Who’s Disrupting — and Funding — the AI Boom

Our Global Head of Sustainability Research and U.S. Utilities Analyst discuss the rapidly growing power needs of the GenAI enablers and how to meet them.----- Transcript -----Stephen Byrd: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Stephen Byrd, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Sustainability Research.David Arcaro: And I'm Dave Arcaro, Head of the US Power and Utilities team.Stephen Byrd: And on this episode of the podcast, we'll discuss just what it would take to power the Gen AI revolution.It's Tuesday, April 16th at 10am in New York.Last summer, scientists used GenAI to find a new antibiotic for a nasty superbug. It took the AI system all of an hour and a half to analyze about 7,000 chemical compounds; something that human scientists would have toiled over for months, if not years. It's clear that GenAI can open up breathtaking possibilities, but you have to stop and think. What kind of compute power is needed for all of this?A few weeks ago, our colleague Emmet Kelly, who covers European Telecom, discussed the exponential growth of European data centers on this podcast. And today, Dave and I want to continue the conversation about this critical moment of powering the GenAI revolution.So, Dave, what is your current assessment of the global power demand from data centers?David Arcaro: Yeah, Stephen, we're expecting rapid growth in the power demand coming from data centers across the world. We're currently estimating data centers consume about one and a half per cent of global electricity today. We're expecting that to grow to almost four percent in 2027. And in the US, data centers represent roughly three percent of total electricity consumption now, and we expect that to escalate to eight per cent of the total US by 2027.And there will be even more dramatic impacts at the local and regional level. The data center landscape tends to be highly concentrated, and the next wave of GenAI data centers is likely to be much larger than the previous generation.So, the impact on specific regions will be magnified. To give an example, in Georgia, the utility there has previously forecasted just half a percent of annual growth in electricity use but is now calling for nine per cent of annual growth in electricity consumption, and that's largely driven by data centers.It's a dynamic that we haven't seen in decades in the utility space.Stephen Byrd: You know, what I find interesting about what you just said, Dave, is -- it is impressive to see growth go from one and a half to four per cent, but it's really these local dynamics where what we're seeing is just much more concentrated, and that's where we start to see the real issues with the infrastructure growing quickly enough.So, it's becoming obvious that the existing power grid infrastructure is not meeting the growth and capacity needs of data centers. And that's something that you refer to as the tortoise and the hare. How big of a mismatch are we exactly talking about here, Dave?David Arcaro: It's definitely a big mismatch. To your point before, the US electricity growth across the country has been flattish over the last 10 years.So, this is a step change in expectations now, from the impact from Gen AI going forward. And we're looking at over 100 per cent annual growth in the power consumed by data centers now in the US over the next four years. And for comparison, the US utility industry is growing at about 8 per cent a year.These data centers that are coming are huge. They can be 10 to 50 times as big as the last generation of data centers in terms of their power consumption. And this means it takes time to connect to the electric grid and get power. 12 to 18 months in the best case, three to five years plus in other locations, often because they might need to wait for the electric utility grid to catch up, waiting for grid upgrades and assessments and new power plants to get built.Stephen Byrd: Well, I think those delays are going to be fairly problematic for the fast-moving GenAI sector. So essentially there's a lot of pressure on data center developers to secure a power source as quickly as possible. And in our note, we described the mathematics around that. The time value to get these data centers online is absolutely enormous. But you've just described the power grid infrastructure as a tortoise.So, are there any other alternatives? How about nuclear power plants in this context?David Arcaro: There's a lot of urgency, as you can tell from the data center companies, to get online as fast as possible. It's a fast-moving market, very competitive, they need the power, they need to run these GenAI models as soon as possible. And the utility industry is not used to responding to demand that's coming this quickly.It's a slower moving industry. There's policies and processes and regulation that all utilities have to get through. They're not prepared strategically to move as quickly as the data center industry is moving. So, data center developers are getting creative and they're looking at all options to get power.And one that has an appealing value proposition is nuclear plants. By placing a data center at an existing nuclear plant, this can avoid the need to go through that lengthy electric grid connection process, providing a much faster timeline to get the data center powered up.And that has big benefits for the data center companies, as you can imagine. Nuclear plants also have other advantages. They have land available on site. They have water for cooling, security. It's 24x7 clean power with no emissions, and it's already up and running, so you don't have to go and build much.Over time, we do expect renewables to play a major role as well in powering data centers along with traditional power from the electric grid and even new gas plants, but the benefits of coming online quickly in this market we think, give nuclear an edge.So, Stephen, as much as I can talk about the massive power needs of Gen AI, we can't ignore the issue of sustainability. So, what have you been thinking about when it comes to assessing the potential carbon footprint of powering data centers? What concerns are you seeing?Stephen Byrd: You know, Dave, this field is evolving so quickly that we've had to evolve our assessment of the carbon footprint of GenAI quite quickly as well. You know, traditionally what we would have seen is a data center gets connected to the grid. And then that data center developer would often sign a power contract with a renewable developer. And that results in a very low carbon footprint, if zero in many cases. But going forward, we do see the potential for increased natural gas usage in power plants, higher than we had originally forecast.And that's driven really by two dynamics. The first is the increased potential to site data centers directly at nuclear power plants, which you described, and there are a lot of benefits to doing so. In effect, what's going to happen then is, those data centers will siphon away that nuclear power, so less nuclear power goes to the grid. Something has to make up that deficit. That something is often going to be natural gas fired power plants.The second dynamic that we could see happening is an increased potential for just onsite natural gas fire power generation at the data centers that could provide shorter time to power, and also provide quite good power reliability.Now, when we sum these up and we look at the projected carbon footprint of data centers going forward, we could see an additional 70 million tons a year. We're about half a per cent of 2022 global CO2 emissions for data centers. That is quite a bit higher than we had previously forecast.Now that said, a wild card would be the hyperscalers and others who may decide to consciously offset this by signing additional power contracts with new renewables that could reduce this quite a bit. So, it's very much in flux right now. We frankly don't know what the carbon footprint is really going to look like.David Arcaro: You know, there's so much urgency to bring data centers online quickly that in the past many of these big hyperscalers especially have had quite ambitious sustainability goals and decarbonization goals. I'd say it's an open question on our end as to how flexible they might get in the near term or how strictly they do apply those decarbonization …Stephen Byrd: Exactly…David Arcaro: … targets going forward as they, y’know, also try to compete in an urgent grab for power in the near term.Stephen Byrd: That's exactly right. That's… You laid that tension out quite well.David Arcaro: And finally, from your global perspective, what regions are best positioned to keep pace with the power needs of Gen AI?Stephen Byrd: You know, Dave, I am thinking a lot about what you said a minute ago, about the size of these datacentres moving from, you know, quite small – often we would see datacentres at just 10 or 15 megawatts. Now the new designs are often above 100 megawatts.And now we're starting to hear and see some signs of truly mega data centers, essentially massive supercomputers that could be a thousand megawatts, a couple of thousand megawatts, and could cost tens of billions of dollars to build. So, when we think about that dynamic, that's a lot of power for any one location. So, to go back to your question, we think about the locations. It's very local specific.The dynamics all have to line up correctly, for this to work. So, we see pockets of opportunity around the world. Examples would be Pennsylvania, Texas, Illinois, Malaysia, Portugal -- these are locations for a variety of reasons where policy support is there, the infrastructure growth potential is there, and for a number of reasons, just it's the right confluence of dynamics. Most of the world doesn't have that confluence, so it's going to be very specific. And I think we're also setting up for a lot of concentration in those locations where all these dynamics line up.David Arcaro: You know, historically, the data center industry in the US has been highly concentrated, like you say, in Northern Virginia, in Northern California, they've been data center hubs, but we're running into infrastructure constraints there, we've got to look elsewhere. And some of these factors, geographically, are going to be extremely important.Where is their local support? And one of the dynamics we think could happen is that as you build more data centers that are very power hungry, that could push up the price of power. And what kind of local pushback might you get in that situation? What's the local desire to have a data center from an employment perspective and property tax and local benefit perspective? And how does the cost benefit weigh against the potential for higher power prices in those regions?Stephen Byrd: That's a great point. I mean, in places like Northern Virginia, to your point about property taxes, the value of all this data center equipment is in the tens of billions, which does help local tax revenue quite a bit. That said, there are offsetting impacts such as higher power prices. And this is why I think your original point about the local dynamics mattering so much is so critical because you really do need to see political support, policy support. You need to see the infrastructure that's available.So that's a fairly precious lineup, a fairly rare lineup of all the attributes you need to see to support new giant data center development.David Arcaro: Definitely a delicate balance that the industry needs to tread here as these huge data centers start to come online.Stephen Byrd: Well, I think a delicate balance is a good place to end this discussion. Dave, thanks so much for taking the time to talk.David Arcaro: Great to speak with you, Stephen.And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen to the show, and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

16 Huhti 202410min

Markets are suggesting that spirits consumption will return to historical growth levels post-pandemic, but our Head of European Consumer Staples Research disagrees.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Sarah Simon, Head of the European Consumer Staples team. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll talk about a surprising trend in the global spirits market.It's Monday, April 15, at 2pm in London. We all remember vividly the COVID-19 period when we spent much more on goods than services, particularly on goods that could be delivered to our homes. Not surprisingly, spirits consumption experienced a super-cycle during the pandemic. But as the world returned to normal, the demand for spirits has dropped off. The market believes that after a period of normalization, the US spirits market will return to mid-single-digit growth in line with history; but we think that’s too optimistic.Changes in demographics and consumer behavior make it much more likely that the US market will grow only modestly from here. There are several key challenges to the volume of US alcohol consumption in the coming years. Sobriety and moderation of alcohol intake are two rising trends. In addition, there’s the increased use of GLP-1 anti-obesity drugs, which appear to quell users' appetite for alcoholic beverages. And finally, there’s stiffer regulation, including the lowering of alcohol limits for driving.A slew of recent survey data points to consumer intention to reduce alcohol intake. A February 2023 IWSR survey reported that 50 per cent of US drinkers are moderating their consumption. Meanwhile, a January 2024 NCSolutions survey reported that 41 per cent of respondents are trying to drink less, an increase of 7 percentage points from the prior year. And importantly, this intention was most concentrated among younger drinkers, with 61 per cent of Gen Z planning to drink less in 2024, up from 40 per cent in the prior year's survey. Meanwhile, 49 per cent of Millennials had a similar intention, up 26 per cent year on year.Why is all this happening? And why now? Perhaps the increasingly vocal commentary by public bodies linking alcohol to cancer is really hitting home. Last November, the World Health Organization stated that "the higher the amount of alcohol consumed, the higher the risk of developing cancer" but also that "half of all alcohol-attributable cancers in the WHO European Region are caused by ‘light’ and ‘moderate’ alcohol consumption. A recent Gallup survey of Americans indicated that young adults are particularly concerned that moderate drinking is unhealthy, with 52 per cent holding this view, up from 34 per cent five years ago. Another explanation for the increased prevalence of non-drinking among the youngest group of drinkers may be demographic makeup: the proportion of non-White 18- to 34-year-olds has nearly doubled over the past two decades.And equally, the cost of alcohol, which saw steep price increases in the last couple of years, seems to be a reason for increased moderation. Spending on alcohol stepped up materially over the COVID-19 period when there were more limited opportunities for spending. With life returning to normal post pandemic, consumers have other – more attractive or more pressing – opportunities for expenditure.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen to podcasts. It helps more people to find the show.

16 Huhti 20244min

The math of ‘bond-equity correlation' is complicated. Our head of Corporate Credit Research breaks it down, along with the impact of bond rates on other asset classes.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about why the same factors can have different outcomes for interest rates and credit spreads.It's Friday, April 12th at 2pm in London. Most of 2024 remains to be written. But so far, the financial story has been a tale of two surprises. First, the US Economy continues to be much stronger and hotter than expected, with growth and job creation exceeding initial estimates. Then second, due in part to that strong economy, interest rates have risen materially, with the yield on the US 10-year government bond about half-a-percent higher since early January. More specifically, market attention over the last week has refocused on whether these higher interest rates are a problem for other markets. In math terms, this is the great debate around bond-equity or bond-spread correlation, the extent to which assets move with bond yields, and a really important variable when it comes to thinking about overall portfolio diversification. But this somewhat abstract mathematical idea of correlation can also be simplified. The factors that are driving yields higher might look very different for other asset classes, such as credit. That could argue for a different correlation. Let’s think about how.Consider first why yields have been rising. Economic data has been good, with strong job growth and rising Purchasing Manager Indices or PMIs, conditions that are usually tough for government bonds. Supply has been heavy, with the issuance of Treasuries up substantially relative to last year. The so-called carry on government bonds is bad as the yield on government bond yields is generally lower, much lower, than the yield on cash. And the time-of-year is unhelpful: since 1990, April has been the worst month of the year for government bonds.But take all those same things thought the eyes of a different asset class, such as credit, and they look – well – different. Good economic data should be good for credit; historically, low-but-rising PMIs, as we’ve been seeing recently, is the most credit-friendly regime. Corporate bond supply hasn’t risen nearly as much as the supply for government bonds. The carry for credit is positive, thanks to still-steep credit curves. And the time of year looks very different: over that same period since 1990, April has been the best month of the year for corporate credit – as well as broader stock markets.Government bonds are currently being buffeted by multiple headwinds. Hot economic data, heavy supply, poor yields relative to cash, and unhelpful seasonality. The good news? Well, Morgan Stanley’s interest rate strategists expect these headwinds to be temporary, and still forecast lower yields by year-end. But for other asset classes, including credit, it’s also important to note that that same data, supply, carry and seasonality debate – fundamentally look very different in other asset classes.We think that means that Credit spreads can stay at historically tight levels in April and beyond, even as government bond yields have risen.Thanks for listening. Subscribe to Thoughts on the Market on Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen, and leave us a review. We’d love to hear from you.

12 Huhti 20243min

With global temperatures rising and an increasing urgency to speed progress on the energy transition, our Head of Sustainability Equity Research examines the key materials needed—and the risks of disruption from US-China trade tensions.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Laura Sanchez, Head of Sustainability Equity Research in the Americas. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I’ll discuss a highly topical issue: the impact of US-China trade tensions on the energy transition. It is Thursday, April 11, at 12 pm in New York.Last week, you may have heard my colleagues discuss the geopolitics at play around US-China trade tensions and the energy transition. Today I’m going to elaborate on that discussion, spearheaded by my team, with a deeper dive into the materials and minerals at risk and exactly what is at stake for several industries in the US.When we talk about clean technologies such as electric vehicles, energy storage and solar, it is important to note that minerals such as rare earths, graphite, and lithium — just to name a few — are crucial to their performance. At present, China is a dominant producer of many of those key minerals, whether at the mining level – which is the case with gallium, rare earths and natural graphite; at the refining level – the case for cobalt and lithium; or at the downstream level – that is, the final product, such as batteries and EVs.If trade tensions between the US and China rise, we believe China could implement new or incremental export bans on some of these minerals that are key for western nations’ energy transition as well as for their broad economic and national security.So, we have analyzed over 10 materials and found that the highest risks of disruption exist for rare earths and related equipment, as well as for graphite, gallium, and cobalt. Some minerals have already seen certain export bans but given the lack of diversification across the value chain, we actually see the potential for incremental restrictions.So, this led us to ask our research analysts: how should investors view rising trade tensions in the context of clean technologies’ penetration, specifically?While electric vehicles appear most at risk, we see the largest negative impacts for the clean technology sector as well as for large-scale renewable energy developers. This has to do with China dominating around 70 per cent of the battery supply chain and still having strong indirect ties in the solar supply chain. But there are important nuances to consider for renewable energy developers, such as their ability to pass the higher costs to customers, whether this higher cost could hurt the economics of projects and therefore demand, and the unequal impacts between large and small players – where large, tier 1 developers could actually gain share in the market as they have proven to navigate better through supply chain bottlenecks in the past.On the Autos side, slower EV adoption would naturally impact sentiment on EV-tilted stocks; but as our sector analyst highlights, this could also mean lighter losses near term, as well as market share preservation for the largest EV players in the market. US Metals & Mining stocks would likely see positive moves as further trade tensions incentivize onshoring of mining and increase demand for US-made equipment.Given strong bipartisan support in the US for a more hawkish approach to China, our policy experts believe that the US presidential election is unlikely to lead to easing trade restrictions. Nonetheless, in terms of the energy transition theme, a Republican win could create volatility for trade and corporate confidence, while a Democrat administration would be more sensitive to the balance between protectionism and achieving global climate goals.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

11 Huhti 20244min

Our Global Chief Economist joins our Head of Fixed Income Research to review the most recent Consumer Price Index data, and they lay out potential outcomes in the upcoming U.S. elections that could impact the course of inflation’s trajectory. ----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income and Thematic Research.Seth Carpenter: And I'm Seth Carpenter, Global Chief Economist.Michael Zezas: And on this special episode of Thoughts on the Market, we'll be taking a look at how the 2024 elections could impact the outlook for inflation.It's Wednesday, April 10th at 4pm in New York.Seth, earlier this morning, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics released the Consumer Price Index (CPI) data for March, and it's probably an understatement to say it's been a much-anticipated report -- because it gives us some signal into both the pace of inflation and any potential fed rate cut path for 2024. I want to get into the longer-term picture around what the upcoming US election could mean for inflation. But first, I'd love your immediate take on this morning's data.Seth Carpenter: Absolutely, Mike. This morning's CPI data were absolutely critical. You are right. Much anticipated by markets. Everyone looking for a read through from those data to what it means for the Fed. I think there's no two ways about it. The market saw the stronger than expected inflation data as reducing the likelihood that the Fed would start cutting rates in June.June was our baseline for when the Fed would start cutting rates. And I think we are going to have to sharpen our pencils and ask just how much is this going to make the Fed want to wait? I think over time, however, we still see inflation drifting down over the course of this year and into next year, and so we still think the Fed will get a few rate hikes in.But you wanted to talk longer term, you wanted to talk about elections. And when I think about how elections could affect inflation, it's usually through fiscal policy. Through choices by the President and the Congress to raise taxes or lower taxes, and by choices by the Congress and the President to increase or decrease spending.So, when you think about this upcoming election, what are the main scenarios that you see for fiscal policy and an expansion, perhaps, of the deficit?Michael Zezas: Yeah, I think it's important to understand first that the type of election outcome that historically has catalyzed a deficit expansion is one where one party gets complete control of both the White House and both chambers of Congress.In 2025, what we think this would manifest in if the Democrats had won, is kind of a mix of tax extensions, as well as some spending items that they weren't able to complete during Biden's first term -- probably somewhat offset by some tax increases. On net, we think that would be incremental about $500 billion over 10 years, or maybe $40 [billion] to $50 billion in the first year.If Republicans are in a position of control, then we think you're looking at an extension of most of the expiring corporate tax cuts -- expire at the end of 2025 -- that is up to somewhere around a trillion dollars spread over 10 years, or maybe a hundred to $150 billion in the first year.Seth Carpenter: So, what I'm hearing you say is a wide range of possible outcomes, because you didn't even touch on what might happen if you've got a split government, so even smaller fiscal expansion.So, when I take that range from a truly modest expansion, if at all, with a split government, to a slight expansion from the Democrats, a slightly bigger one from a Republican sweep, I'm hearing numbers that clearly directionally should lead to some inflationary pressures -- but I'm not really sure they're big enough to really start to move the needle in terms of inflationary outcomes.And I guess the other part that we have to keep in mind is the election’s happening in November of this year. The new president, if there's a new president, the new Congress would take seats in the beginning of the year next year. And so, there's always a bit of a lag between when a new government takes control and when legislation gets passed; and then there's another lag between the legislation and the outcome on the economy.And by the time we get to call it the end of 2025 or the beginning of 2026, I think we really will have seen a lot of dissipation of the inflation that we have now. So, it doesn't really sound like, at least from those baseline scenarios that we're talking about a huge impetus for inflation. Would you think that's fair?Michael Zezas: I think that's fair. And then it sort of begs the question of, if not from fiscal policy, is there something we need to consider around monetary policy? And so around the Fed, Chair Powell's term ends in January of 2026 -- meaning potential for a new Fed chair, depending on the next US president.So, Seth, what do you think the election could mean for monetary policy then?Seth Carpenter: Yeah, that's a great question, Mike. And it's one that, as you know well, we tend to get from clients, which is why you and I jointly put out some research with other colleagues on just what scope is there for there to be a -- call it particularly accommodative Fed chair under that Republican sweep scenario.I would say my take is -- not the biggest risk to worry about right now. There are two seats on the Federal Reserve Board that are going to come open for whoever wins the election as president to appoint. That's the chair, clearly very important. And then one of the members of the Board of Governors.But it's critical to remember there's a whole committee. So, there are seven members of the Board of Governors plus five voting members, across the Federal Reserve Bank presidents. And to get a change in policy that is so big, that would have massive inflationary impacts, I really think you'd have to have the whole committee on board. And I just don't see that happening.The Fed is set up institutionally to try to insulate from exactly that sort of, political influence. So, I don't think we would ever get a Fed that would simply rubber stamp any president's desire for monetary policy.Michael Zezas: I think that makes a lot of sense. And then clients tend to ask about two other concerns; with particularly concerns with the Republican sweep scenario, which would be the impact of potentially higher trade tariffs and restrictions on immigration. What's your read here in terms of whether or not either of these are reliable in terms of their impact on inflation?Seth Carpenter: Yeah, super topical. And I would say at the very least, we have some experience now with tariff policy. And what did we see during the last episode where there was the trade war with China? I think it's very natural to assume that higher tariffs mean that the cost of imported goods are going to be higher, which would lead to higher inflation; and to some extent that was true, but it was a much smaller, much more muted effect than I think you might otherwise assume given numbers like 25 per cent tariffs or has been kicked around a few times, maybe 60 per cent tariffs. And the reason for that change is a few things.One, not all of the goods being brought in under tariffs are final consumer goods where the price would just go straight through to something like the CPI. A lot of them were intermediate goods. And so, what we saw in the last round of tariffs was some disruption to US manufacturing, disruption to production in the United States because the cost of production went up.And so, it was as much a supply shock as it was anything else. For those final consumer goods, you could see some pass through; but remember, there's also the offset through the exchange rate, that matters a lot. And, consumers, they have a willingness to pay, or maybe a willingness not to pay, and so, sellers aren't always able to pass through the full cost of the tariffs. And so, as a result, I think the net effect there is some modestly higher inflation, but really, it's important to keep in mind that hit to economic activity that, over time, could actually go in the opposite direction and be disinflationary.Immigration, very different story, and it has been very much in the news recently. And we have seen a huge surge in immigration last year. We expect it to continue this year. And we think it's contributing to the faster run rate that we've seen in the economy without continued inflationary pressure. So, I think it's a natural question to ask -- if immigration was restricted, would we see labor shortages? Would that drive up inflation? And the answer is maybe.However, a few things are really critical. One, the Fed is still in restrictive territory now, and they're only going to start to lower rates if and when we see inflation come down. So the starting point will matter a lot. And second, when we did our projections, we took a lot of input from where the CBO's estimates are, and they've already been assuming that immigration flows really start to normalize a bit in 2025 and a lot more in 2026. Back to run rates that are more like pre-COVID rates. And so, against that backdrop, I think a change in immigration policy might be less inflationary because we'd already be in a situation where those flows were coming down.But that's a good time for me to turn things around, Mike, and throw it right back to you. So, you've been thinking about the elections. You run thematic research here. I've heard you say to clients more than once that there is some scope, but limited scope for macro markets to think about the outcome from the election, but lots of scope from a micro perspective. So, if we were thinking about the effect of the election on equity markets, on individual sectors, what would be your early read on where we should be focusing most?Michael Zezas: So we've long been saying that the reliable market impacts from this election, at least this far out, appear to be more micro than macro. And so, for example, in a Republican sweep scenario, we feel pretty confident that there would be a heavier skew towards extending corporate tax cut provisions that are expiring at the end of 2025.And if you look at who benefits fundamentally from those extensions, it tends to be companies that do more business domestically in the US and tend to be a bit smaller. Sectors that tend to come in the scope include industrials and telecom; and in terms of size of company, it tends to skew more towards small caps.Seth Carpenter: So, I can see that, Mike, but let me make it even more provocative because a question I have got from clients recently is the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which in lots of ways is helping to spur spending on infrastructure, is helping to spur spending on green energy transition. What's the chance that that gets repealed if the outcome, if the election goes to Trump?Michael Zezas: We see the prospects for the IRA to get repealed is quite limited, even in a Republican sweep scenario. The challenge for folks who might not want to see the law exist anymore is that many of the benefits of this law have already been committed; and the geographic area where they've been committed overlays with many of the districts represented by Republicans, who would have to vote for its repeal. And so, they might be voting against the interests of their districts to do that. So, we think this policy is a lot stickier than people perceive. The campaign rhetoric will probably be, pretty elevated around the idea of repealing it; but ultimately, we think most of the money behind the IRA will be quite durable. And this is something that should accrue positively to the clean tech sector in particular.Seth Carpenter: Got it. Well, Mike, as always, I love being able to take time and talk to you.Michael Zezas: Seth, likewise, thanks for taking the time to talk. And as a reminder, if you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us on the Apple podcast app. It helps more people find the show.

10 Huhti 202411min

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist surveys the latest big swings in the oil market, which could lead to opportunities in equities and credit around the energy sector.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, I'll be talking about the implications of recent strong moves in oil markets.It's Tuesday, April 9th at 3pm in New York.A lot is going on in the commodity markets, particularly in the oil market. Oil prices have made a powerful move. What is driving these moves? And how should investors think about this in the context of adjacent markets in equities and credit?Morgan Stanley's Global Commodity Strategist and Head of European Energy Research, Martijn Rats, raised crude oil price forecast for the third quarter to $94 per barrel. The rally in recent weeks is a result of positive fundamental news and rising geopolitical tensions.On the fundamental side, we've had better than expected demand from China and steeper than forecast fall in US production. Further, oil prices have also found support from growing potential for supply uncertainty in the Middle East. Martijn thinks that the last few dollars of rally in oil prices should be interpreted as a premium for rising geopolitical risks. The revision to the third quarter forecast should therefore be seen to reflect these growing geopolitical risks.Our US equity strategists, led by Mike Wilson, have recently upgraded the energy sector. The underlying rationale behind the upgrade is that the energy sector relative performance has really lagged crude oil prices; and unlike many other sectors within the US stock world, valuation in energy stocks is very compelling.Furthermore, the relative earnings revisions in energy stocks are beginning to inflect higher and the sector is actually exhibiting best breadth of any sector across the US equity spectrum. Higher oil prices are also important for credit markets. To quote Brian Gibbons, Morgan Stanley's Head of Energy Credit Research, for credit bonds of oil focused players, flat production levels and strong commodity prices should support free cash flow generation, which in turn should go to both shareholder returns and debt reduction.In summary, there is a lot going on in the energy markets. Oil prices have still some room to move higher in the short term. We find opportunities both in equity and credit markets to express our constructive view on oil prices.Thanks for listening. If you enjoyed the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to this podcast. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

9 Huhti 20242min

Our Global Chief Economist explains why the rapid hikes, pause and pivot of the current interest rate cycle are reminiscent of the 1990s.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the current interest rate cycle and the parallels we can draw from the 1990s.It's Monday, April 8th, at 10am in New York.Last year, we reiterated the view that the 1990s remain a useful cycle to consider for understanding the current cycle. Our European equity strategy colleagues shared our view, and they've used that episode to inform their ‘out of consensus, bullish initiation on European equities’ in January. No two cycles are identical, but as we move closer to a Fed cut, we reassess the key aspects of that comparison.We had previously argued that the current interest rate cycle and the mid 90s cycle differ from the intervening cycles because the goal now is to bring inflation down, rather than preventing it from rising. Of course, inflation was already falling when the 1994 cycle started, in part, because of the recession in 1991.This cycle -- because much of the inflation was driven by COVID-related shocks, like supply chains for consumer goods and shifts in housing for shelter inflation -- inflation started falling rapidly from its peak before the first hike could have possibly had any effect. In recent months, our economic growth forecasts have been regularly revised upward, even as we have largely hit our expected path for inflation.A labor supply shock appears to be a contributing factor that accounts for some of that forecast deviation, although fiscal policy likely contributed to the real side's strength as well. Supply shocks to the labor market are an interesting point of comparison for the two cycles. In the 1990s, labor force growth was still benefiting from this multi-decade rise in labor force participation among females. The aggregate labor force participation rate did not reach its peak until 2000.Now, as we've noted in several publications, the surge in immigration is providing a similar supply side boost, at least for a couple of years. But the key lesson for me for the policy cycle is that monetary policy is not on a pre-set, predetermined course merely rising, peaking and then falling. Cycles can be nuanced. In 1994, the Fed hiked the funds rate to 6 per cent, paused at that peak and then cut 75 basis points over 1995 and 1996. After that, the next policy move was actually a hike, not a cut.Currently, we think the Fed starts cutting rates in June; and for now, we expect that cutting to continue into next year. But as our US team has noted, the supply side revisions mean that the path for policy next year is just highly uncertain and subject to review. From 1994 to 1996, job gains trended down, much like they have over the past two years.That slowing was reflective of a broader slowing in the economy that prompted the Fed to stop hiking and partially reverse course. So, should we expect the same now, only a very partial reversal? Well, it's too soon to tell, and as we've argued, the faster labor supply growth expands both aggregate demand and aggregate supply -- so a somewhat tighter policy stance could be appropriate.In 1996, inflation stopped falling, and subsequently rose into 1997, and it was that development that supported the Fed's decision to maintain their somewhat restrictive policy. But we can't forget, afterward, inflation resumed its downward trajectory, with core PCE inflation eventually falling below 1.5 per cent, suggesting that that need to stop cutting and resume hiking, well, probably needs to be re-examined.So, no two cycles match, and the comparison may break down. To date, the rapid hikes, pause and pivot, along with a seeming soft landing, keeps that comparison alive. The labor supply shock parallel is notable, but it also points to what might be, just might be, another possible parallel.In the late 1990s, there was a rise in labor productivity, and we've written here many times about the potential contributions that AI might bring to labor productivity in coming years.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

8 Huhti 20244min

Oil demand has been higher than expected so far in 2024. Our Global Commodities Strategist explains what could drive oil to $95 per barrel by summer.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Martijn Rats, Morgan Stanley’s Global Commodities Strategist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I’ll discuss recent developments in the oil market. It is Friday, April the 5th at 4 PM in London. At the start of the year, the outlook for the oil market looked somewhat unexciting. With the recovery from COVID largely behind us, growth in oil demand was slowing down. At the same time, supply from countries outside of OPEC (Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries) had been growing strongly and we expected that this would continue in 2024. In fact, at the start of the year it looked likely that growth in non-OPEC supply would meet, or even exceed, all growth in global demand. When that occurs, room in the oil market for OPEC oil is static at best, which in turn means OPEC needs to keep restraining production to keep the balance in the market. Even if it does that, it results in a decline in market share and a build-up of spare capacity. History has often warned against such periods.Still, by early February, the oil market started to look tighter than initially expected. Demand started to surprise positively – partly in jet fuel, as aviation was stronger than expected; partly in bunker fuel as the Suez Canal issues meant that ships needed to take longer routes; and partly in oil as petrochemical feedstock, as the global expansion of steam cracker capacity continues. At the same time, production in several non-OPEC countries had a weak start of the year, particularly in the United States where exceptionally cold weather in the middle of January caused widespread freeze offs at oil wells, putting stronger demand and weaker supply together, and the inventory builds that we expected in the early part of the year did not materialise. By mid-February, we could argue that the oil market looked balanced this year, rather than modestly oversupplied; and by early March, we were able to forecast that oil market fundamentals were strong enough to drive Brent crude oil to $90 a barrel over the summer.Since then, Brent has honed in on that $90 mark quicker than expected. Over the last week or so, the oil market has shown a powerful rally that has the hallmarks of simply tightening fundamentals but also with some geopolitical risk premium creeping back into the price. For now, our base-case forecast for the summer is still for Brent to trade around $90 per barrel as that is where we currently see fundamental support. However, the oil market typically enjoys a powerful seasonal demand tailwind over the summer. And that still lies ahead. And, geopolitical risk is still elevated, for which oil can be a useful diversifier. With those factors, our $95 bull case can also come into play.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

5 Huhti 20243min