EP17: Will Europe make its own nuclear weapons?

Summary:

In this episode we explore the possibility of European countries developing their own nuclear weapons, prompted by Ukrainian President Zelensky's recent comments about the need for nuclear deterrence. We discuss the process of uranium enrichment, a crucial step in nuclear weapon production, highlighting the key role of centrifuges in achieving the necessary level of enrichment. We examine the various companies involved in centrifuge production and the availability of designs from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. We delve into the different methods of delivering nuclear weapons, from simple bombs to more complex intercontinental ballistic missiles. We conclude by speculating on the potential scenarios for European nuclear weapons development, considering the possibility of both cooperative and clandestine acquisition of enrichment technology.

Questions to consider as you read/listen:

1. What factors make it possible for a country with nuclear reactors to develop nuclear weapons?
2. Given current technology and global dynamics, is it likely that any European nations will develop nuclear weapons?
3. How could the spread of nuclear weapons technology in Europe impact global security and international relations?

Long format:

Will Europe develop an endogenous nuclear weapon production capability? What countries in Europe have nuclear reactors? How easy is it to make a nuclear weapon?

At the European Council summit in Brussels on Thursday October 17, 2024, Ukrainian President Zelensky said: "Which of these major nuclear powers suffered? All of them? No. Ukraine (did). Who gave up nuclear weapons? All of them? No. Ukraine. Who is fighting today? Ukraine. Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons and that will be our protection or we should have some sort of alliance. Apart from NATO, today we do not know any effective alliances."

This has spurred a lot of discussion about the future of nuclear weapons in Europe.

What European countries have a nuclear reactor?

France, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Germany hungry, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden

Source:

https://www.statista.com/statistics/792589/operational-nuclear-reactors-european-union-eu-28/#:~:text=As%20of%20September%2C%20there%20were,down%20reactors%2C%20with%2036%20units.

How do you make highly enriched uranium (HEU) from low enrichment uranium (LEU)?

Most commercial reactors use LEU with a concentration of about 3-5% U-235 as fuel. This is why having a nuclear reactor is pretty much a bare minimum entry point for making a nuclear weapon.

LEU needs to be enriched to 90% for it to be considered weapons grade uranium. As a general rule, higher levels of enrichment mean that less uranium is required to produce a weapon. That means warheads can be smaller and lighter, enabling missiles to cover greater distances and aircraft to deliver more weapons.

A nuclear bomb requires about 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of uranium enriched to 90% to 93% U-235.

Once a country can enrich uranium, it can produce enough HEU for a nuclear weapon within months.

It's relatively easier and quicker to enrich LEU to 90 percent needed for weapons-grade uranium than start whole cloth from nothing from natural uranium. Once a country can enrich uranium at all, its breakout time is often just months.

Natural uranium contains 0.7% of the U-235 isotope. The remaining 99.3% is mostly the U-238 isotope which does not contribute directly to the fission process (though it does so indirectly by the formation of fissile isotopes of plutonium). Isotope separation is a physical process to concentrate (‘enrich’) one isotope relative to others. Most reactors are light water reactors (of two types – PWR and BWR) and require uranium to be enriched from 0.7% to 3-5% U-235 in their fuel. This is normal low-enriched uranium (LEU). There is some interest in taking enrichment levels to about 7%, and even close to 20% for certain special power reactor fuels, as high-assay LEU (HALEU).

Centrifugation is the only enrichment process used today. In both gaseous diffusion and centrifuge processes, UF6 gas is used as the feed material. Molecules of UF6 with U-235 atoms are about one percent lighter than the rest, and this difference in mass is the basis of both processes. Isotope separation is a physical process.

The gas is fed into a series of vacuum tubes, each containing a rotor 3 to 5 metres tall and 20 cm diameter. USEC's American Centrifuges are more than 12 m tall and 40-50 cm diameter. The Russian centrifuges are less than one metre tall. Chinese ones are larger, but shorter than Urenco's.

The enriched gas forms part of the feed for the next stages while the depleted UF6 gas goes back to the previous stage. Eventually enriched and depleted uranium are drawn from the cascade at the desired assays.

To obtain efficient separation of the two isotopes, centrifuges rotate at very high speeds, with the outer wall of the spinning cylinder moving at between 400 and 500 metres per second to give a million times the acceleration of gravity.

The output of a centrifuge is measured in “separative work units” (SWU) per year. SWU reflect the effort needed to separate the two uranium isotopes in the enrichment process. A centrifuge with a higher SWU per year can enrich greater quantities of uranium to higher levels in shorter periods of time than a less efficient centrifuge.

Centrifuge stages normally consist of a large number of centrifuges in parallel. Such stages are then arranged in cascade similarly to those for diffusion.

Not a lot of companies in the world make these special purpose centrifuges as you can imagine.

-Centrus Energy (US)

-Louisiana Energy Services (US)

-American Centrifuge Manufacturing, LLC (ACM) (US)

-Urenco (US in the future)

-Orano (France)

-Rosatom (Russia)

However, and most depressing overall perhaps, is that Pakistani scientist AQ Khan has made designs on how to make various grade SWU centrifuges (IR-1 through IR-9) readily available to anyone in the world. (That’s how Iran is able to make its centrifuges without importing them). All one needs is:

• Construction materials, such as carbon fiber, maraging steel and high-strength aluminum;
• Items for electric power control systems, such as frequency convertors and process control software;
• Equipment to operate cascades, such as pressure transducers and vacuum pumps.

(This operation of cascading operations is what Stuxnet exploited)

Beyond the challenges listed above and ignoring for the safe of brevity the actual

The next question is the method of delivery. Dropping a bomb is easy presuming it is stable and small enough and you have a big enough bomber to deliver it.

Delivering a bomb aboard a missile rather than simply dropping it from the air entails mastering both ballistics — all the calculations involved in getting the warhead to its target — and the miniaturization of the nuclear charge so that it can be mounted on the warhead. Not as easy but easily I should think within the expertise of this short list of nations.

An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that requires a guidance and stability control system to direct it thousands of miles accurately without breaking apart is another level. Is that needed now in Europe? Probably not.

So can Europe start to make its own nuclear weapons? Those countries that have nuclear plants, sure. But the choke point maybe the centrifuges to try to import them. In the alternative thanks to AQ Khan these countries can make their own internally.

Is it going to be a breakout (where the US collaboratively sells the centrifuges to them) or a sneakout (where the centrifuges are not sold to them but instead they domestically make them perhaps secretly) event? That’ll be interesting to see.

Sources:

https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/how-do-countries-create-nuclear-weapons

https://op.europa.eu/o/opportal-service/download-handler?identifier=354b0235-181a-4066-b68e-021087a3ebf4&format=pdfa1b&language=en&productionSystem=cellar&part=

https://tutorials.nti.org/nuclear-101/uranium-enrichment/#:~:text=Uranium%20enriched%20to%20concentrations%20above,highly%20enriched%20uranium%20(HEU)

https://theworld.org/stories/2017/11/30/how-build-and-deliver-nuclear-weapon#:~:text=But%20a%20concentration%20of%20some,(18%20pounds)%20of%20plutonium.

https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/22/explainer-controversy-over-iran’s-centrifuges