Special Encore: Will US Tariffs Drive Mexico Closer to China?

Special Encore: Will US Tariffs Drive Mexico Closer to China?

Original Release Date November 22, 2024: Our US Public Policy Strategist Ariana Salvatore and Chief Latin America Equity Strategist Nikolaj Lippmann discuss what Trump’s victory could mean for new trade relationships.


----- Transcript -----


Andrew Sheets: 2024 was a year of transition for economies and global markets. Central banks began easing interest rates, U.S. elections signaled significant policy change, and Generative AI made a quantum leap in adoption and development.

Thank you for listening throughout 2024, as we navigated the issues and events that shaped financial markets, and society. We hope you'll join us next year as we continue to bring you the most up to date information on the financial world. This week, please enjoy some encores of episodes over the last few months and we'll be back with all new episodes in January. From all of us on Thoughts on the Market, Happy Holidays, and a very Happy New Year.

Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Morgan Stanley's US Public Policy Strategist.

Nikolaj Lippmann: And I'm Nik Lippmann, Morgan Stanley's Chief Latin American Equity Strategist.

Ariana Salvatore: Today, we're talking about the impact of the US election on Mexico's economy, financial markets, and its trade relationships with both the US and China.

It's Friday, November 22nd at 10am in New York.

The US election has generated a lot of debate around global trade, and now that Trump has won, all eyes are on tariffs. Nik, how much is this weighing on Mexico investors?

Nikolaj Lippmann: It’s interesting because there's kind of no real consensus here. I'd say international and US investors are generally rather apprehensive about getting in front of the Trump risk in Mexico; while, interestingly enough, most Mexico-based investors and many Latin American investors think Trump is kind of good news for Mexico, and in many cases, even better news than Biden or Harris. Net, net, Mexican peso has sold off. Mexico's now down 25 per cent in dollar terms year to date, while it was flat to up three, four, 5 per cent around May. So, we've already seen a lot being priced then.

Ariana, what are your expectations for Trump's trade policy with regards to Mexico?

Ariana Salvatore: So, Mexico has been a big part of the trade debate, especially as we consider this question of whether or not Mexico represents a bridge or a buffer between the US and China. On the tariff front, we've been clear about our expectations that a wide range of outcomes is possible here, especially because the president can do so much without congressional approval.

Specifically on Mexico, Trump has in the past threatened an increase in exchange for certain policy concessions. For example, back in 2019, he threatened a 5 per cent tariff if the Mexican government didn't send emergency authorities to the southern border. We think given the salience of immigration as a topic this election cycle, we can easily envision a scenario again in which those tariff threats re-emerge.

However, there's really a balance to strike here because the US is Mexico's main trading partner. That means any changes to current policy will have a substantial impact.

So, Nik, how are you thinking about these changes? Are all tariff plans necessarily a negative? Or do you see any potential opportunities for Mexico here?

Nikolaj Lippmann: Look, I think there are clear risks, but here are my thoughts. It would be very hard for the United States to de-risk from China and de-risk from Mexico simultaneously. Here it becomes really important to double-click on the differences in the manufacturing ecosystems in North America versus Southeast Asia and China.

The North American model is really very integrated. US companies are by a mile the biggest investor. In Mexico – and Mexican exports to the US kind of match the Mexican import categories – the products go back and forth. Mexico has evolved from a place of assembly to a manufacturing ecosystem. 25 years ago, it was more about sending products down, paint them blue, put a lid on it. Now there's much more value add.

The link, however, is still alive. It's a play on enhancing US competitiveness. You can kind of, as you did, call it a China buffer; a fender that helps protect US competitiveness. But by the end of the day, I think integration and alignment is going to be the key here.

Ariana Salvatore: But of course, it's not just the direct trade relationship between the US and Mexico. We need to also consider the global geopolitical landscape, and specifically this question of the role of China. What's Mexico's current trade policy like with China?

Nikolaj Lippmann: Another great question, Ariana, and I think this is the key. There is growing evidence that China is trying to use Mexico as a China bridge.

And I think this is an area where we will see the biggest adjustments or need for realignment. This is a debate we've been following. We saw, with interest, that Mexico introduced first a 25 per cent tariff and then a 35 per cent tariff on Chinese imports. And saw this as the initial signs of growing alignment between the two countries.

However, Mexican import from China never really dropped. So, we started looking at like the complicated math saying 35 per cent times $115 billion of import. You know, best case scenario, Mexico should be collecting $40 billion from tariffs; that's huge and almost unrealistic number for Mexico. Even half of that would go a long way to solve fiscal challenges in that country.

However, when we started looking at the actual tax collection from Chinese imports, it was closer to $3 billion, as we highlighted in a note with our Mexico economist just recently. There's just multiple discounts and exemptions to effective tariffs at neither 25 per cent nor 35 per cent, but actually closer to 2.5 [or] 3 per cent. I think there's a problem with Chinese content in Mexican exports, and I think it's likely to be an area that policymakers will examine more closely. Why not drive-up US or North American content?

Ariana Salvatore: So, it sounds like what you're saying is that there is a political, or rhetorical at least, alignment between the US and Mexico when it comes to China. But the reality is that the policy implementation is not yet there.

We know that there's currently nothing in the USMCA treaty that prevents Mexico from importing goods from China. But a lot has changed over the past four years, even since the pandemic. So, looking forward, do you expect Mexico's policy vis-a-vis China to change after Trump takes office?

Nikolaj Lippmann: I think, I certainly think so, and I think this is again; this is going to be the key. As you mentioned, there's nothing in the USMCA treaty that prevents Mexico from buying the stuff from China. And it's not a customs union. Mexican consumers, much like American consumers, like to buy cheap stuff.

However, the geopolitics that you refer to is important. And when I reflect, frankly, on the bilateral relationship between the two countries, I think Mexican policymakers need to perhaps pause and think a little bit about things like the spirit of the treaty and not just the letter of the treaty; and also about how to maintain public opinion support in the United States.

By the end of the day, when we see what has happened with regards to China after the pandemic, it has been a significant change in political consensus and public opinion. When I think Americans are not necessarily interested in just using Mexico as a China bridge for Chinese products.

During the first Trump administration, the NAFTA agreement was renegotiated as the US Mexico Canada agreement, the USMCA, that took effect or took force in mid 2020. This agreement will come under review in 2026.

Ariana, what are the expectations for the future of this agreement under the Trump administration?

Ariana Salvatore: So, I think this USMCA review that's coming up in 2026 is going to be a really critical litmus test of the US-Mexico relationship, and we're going to learn a lot about this China bridge or buffer question that you mentioned. Just for some very brief context, that agreement as you mentioned was signed in 2020, but it includes a clause that lets all parties evaluate the agreement six years into a 16-year time horizon.

So, at that point, they can decide to extend the agreement for another 16 years. Or to conduct a joint review on an annual basis until that original 16 years lapses. So, although the agreement will stay in force until at least 2036, the review period, which is around June of [20]26, provides an opportunity for the signing parties to provide recommendations or propose changes to the agreement short of a full-scale renegotiation.

We do see some overlapping objectives between the two parties. For example, things like updating the foundation for digital trade and AI, ensuring the endurance of labor protections, and addressing Mexico's energy sector. But Trump's approach likely will involve confronting the auto EV disputes and could possibly introduce an element of immigration policy within the revision. We also definitely expect this theme of Chinese investment in Mexico to feature heavily in the USMCA review discussions.

Finally, Nik, keeping in mind everything that we've discussed today, with global supply chains getting rewired post the pandemic, Mexico has been a beneficiary of the nearshoring trend. Do you think this is going to change as we look ahead?

Nikolaj Lippmann: So, look, we [are] still underweight Mexico, but I think risk ultimately biased with the upside over time with regards to trade.

We need evidence to be able to lay it out, these scenarios; Mexico could end up doing quite well with Trump. But much work needs to be done south of the border with regards to all the areas that we just mentioned there, Ariana.

When we reflect on this over the next couple of years, there's a couple of things that really stand out. Number one is that first wave of reshoring or nearshoring, which was really focused on brownfield. It was bringing our manufacturing ecosystems where we already had existing infrastructure.

What is potentially next, and what we're going to be watching in terms of sort of policy maker incentives and so on, will be some of the greenfield manufacturing ecosystems. That could involve things like IT hardware, maybe EV batteries, and a couple of other really important sectors.

Ariana Salvatore: And that's something we might get some insight into when we hear personnel appointments from President-elect Trump over the coming months. Nik, thanks so much for taking the time to talk.

Nikolaj Lippmann: Thank you very much, Arianna.

Ariana Salvatore: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen, and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

Episoder(1540)

Special Encore: Almost Human: Robots in Our Near Future

Special Encore: Almost Human: Robots in Our Near Future

Original release date July 23, 2024: Our Head of Global Autos & Shared Mobility discusses what makes humanoid robots a pivotal trend with implications for the global economy.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Adam Jonas, Morgan Stanley’s Head of Global Autos & Shared Mobility. Today I’ll be talking about an unusual but hotly debated topic: humanoid robots. It’s Tuesday, July 23rd, at 10am in New York.We've seen robots on factory floors, in displays at airports and at trade shows – doing work, performing tasks, even smiling. But over the last eighteen months, we seem to have hit a major inflection point. What's changed? Large Language Models and Generative AI. The current AI movement is drawing comparisons to the dawn of the Internet. It’s begging big, existential questions about the future of the human species and consciousness itself. But let’s look at this in more practical terms and consider why robots are taking on a human shape. The simplest answer is that we live in a world built for humans. And we’re getting to the point where – thanks to GenAI – robots are learning through observation. Not just through rudimentary instruction and rules based heuristic models. GenAI means robots can observe humans in action doing boring, dangerous and repetitive tasks in warehouses, in restaurants or in factories. And in order for these robots to learn and function most effectively, their design needs to be anthropomorphic. Another reason we're bullish on humanoid robots is because developers can have these robots experiment and learn from both simulation and physically in areas where they’re not a serious threat to other humans. You see, many of the enabling technologies driving humanoid robots have come from developments in autonomous cars. The problem with autonomous cars is that you can't train them on public roads without directly involving innocent civilians – pedestrians, children and cyclists -- into that experiment. Add to all of this the issue of critical labor shortages and challenging demographic trends. The global labor total addressable market is around $30 trillion (USD) or about one-third of global GDP. We’ve built a proprietary US total addressable market model examining labor dynamics and humanoid optionality across 831 job classifications, working with our economics team; and built a comprehensive survey across 40 sectors to understand labor intensity and humanoid ability of the workforce over time. In the United States, we forecast 40,000 humanoid units by 2030, 8 million by 2040 and 63 million by 2050 – equivalent to around $3 trillion (USD) of salary equivalent. But as early as 2028 we think you're going to see significant adoption beginning in industries like manufacturing, production, warehousing, and logistics, installation, healthcare and food prep. Then in the 2030s, you’re going to start adding more in healthcare, recreational and transportation. And then after 2040, you may see the adoption of humanoid robots go vertical. Now you might say – that’s 15 years from now. But just like autonomous car – the end state might be 20 years away, but the capital formation is happening right now. And investors should pay close attention because we think the technological advances will only accelerate from here. Thanks for listening. And if you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

20 Aug 20243min

Why Immigration Matters for Global Economies

Why Immigration Matters for Global Economies

Our Global Chief Economist explains what stricter immigration policy in key markets around the world could mean for economic growth and inflation.----- Transcript -----Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll discuss a key driver of the global economy, migration.It's Monday, August 19th at 10am in New York.Migration has always been an important feature of the global economy.Not surprisingly, migrants typically move from lower income countries to higher income countries and for more than 50 years, it has added something like three-tenths of a percent per year to the growth of high-income economies. But in recent years, migration trends have been hit by a couple of major events.One was COVID. International travel restrictions during the pandemic slowed, or stopped, migration for a while. Despite a strong rebound over the past two years, many economies still have not fully recovered to pre-COVID migration trends. Another is geopolitical unrest. The Ukrainian refugee crisis, for example, is the largest population displacement in Europe since WWII with increasingly global repercussions.But how does immigration affect economies? One way that I frame the discussion is that immigration can boost both aggregate supply and aggregate demand. It's likely some of each -- and the relative importance of those two affects how inflationary or disinflationary the phenomenon is.In 2023, with a very large influx of immigrants into the US labor market, the economy was able to grow rapidly while still seeing inflation fall. The supply effect dominated the demand effect. In Australia, by contrast, with more of the immigrants in school or otherwise not in the labor market, prices -- especially for housing -- have gone up because demand was relatively more important.But some of the effects will only play out over time. Across many developed market economies, economic activity has risen less than population, meaning that measured productivity is lower. But we think that is just a lagged effect of the response of capital investment to the rise in labor. Over a longer time horizon, immigration can also offset demographic declines. Since 2021 population growth in many high-income economies has turned negative, if you exclude immigrants. Sustaining economic growth and managing government debt loads are made much more difficult with an aging, and then declining population, as a baseline.We assume that immigration will revert to pre-COVID trends in 2024 and [20]25 for most economies. This delta is largest for the economies with the highest immigration rates, like Canada or Australia; but for other economies, policies, cultural norms, those will determine the path for immigration.The key, however, is that immigration can be a critical component of demographic trends. In the US, the best estimate of net immigration was about 3.3 million people in 2023, and we assume it will taper from there to something closer to 2.5 million in 2025. That addition to the labor market created what Fed Chair Powell called “a bigger, but not tighter economy.”For people following the economy in real time, the extra availability of labor is also why we have argued that the rise in the unemployment rate over the past year or so is not the harbinger of recession that it has been in past cycles.Now, looking ahead, one key risk to our forecasts -- well everywhere around the world -- would be an abrupt tightening in immigration policy that causes the flow of workers to fall quickly or even end. Such a scenario would imply a much sharper economic slowdown and possibly higher inflation in the economies where the supply boost has dominated. That's yet another reason why elections and government policy remain key to the economic outlook.Well, thanks for listening. And if you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.

19 Aug 20244min

Strong Balance Sheets, Cautious Boardrooms

Strong Balance Sheets, Cautious Boardrooms

Our Head of Corporate Credit Research explains how corporate balance sheets have remained resilient post-COVID, and why that could continue in the face of a potential economic slowdown.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll discuss how corporate balance sheets are in a better place to handle a potential growth slowdown. It's Friday, August 16th at 2pm in London. Much of the volatility over the last several weeks has been centered around fears that excessively high interest rates from the Federal Reserve will now cause the US economy to slow too quickly. Morgan Stanley’s economists are more optimistic and believe that the data will hold up, leading the Fed to start a gradual rate cutting cycle in September, rather than a more radical course-correction. Against this backdrop, good economic data is good for markets and vice versa. But even though we remain optimistic at Morgan Stanley about a soft landing in the US economy, our economists still expect growth to slow. How prepared are corporate balance sheets for that slowing, and how worried should we be that this could lead to higher rates of default? A good place to start is thinking about how optimistic companies were heading into any slowdown of the economy. Overconfidence is often the enemy of credit investors, as rose-tinted glasses can lead companies to make too many unwise acquisitions or investments, funded with too much debt. Yet across a variety of metrics, this isn’t what we see. Despite some of the lowest interest rates in human history, the level of debt to cash-flow for US and European companies has been pretty stable over the last five years. Excess capital held by banks remains historically high. And Merger and Acquisition activity, another key measure of corporate confidence, remains well below the long run trend – even after a pick up this year, as my colleague Ariana Salvatore discussed on this program earlier in the week. So, despite the strong recovery in the US economy and the stock market over the last four years, many corporate boardrooms have remained cautious, a good thing when considering their financial risk. Where Corporate debt did increase, it was often in places that we think could withstand it. Large-cap Technology and Pharmaceuticals issuers have taken out more debt over the last several years, relative to history, but it's been a pretty modest amount from a pretty low historical starting point. The Utility sector has also taken on more debt recently, but the stable nature of its business may make this easier to handle. While companies across the ratings spectrum generally didn’t increase their leverage over the last several years, they did take advantage of refinancing the debt they already had at historically low rates. And this is important for thinking about the stress that higher interest rates could eventually produce. The average maturity in the US Investment Grade index is about 11 years, and that means that, for many companies, potentially less than one-tenth of their overall debt resets to the current interest rate every year. That means companies may still have many years of enjoying the low interest rates of the past, and that helps smooth the adjustment to higher interest rates in the future. The lack of corporate confidence since COVID means that corporate balance sheets are generally in a better place if the economy potentially slows. But while this is helpful overall, it’s important to note that it doesn’t apply in all cases. We still see plenty of dispersion between winners and losers, driving divergence under the hood of the credit market. Even if balance sheets are stronger overall, there is plenty of opportunity to pick your spots. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

16 Aug 20243min

Will the US Dollar Remain Strong Post-Election?

Will the US Dollar Remain Strong Post-Election?

Our US Public Policy and Currency experts discuss how different outcomes in the upcoming U.S. elections could have varying effects on the strength of the dollar.----- Transcript -----Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore from Morgan Stanley's U.S. Public Policy Research Team. And I'mAndrew Watrous: And I'm Andrew Watrous, G10 Currency Strategist.Ariana Salvatore: On this episode of the podcast, we'll discuss an issue that's drawing increasing attention from investors leading up to the U.S. election -- and that is the U.S. dollar and how a Harris or Trump administration could impact it.It's Thursday, August 15th at 10am in New York.Earlier this year, Morgan Stanley experts came on this show to discuss the current strength of the US dollar, which has had quite a historic run.Now we all know there are numerous ways in which politics could affect the currency. But before we get into the details there, Andrew, can you just set the stage here a little bit and give some context to listeners on where the dollar is right now and what's been driving that performance?Andrew Watrous: Yeah, the dollar's been rising this year. So, if you look at a trade weighted gauge of the US dollar, it's up about 3 percent, so far. And part of that US dollar strength is because growth expectations for the US have risen since January. There's a survey of Wall Street economists, and if you look at their median forecast for the US growth, it's moved up about one percentage point since January.And as a result of that strong US growth, we've seen Fed policy expectations move higher. We started this year with the market pricing the Fed to be below 4 percent by December. And that expectation for where the Fed is going to be in December has moved up about 1 percentage point since January.So, robust US growth and a higher near-term Fed policy rate expectation have made the US more attractive as an investment destination. And that's boosted the US dollar broadly as capital flows to the US.Ariana Salvatore: That makes sense. Now, thinking about the balance of the year, it's impossible to look ahead and not consider how the US election could impact or change this trend that you've been talking about. As we get closer to November, investors are also starting to question just what will happen to the dollar in a Republican or Democratic win. What's been our approach to thinking through that question?Andrew Watrous: So, if you look at policies proposed by the Republican presidential campaign, a number of those policies, if implemented, would probably boost the US dollar.First, higher tariffs on goods imported from our trading partners could weigh on expectations for growth abroad. That would make the US more attractive in comparison, maybe send capital to the US as a safe haven due to policy uncertainty. And of all the scenarios we look at, we think that one where the Republicans control both Congress and the White House would be the scenario in which the federal government spends the most and issues the most debt.More spending would likely make US growth expectations and bond yields higher in comparison to what we'd see in the rest of the world. So, a Republican presidential administration could attempt to offset some of that US dollar strength; but in the near term we think that the US dollar should go up if a Republican White House looks increasingly likely. And on the other side, the dollar could go down if the likelihood of a Democratic White House looks increasingly likely -- as some positive risk premium around trade and fiscal policy is reduced.Ariana Salvatore: Okay, so you mentioned quite a few policy variables there. Let's take those issue areas one by one. On trade policy and geopolitical risk, it wouldn't surprise us from the policy side to see a potential Trump administration introduce tariffs, just given the rhetoric we've seen on the campaign trail. We've talked about the potential impact from 10 per cent universal -- targeted or one-for-one tariffs -- which all come with varying degrees of economic impacts.On the currency side, Andrew, walk us through your thought process on how the risks to growth expectations from tariffs could factor into dollar positive or negative outcomes.Andrew Watrous: So, a lot of our thinking on this is shaped by what we saw in 2018 and 2019, when there were trade tensions. During that period, the dollar moved higher, starting in spring 2018 until the end of 2019, and a big part of that dollar strength was probably due to trade tensions between the US and China. Those tensions meant that investors were probably more hesitant to take on risk outside the US than they otherwise may have been. That's why the US dollar kept rising during that period, despite the Fed cutting rates three times in 2019. And in 2018 and 2019, we saw expectations for growth in countries outside the US moving lower -- in part because of trade tensions during that period.So, from speaking to my colleagues in the economics department here at Morgan Stanley, it seems pretty plausible that something similar happens to expectations for growth outside the US, again, if another trade war looks increasingly likely. And that drop in what people expect for growth outside the US would probably boost the US dollar as the US looks more attractive in comparison.Ariana Salvatore: Got it. Now, shifting gears slightly to the fiscal policy outlook. We've said that the Republican sweep outcome is the most likely to lead to the greatest degree of fiscal expansion, and that's because we think lawmakers are going to have to contend with the expiring Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. We think that in a divided government outcome, or a Democratic sweep, some of those tax measures are still on the table, but it'll probably be a narrower extension from a deficit standpoint.So, Andrew, what would a fiscally expansionary regime mean for the dollar?Andrew Watrous: So, as you mentioned, the most fiscally expansionary scenario would be a Republican sweep scenario. And we did some research into capital flows; and the Treasury data show that historically, higher US spending is associated with net inflows of private capital into the US. And if you look at the pace of US spending versus the pace of spending in Europe, if you look at that differential -- that differential is positively correlated to movements in Euro. So faster US spending means lower Euro relative to spending in Europe.Ariana Salvatore: So, we expect that a Republican administration's policies might strengthen the dollar in summary. But it's possible that they don't like that dollar strength. We've heard Trump talk about the benefits of a weaker currency for exports, for example. So, what might a Republican presidential administration try to do to maybe offset some of the strength?Andrew Watrous: Yeah, so if we’re right and the Republican policies do strengthen the dollar, that Republican administration could try to offset that dollar strength with a number of policy tools. And those might be effective in weakening the US dollar against one or more of our trading partners. But we don't think that the market expectation of those dollar negative policy options would fully offset the effect of other Republican policies, which would boost the dollar.There are legal, logistical, and political challenges associated with a lot of those dollar negative policy options. So, for example, former US Trade Representative Lighthizer has reportedly expressed doubt about the viability of broad international coordinated intervention against the US dollar. He said that no policy advisor that he knows of is working on a plan to weaken the dollar. And former President Trump reportedly rejected a 2019 proposal to intervene against the dollar from former White House Trade Advisor Peter Navarro.Ariana Salvatore: Got it. So, sounds like we have a lot of moving pieces here and we will keep refining our views as we get some more policy clarity in the coming months. Andrew, thanks for taking the time to talk.Andrew Watrous: Great speaking with you Ariana.Ariana Salvatore: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy thoughts on the market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

15 Aug 20247min

Can Vacant Offices Help Solve the US Housing Crisis?

Can Vacant Offices Help Solve the US Housing Crisis?

The rise in unused office space has triggered suggestions about converting commercial real estate into residential buildings. But our US Real Estate Research analyst lists three major challenges.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Adam Kramer, from the Morgan Stanley U.S. Real Estate Research team. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I’ll discuss a hot real estate topic. Whether the surplus of vacant office space offers a logical solution to the national housing shortage.It’s Wednesday, August 14, at 10am in New York.Sitting here in Morgan Stanley’s office at 1585 Broadway, Times Square is bustling and New York seems to have recovered from COVID and then some. But the reality inside buildings is a little bit different. On the one hand, 14 percent of U.S. office space is sitting unused. Our analysis shows a permanent impairment in office demand of roughly 25 percent compared to pre-COVID. And on the other hand, we have a national housing shortage of up to 6 million units. So why not simply remove obsolete lower-quality office stock and replace it with much-needed housing? On the surface, the idea of office-to-residential conversion sounds compelling. It could revitalize struggling downtown areas, creating a virtuous cycle that can lead to increased local tax revenues, foot traffic, retail demand and tourism.But is it feasible?We think conversions face at least three significant challenges. First, are the economics of conversion. In order for conversions to make sense, we would need to see office rents decline or apartment rents rise materially – which is unlikely in the next 1-2 years given the supply dynamics — and office values and conversion costs would need to decline materially. Investors can acquire or develop a multifamily property at roughly $600 per square foot. Alternatively, they can acquire and convert an existing office building for a total cost of nearly $700 per square foot, on average. The bottom line is that total conversion costs are higher than acquisition or ground-up development, with more complexity involved as well. The second big challenge is the quality of the buildings themselves. Numerous elements of the physical building impact conversion feasibility. For example, location relative to transit and amenities. Buildings in suboptimal locations are unlikely to be considered. Whether the office asset is vacant or not is also a factor. Office leases are typically longer duration, and a building needs to be close to or fully vacant for a full conversion. And lastly, physical attributes such as architecture, floor-plate depth, windows placement, among others. And finally, regulation presents a third major hurdle. Zoning and building code requirements differ from city to city and can add substantive time, cost, complexity, and limitations to any conversion project. That said, governments are in a unique position to encourage conversions — for example, via tax incentives – and literally remake cities short on affordable housing but with excess, underutilized office space.We have looked at conversion opportunities in three key markets: New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. In Manhattan, active office to residential conversions have been concentrated in the Financial District, and we think this trend will continue. We also see the East Side of Manhattan as a uniquely untapped opportunity for future conversions, given higher vacancy today. This would shift existing East Side office tenants to other locations, boosting demand in higher-quality office neighborhoods like Park Avenue and Grand Central.In San Francisco, we are concerned about other types of real estate properties beyond just office. Retail, multifamily, and lodging in the downtown area are taking longer to recover post-COVID, and we think this will limit conversions in the market. And finally, in Washington, D.C. we think conversion would work best for older, Class B/C office buildings on the edges of pre-existing residential areas. In these three markets, and others, conversions could work in specific instances, with specific buildings in specific sub-markets. But on a national basis, the economic and logistic challenges of wide-scale conversions make this an unlikely solution.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

14 Aug 20244min

US Election Should Not Dim M&A Resurgence

US Election Should Not Dim M&A Resurgence

Our US Public Policy Strategist expects a robust M&A cycle, regardless of the outcome of the US election. But rising antitrust concerns could create additional scrutiny on possible future deals. ----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Ariana Salvatore, from Morgan Stanley’s US Public Policy Research Team. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I’ll talk about the impact of the US election on M&A. It’s Tuesday, August 13th, at 10am in New York.2023 saw the lowest level of global mergers and acquisitions – or M&A – in more than 30 years, relative to the overall size of the economy. But we believe that the cycle is currently reversing in a significant way and that politics won't halt the "Return of M&A." Why? Because M&A cycles are primarily driven by broader factors. Those include macroeconomics, the business cycle, CEO confidence and financing conditions. More specifically, unusually depressed volumes, open new issue markets, incoming rate cuts and the bottom-up industry trends are powerful tailwinds to an M&A recovery and can offset the political headwinds. So far this year we’ve seen an increase in deal activity. Announced M&A volume was up 20 per cent year-over-year in the first half of [20]24 versus [20]23, and we continue to expect M&A volumes to rise in 2024 as part of this broader, multi-year recovery. That being said, one factor that can impact M&A is antitrust regulation. Investors are reasonably concerned about the ways in which the election outcome could impact antitrust enforcement – and whether or not it would even be a tailwind or a headwind. If you think about traditional Republican attitudes toward deregulation, you might think that antitrust enforcement could be weaker in a potential Trump win scenario; but when we look back at the first Trump administration, we did see various antitrust cases pursued across a number of sectors. Further, we’ve seen this convergence between Republicans and Democrats on antitrust enforcement, specifically the vice presidential pick JD Vance has praised Lina Khan, the current FTC chair, for some of her efforts on antitrust in the Biden administration. In that vein, we do think there are certain circumstances that could cause a deal to come under scrutiny regardless of who wins the election. First, on a sector basis, we think both parties share a similar approach toward antitrust for tech companies. Voters across the ideological spectrum seem to want their representatives to focus on objectives like 'breaking up big tech' and targeting companies that are perceived to have outsized control. We also think geopolitics is really important here. National security concerns are increasingly being invoked as a consideration for M&A involving foreign actors, in particular if the deal involves a geopolitical adversary like China. We’ve seen lawmakers invoke these kind of concerns when justifying increased scrutiny for proposed deals. Finally, key constituencies' positions on proposed deals could also matter. The way that a deal might impact key voter cohorts – think labor unions, for example – could also play a role in determining whether or not that deal comes under extra scrutiny. We will of course keep you updated on any changes to our M&A outlook. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

13 Aug 20243min

Pay Attention to Data, Not Market Drama

Pay Attention to Data, Not Market Drama

Recent market volatility has made headlines, but our Global Chief Economist explains why the numbers aren’t as dire as they seem.----- Transcript -----Seth Carpenter: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about central banks, the Bank of Japan, Federal Reserve, data and how it drove market volatility.It's Monday, August 12th at 10am in New York.You know, if life were a Greek tragedy, we might call it foreshadowing. But in reality, it was probably just an unfortunate coincidence. The BOJ's website temporarily went down when the policy announcement came out. As it turns out, expectations for the BOJ and the Fed drove the market last week. Going into the BOJ meeting consensus was for a September hike, but July was clearly in play.The market's initial reaction to the decision itself was relatively calm; but in the press conference following the decision, Governor Ueda surprised the markets by talking about future hikes. Some hiking was already priced in, and Ueda san's comments pushed the amount priced in up by another, call it 8 basis points, and it increased volatility.In the aftermath of that market volatility, Deputy Governor Yoshida shifted the narrative again, by stressing that the BOJ was attuned to market conditions and that there was no fundamental change in the BOJ's strategy. But this heightened attention on the BOJ's hiking cycle was a critical backdrop for the US non farm payrolls two days later.The market knew the BOJ would hike, and knew the Fed would cut, but Ueda san's tone and the downside surprise to payrolls ignited two separate but related market risks: A US growth slowdown and the yen carry trade.The Fed's July meeting was the same day as the BOJ decision, and Chair Powell guided markets to a September rate cut. Prior to July, the FOMC was much more focused on inflation after the upside surprises in the first quarter. But as inflation softened, the dual mandate came into a finer balance. The shift in focus to both growth and inflation was not missed by markets; and then payrolls at about 114, 000 in July. Well, that was far from disastrous; but because the print was a miss relative to expectations on the heel of a shift in that focus, the market reaction was outsized.Our baseline view remains a soft landing in the United States; and those details we discussed extensively in our monthly periodical. Now, markets usually trade inflections, but with this cycle, we have tried to stress that you have to look at not just changes, but also the level of the economy. Q2 GDP was at 2.6 per cent. Consumer spending grew at 2.3 per cent. And the three-month average for payrolls was at 170, 000 -- even after the disappointing July print.Those are not terribly frightening numbers. The unemployment rate at 4.3 per cent is still low for the United States. And 17 basis points of that two-tenths rise last month; well, that was an increase in labor force participation. That's hardly the stuff of a failing labor market.So, while these data are backward looking, they are far from recessionary. Markets will always be forward looking, of course; but the recent hard data cannot be ignored. We think the economy is on its way to a soft landing, but the market is on alert for any and all signs for more dramatic weakness.The data just don't indicate any accelerated deterioration in the economy, though. Our FX Strategy colleagues have long said that Fed cuts and BOJ hikes would lead to yen appreciation. But this recent move? It was rapid, to say the least. But if we think about it, the pair really has only come into rough alignment with the Morgan Stanley targets based on just interest rate differentials alone.We also want to stress the fundamentals here for the Bank of Japan as well. We retain our view for cautious rate hikes by the BOJ with the next one coming in January. That's not anything dramatic because over the whole forecast that means that real rates will stay negative all the way through the end of 2025.These themes -- the deterioration in the US growth situation and the appreciation of the yen -- they're not going away anytime soon. We're entering a few weeks of sparse US data, though, where second tier indicators like unemployment insurance claims, which are subject to lots of seasonality, and retail sales data, which tend to be volatile month to month and have had less correlation recently with aggregate spending, well, they're going to take center stage in the absence of other harder indicators.The normalization of inflation and rates in Japan will probably take years, not just months, to sort out. The pace of convergence between the Fed and the BOJ? It's going to continue to ebb and flow. But for now, and despite all the market volatility, we retain our outlook for both economies and both central banks. We see the economic fundamentals still in line with our baseline views.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy this show, please leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

12 Aug 20245min

Rate Cut Ripple

Rate Cut Ripple

As markets adjust to global volatility, our Head of Corporate Credit Research considers when the Fed might choose to cut interest rates and how long the impacts may take to play out.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll discuss the market’s expectation for much larger rate cuts from the Federal Reserve, and how much that actually matters.It's Friday, August 9th at 2pm in London.Markets have been volatile of late. One of the drivers has been rising concern that the Fed may have left interest rates too high for too long, and now needs to more dramatically course-correct. From July 1st through August 2nd, the market’s expectation for where the Fed’s target interest rate will be in one year’s time has fallen by more than 1 percent. But…wait a second. We’re talking about interest rates here. Isn’t a shift towards expecting lower interest rates, you know, a good thing? And that seems especially relevant in the recent era, where strong markets often overlapped with fairly low interest rates. Zoom out over a longer span of history, however, and that’s not always the case.Interest rates, especially the rates from the Federal Reserve, are often a reflection of economic strength. And so high interest rates often overlap with strong growth, while a weak economy needs the support that lower rates provide. And so if interest rates are falling based on concern that the economy is weakening, which we think describes much of the last two weeks, it’s easier to argue why credit or equity markets wouldn’t like that outcome at all.That’s especially true because of the so-called lag in monetary policy. If the Fed lowered interest rates tomorrow, the full impact of that cut may not be felt in the economy for 6 to 12 months. And so if people are worried that conditions are weakening right now, they’re going to worry that the help from lower rates won’t arrive in time.The upshot is that for Credit, and I would say for other asset classes as well, rate cuts have only tended to be helpful if growth remained solid. Rate cuts and weaker growth were bad, and that was more true the larger those rate cuts were. In 2001, 2008 and February of 2020, large rate cuts as the economy weakened led to significant credit losses. Concern about what those lower rates signalled outweighed the direct benefit that a lower rate provided.We think that dynamic remains in play today, with the market over the last two weeks suggesting that a combination of weaker growth and lower rates may be taken poorly, not taken well.But there’s also some good news: Our economists think that the market's views on growth, and interest rates, may both be a little overstated. They think the US economy is still on track for a soft-landing, and that last week’s jobs report wasn’t quite as weak as it was made out to be.Because of all that, they also don’t think that the Fed will reduce interest rates as quickly as the market now expects. And so, if that’s now right, we think a stronger economy and somewhat higher rates is going to be a trade-off that credit is happy to take.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

9 Aug 20243min

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