Central Banks?

As the Fed Recalibrates, What’s Ahead for Central Banks?

Our Global Chief Economist, Seth Carpenter, explains why, despite last week’s big Fed move, there’s still plenty of uncertainty in global markets and questions about how other central banks will respond. ----- Transcript -----Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist.Today, I'll be talking about the Fed meeting, where they cut rates for the first time in this cycle, and what it means for the economy around the world.It's Monday, September 23rd at 10am in New York.The Fed cut rates by 50 basis points; but we did not see a huge shift in its reaction function. Rather, the 50 basis points was to show a commitment to not falling behind the curve -- to use Chair Powell's words. From here, the most likely path, from my perspective, is a string of 25 basis point cuts. Powell has again demonstrated that the Fed can move gradually, or quickly, depending on perceptions of risk.But for now, judging from Powell, or other policy makers comments, the Fed still sees the economy as healthy in the labor market; as solid. But another payroll print of 100, 000 or softening in consumer spending, well, that would tip the balance. So, the market debate will continue to focus on the pace of rate cuts and the ultimate landing zone.Our baseline is a touch more front loaded than the dot plot would imply; with us expecting the funds rate to reach just below 3.5 per cent in the middle of next year, rather than the end of next year. The Fed's projections have declines in the target rate into 2026 and beyond, but I have to say the dispersion in the dots that they put up shows just how much consensus is yet to be built within the committee. And, as a result, the phrase data dependency, well, that's not a term that we want to drop from the lexicon anytime soon.The magnitudes of the changes differ, but a comparison that we have made often here is to the 1990s, and that cutting cycle eventually it paused as the economy stabilized and continued to grow. So, there are lots of options for where we go next.Globally, central banks will be adapting and reacting both to global financial conditions like this Fed rate cut, as well as their domestic outlook. Among emerging market economies, Brazil and Indonesia make for useful case studies. With an eye on defending its policy credibility and on market expectations, the central bank in Brazil hiked rates to 10-and-three-quarters per cent this week after a cutting cycle and then a long pause. A weaker currency is the external push, but strong domestic growth is the internal consideration and both of those imply some inflation risks.The Bank of Indonesia cut rates after a strong appreciation in the currency, which lowered the risk from inflations, and it really enabled them to change their footing.Now, for DM central banks, the 50 basis point cut really doesn't materially shift our expectations for what's going to happen. If we are right, and ultimately we get a string of 25 basis point cuts, there's little reason for other developed market central banks to really adjust what they're doing. In Europe, we're waiting for inflation data to confirm the slowdown after the softening of wages that we've seen. So, we have high conviction that there's a cut in September, and we expect another cut in December.Now, more cutting by the Fed might lead to a stronger Euro, which would reinforce that inflation trend, but I don't think it would be enough to really change the path and prompt more aggressive cutting from the ECB. After skipping a rate move in September, given all the question marks they still see about inflation in the UK, we think the Bank of England restarts their cuts in November.The split decision at this most recent meeting shows that the MPC is not making frequent adjustments to its plan based on small tweaks to the incoming data. And finally, for the Bank of Japan, we expect them to stay on hold until January. The meeting for the Bank of Japan was primarily about communication, and indeed, Governor Ueda's comments did not prompt the type of reaction that we saw at the July meeting. So, if we're right, and the Fed's path is mostly, like we think it will be, these other developed market central banks don't have to make big changes.So, the Fed didn't really fully recalibrate its outlook. Instead, what it did was signal a willingness, but just a willingness, to make large shifts; with no clear indication that the fundamental strategy has changed.The market implications seem like they could be clear. With the Fed easing, amid economic conditions that remain resilient, that should be positive for risk assets. But the Fed is also trying to prevent complacency, and I have to say, uncertainty is plentiful. If for no other reason, we've got an election coming up, and that makes forecasting what happens in 2025 very difficult.Thanks for listening. And if you enjoy this show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

23 Syys 20245min

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