Is American Market Dominance Over?

Is American Market Dominance Over?

In the first of a two-part episode, Lisa Shalett, our Wealth Management CIO, and Andrew Sheets, our Head of Corporate Credit Research, discuss whether the era of “American Exceptionalism” is ending and how investors should prepare for a global market rebalancing.

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----- Transcript -----


Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley.

Lisa Shalett: And I'm Lisa Shalett, Chief Investment Officer for Morgan Stanley Wealth Management.

Andrew Sheets: Today, the first of two episodes tackling a fascinating and complex question. Is American market dominance ending? And what would that mean for investors?

It's Wednesday, July 30th at 4pm in London.

Lisa Shalett: And it's 11am here in New York.

Andrew Sheets: Lisa, it's so great to talk to you again, and especially what we're going to talk about over these two episodes. , a theme that's been coming up regularly on this podcast is this idea of American exceptionalism. This multi-year, almost multi-decade outperformance of the U.S. economy, of the U.S. currency, of the U.S. stock market.

And so, it's great to have you on the show, given that you've recently published on this topic in a special report, very topically titled American Exceptionalism: Navigating the Great Rebalancing.

So, what are the key pillars behind this idea and why do you think it's so important?

Lisa Shalett: Yeah. So, I think that that when you think about the thesis of American exceptionalism and the duration of time that the thesis has endured. I think a lot of investors have come to the conclusion that many of the underpinnings of America's performance are just absolutely inherent and foundational, right?

They'll point to America as a, economy of innovation. A market with regulation and capital markets breadth and depth and liquidity a market guided by, , laws and regulation, and a market where, heretofore, we've had relatively decent population growth.

All things that tend to lead to growth. But our analysis of the past 15 years, while acknowledging all of those foundational pillars say, ‘Wait a minute, let's separate the wheat from the chaff.’ Because this past 15 years has been, extraordinary and different. And it's been extraordinary and different on at least three dimensions.

One, the degree to which we've had monetary accommodation and an extraordinary responsiveness of the Fed to any crisis. Secondly, extraordinary fiscal policy and fiscal stimulus. And third, the peak of globalization a trend that in our humble opinion, American companies were among the biggest beneficiaries of exploiting, despite all of the political rhetoric that considers the costs of that globalization.

Andrew Sheets: So, Lisa, let me go back then to the title of your report, which is the Great Rebalancing or navigating the Great Rebalancing. So, what is that rebalancing? What do you think kind of might be in store going forward?

Lisa Shalett: The profound out performance, as you noted, Andrew, of both the U.S. dollar and American stock markets have left the world, , at an extraordinarily overweight position to the dollar and to American assets.

And that's against a backdrop where we're a fraction of the population. We're 25 percent of global GDP, and even with all of our great companies, we're still only 33 percent of the profit pool. So, we were at a place where not only was everyone overweight, but the relative valuation premia of American equity assets versus equities outside or rest of world was literally a 50 percent premium.

And that really had us asking the question, is that really sustainable? Those kind of valuation premiums – at a point when all of these pillars, fiscal stimulus, monetary stimulus, globalization, are at these profound inflection points.

Andrew Sheets: You mentioned monetary and fiscal policy a bit as being key to supercharging U.S. markets. Where do you think these factors are going to move in the future, and how do you think that affects this rebalancing idea?

Lisa Shalett: Look, I mean, I think we went through a period of time where on a relative basis, relative growth, relative rate spreads, right? The, the dispersion between what you could earn in U.S. assets and what you could earn in other places, and the hedging ratio in those currency markets made owning U.S. assets, just incredibly attractive on a relative basis.

As the U.S. now kind of hits this point of inflection when the rest of the world is starting to say, okay, in an America first and an America only policy world, what am I going to do?

And I think the responses are that for many other countries, they are going to invest aggressively in defense, in infrastructure, in technology, to respond to de-globalization, if you will.

And I think for many of those economies, it's going to help equalize not only growth rates between the U.S. and the rest of the world, but it's going to help equalize rate differentials. Particularly on the longer end of the curves, where everyone is going to spending money.

Andrew Sheets: That's actually a great segue into this idea of globalization, which again was a major tailwind for U.S. corporations and a pillar of this American outperformance over a number of years.

It does seem like that landscape has really changed over the last couple of decades, and yet going forward, it looks like it's going to change again. So, with rising deglobalization with higher tariffs, what do you think that's going to mean to U.S. corporate margins and global supply chains?

Lisa Shalett: Maybe I am a product of my training and economics, but I have always been a believer in comparative advantage and what globalization allowed. True free trade and globalization of supply chains allowed was for countries to exploit what they were best at – whether it was the lowest cost labor, the lowest cost of natural resources, the lowest cost inputs. And America was aggressive at pursuing those things, at outsourcing what they could to grow profit margins. And that had lots of implications.

And we weren't holding manufacturing assets or logistical assets or transportation assets necessarily on our balance sheets. And that dimension of this asset light and optimized supply chains is something in a world of tariffs, in a world of deglobalization, in a world of create manufacturing jobs onshore, where that gets reversed a bit. And there's going to be a financial cost to that.

Andrew Sheets: It's probably fair to say that the way that a lot of people experience American exceptionalism is in their retirement account.

In your view, is this outperformance sustainable or do you think, as you mentioned, changing fiscal dynamics, changing trade dynamics, that we're also going to see a leadership rotation here?

Lisa Shalett: Our thesis has been, this isn't the end of American exceptionalism, point blank, black and white. What we've said, however, is that we think that the order of magnitude of that outperformance is what's going to close, , when you start burdening, , your growth rate with headwinds, right?

And so, again, not to say that that American assets can't continue to, to be major contributors in portfolios and may even, , outperform by a bit. But I don't think that they're going to be outperforming by the magnitude, kind of the 450 - 550 basis points per year compound for 15 years that we've seen.

Andrew Sheets: The American exceptionalism that we've seen really since 2009, it's also been accompanied by really unprecedented market imbalances. But another dimension of these imbalances is social and economic inequality, which is creating structural, and policy, and political challenges.

Do these imbalances matter for markets? And do you think these imbalances affect economic stability and overall market performance?

Lisa Shalett: People need to understand what has happened over this period. When we applied this degree of monetary and fiscal, stimulus, what we essentially did was massively deleverage the private sector of America, right?

And as a result, when you do that, you enable and create the backdrop for the portions of your economy who are less interest rate sensitive to continue to, kind of, invest free money. And so what we have seen is that this gap between the haves and the have nots, those who are most interest rate sensitive and those who are least interest rate sensitive – that chasm is really blown out.

But also I would suggest an economic policy conundrum. We can all have points of view about the central bank, and we can all have points of view about the current chair. But the reality is if you look at these dispersions in the United States, you have to ask yourself the question, is there one central bank policy that's right for the U.S. economy?

I could make the argument that the U.S. GDP, right, is growing at 5.5 percent nominal right now. And the policy rate's 4.3 percent. Is that tight?

Andrew Sheets: Hmm.

Lisa Shalett: I don't know, right? The economists will tell me it's really tight, Lisa – [be]cause neutral is 3. But I don't know. I don't see the constraints. If I drill down and do I say, can I see constraints among small businesses?

Yeah. I think they're suffering. Do I see constraints in some of the portfolio companies of private equity? Are they suffering? Yeah. Do they need lower rates? Yeah. Do the lower two-thirds of American consumers need lower rates to access the housing market. Yeah.

But is it hurting the aggregate U.S. economy? Mm, I don't know; hard to convince me.

Andrew Sheets: Well, Lisa, that seems like a great place to actually end it for now and Thanks as always, for taking the time to talk.

Lisa Shalett: My pleasure, Andrew.

Andrew Sheets: And that brings us to the end of part one of this two-part look at American exceptionalism and the impact on equity and fixed income markets. Tomorrow we'll dig into the fixed income side of that debate.

Thank you as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen, and also tell a friend or colleague about us today.

*****

Lisa Shalett is a member of Morgan Stanley’s Wealth Management Division and is not a member of Morgan Stanley’s Research Department. Unless otherwise indicated, her views are her own and may differ from the views of the Morgan Stanley Research Department and from the views of others within Morgan Stanley.

Episoder(1543)

Jonathan Garner: Asia Equities Rally Once More

Jonathan Garner: Asia Equities Rally Once More

After a correction that took place in recent months, Asia and emerging markets are once again rallying. But how have these regions sustained their ongoing bull markets?----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Jonathan Garner, Chief Asia and Emerging Market Equity Strategist at Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the recent correction and ongoing bull market in Asia and emerging market equities. It's Thursday, April 13th, at 10 a.m. in London. Asia and emerging market equities underwent a six week correction in February and March, in what we think is an ongoing bull market. However, they've recently stabilized and begun to rally once more as we head into the new quarter. Importantly, the catalyst for the correction came from outside the asset class in the form of banking sector risks in both the U.S. and Europe. EM assets suffered some limited challenges, for example, at one point major EM currencies gave up most of that year to date gains against the U.S. dollar. However, as investors appraised the situation, they recognized that little had actually changed in the investment thesis for the EM asset class this year. At the core of this thesis is the ongoing recovery in China. After an initial surge in mobility indicators and services spending, there is now a broadening out of the recovery to include manufacturing production and even recent strength in property sales. Like the rest of Asia and EM these days, Chinese growth is self-funded in the main from domestic banking systems which are generally well capitalized and liquid. Indeed, just as question marks are now appearing over bank credit growth prospects in the U.S. in segments like commercial real estate lending, the opposite is taking place in China as the authorities encourage more bank lending. Elsewhere, we're also seeing an encouraging set of developments in the semiconductors and technology hardware cycles, which matter for the Korea and Taiwan markets. Although end use demand in most segments remained very weak in the first quarter, we believe our thesis that we are passing through the worst phase of the cycle was confirmed by positive stock price reactions to news of production cuts by industry leaders. We think stock prices in these sectors troughed last October, as usual about six months ahead of the weakest point of industry fundamentals and the industry now has a lower production base to begin to recover from the second half of the year onwards. Elsewhere in EM, we recently adopted a more positive stance on the Indian market after being cautious for six months. Valuations adjusted meaningfully lower in that timeframe and we think Indian equities are now poised to join in the rally from here on an improving economic cycle outlook, as well as heightened structural interest in the market by overseas investors. India continues to benefit from ongoing positive household formation, industrialization and urbanization themes which are well represented in domestic equity benchmarks. Thanks for listening. If you enjoyed the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and recommend Thoughts on the Market to a friend or colleague today.

13 Apr 20233min

Chetan Ahya: Global Impacts on Asia's Growth

Chetan Ahya: Global Impacts on Asia's Growth

Given the recent developments in developed markets banking sectors, can Asia’s economic growth continue to outperform?----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley's Chief Asia Economist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be discussing why Asia remains better placed despite recent global financial developments. It's Wednesday, April 12, at 9 a.m in Hong Kong. With the recent issues in the Developed Markets banking sector, investors are asking if Asia could face similar funding challenges and if Asia will still be able to outperform on growth. On the funding challenge, a key point to keep in mind is that interest rates have not risen as much in Asia compared to the U.S.. Asia's inflation was more cost-push driven, i.e commodity prices driven, and has already started to decelerate, and so central banks did not have to hike rates as much as the Fed. For instance, on July 21, policy rates rose by 4.75% in the U.S., but in Asia, it has risen only by one percentage point on an average. In a similar vein, prior to recent developments, 10 year bond yields rose by 2.8 percentage points in the U.S., but have only risen by just 0.9% in Asia. Another important distinguishing factor has to do with the setup of the banking sector. In Asia, liquidity coverage ratios are well above 100%, loans tend to be more floating rather than fixed, and deposit franchises are more diversified. Turning to the second question on whether Asia can still outperform. We think that recent developments will pose downside risks to both developed markets and Asia's growth but on net, Asia will still be able to outperform. In the case of a meaningful slowdown or a mild technical recession in the U.S., there will be three mitigating factors for Asia's growth outlook. First, the impact from weaker trade would be partially offset by easier financial conditions from lower market pricing of Fed's path, as well as lower commodity prices, leading to an improvement in Asia's terms of trade. The more stable macroeconomic backdrop in Asia means central banks in the region do have more room to ease monetary policy. In our base case, we expect rate cuts starting from the first quarter of 2024, but if downside risks emerge, these rate cuts could come into play sooner than we anticipate. Second, we expect China's GDP to recover to 5.7% in 2023. Reopening is lifting economic activity in China and also helping to generate positive spillovers for the rest of the region. Third, the three of the other large economies in Asia, Japan, India and Indonesia all have economy specific factors driving domestic demand. Japan's accommodative macro policies should keep private sector demand supported. For India, balance sheets for the financial and non-financial private sector have been cleaned up over the years. The private sector is thus pricing with a healthy risk appetite for expansion. In Indonesia, macro stability risks have been well managed, hence, rates have not had to rise as much in other emerging markets, and domestic demand has therefore remained robust. However, we do think that the risks are skewed to the downside. In a hard landing scenario, which we would characterize as U.S. full year GDP contracting by 1% or more, Asia may not be able to escape the downdraft and could recouple on the downside, at least during the worst point of the shock. But once we see a stabilization of global financial conditions with policy response, we believe Asia will be able to recover faster than the U.S. and Europe and resume its growth outperformance. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.

12 Apr 20233min

U.S Housing: The Future of Mortgage Markets

U.S Housing: The Future of Mortgage Markets

Banks and the Fed are winding down activity in the mortgage market amid recent funding challenges, signaling a potential new regime for the asset class. Co-Heads of Securitized Products Research Jim Egan and Jay Bacow discuss.----- Transcript -----Jim Egan: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Jim Egan, Co-Head of U.S. Securitized Products Research here at Morgan Stanley. Jay Bacow: And I'm Jay Bacow, the other Co-Head of U.S. Securitized Products Research. Jim Egan: And on this episode of the podcast, we'll be discussing mortgage markets. It's Tuesday, April 11th, at 11 a.m. in New York. Jim Egan: Now, Jay, there has been lots of news recently about bank funding challenges, and the FDIC put both Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in receivership. They just announced last week that $114 billion of their securities will be sold, over time, with those securities being primarily agency MBS. Now, that sounds like a pretty big number, can you tell us what the impact of this is? Jay Bacow: Sure. So, I think it's important first to realize that the agency mortgage market is the second most liquid fixed income market in the world after treasuries, and so the market is pretty easily able to quickly reprice to digest this news. And as a reminder, agency mortgages don't have credit risk, given the agency guarantee. Now, that $114 billion is a big number and about $100 billion of them are mortgages, and putting that $100 billion in context, we're only expecting about $150 billion of net issuance this year. So this is two thirds of the net supply of the market is going to come just from these portfolio liquidations. That's a lot, and that's before we even get into the composition of what they own. Jim Egan: Isn't a mortgage a mortgage? What do you mean by the composition of what they own? Jay Bacow: Well, yes, a mortgage is a mortgage, but what banks can do is that they can structure the mortgages to better fit the profile of what they want. And based on publicly disclosed data of when they bought, we assume that most of those mortgages right now have very low fixed coupons—in the context of 2%, well below the current prevailing rate for investors. Furthermore, about a third of the mortgages that the FDIC holds in receivership are these structured mortgages, they're still guaranteed, there's no credit risk, but these would be out of index investments for most money managers. Jim Egan: Well, can't banks buy them, though? Like, aren't these pretty typical bank bonds, two banks owned them in the first place? And if the bonds worked for a bank that time, why don't they work for a different bank now? Jay Bacow: So, part of what made them work for those banks is that they bought them around “par,” and given the low coupons that they have now, they're no longer at par. And for accounting reasons that we probably don’t need to get into right now, banks typically don't like to buy bonds that are far away from par. Furthermore, the recent events have made banks likely to need to revisit a lot of the assumptions that they're making on the asset and liability side. In particular, they probably going to want to revisit the duration of their deposits, which is going to bias them towards owning shorter securities. The regulators are probably also going to want to revisit a lot of assumptions as well. And we think what's likely to happen is that they're going to make a lot of the smaller banks have the mark-to-market losses on their available for sale securities flow through to regulatory capital, which in conjunction with some of the other changes probably means banks are going to further bias their security purchases shorter in duration and lowering capital charges. Jim Egan: Okay. So, if the banks aren't going to be active and the Fed is already winding down their portfolio, who's really left to buy? Jay Bacow: Basically, money managers and overseas. And while spreads have widened out some, we think they're biased a little wider from here. Effectively, this is going to be the first year since 2009 that neither domestic banks or the Fed were net buying mortgages. And when you take away the two largest buyers of mortgages, that is a problem for the asset class. And so we think we're in a new regime for mortgages and a new regime for bank demand. Jim Egan: Jay, thank you for that clear explanation, and it's always great talking to you. Jay Bacow: Great talking to you, too, Jim. Jim Egan: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review on the Apple Podcasts app and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

11 Apr 20234min

Diego Anzoategui: Goods, Services and the Shape of China’s Reopening

Diego Anzoategui: Goods, Services and the Shape of China’s Reopening

China’s growth is expected to be strong this year. However, it is being driven by services more than goods, meaning the news for other economies may not be as good as it initially appears. ----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Diego Anzoategui from the Global Economics Team. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the global impact of China's reopening. It's Monday, April 10th, at 3 p.m. in New York. At the end of 2022, China scrapped all COVID zero policies and laid out a growth focused policy agenda for 2023. By mid-January, around 80% of the population had had COVID, but infections are now much lower, mobility is improving, and China's economy seems to be taking off. We estimate China's growth will reach 5.7% in 2023, primarily driven by a rebound in private consumption. This is the first time in four years that COVID, regulatory and economic policy are all pushing in the same direction. Since the Chinese Party Congress in October 2022, the administration has swung to a pro-business stance, and we expect fiscal and monetary support to continue. Furthermore, China's big tech regulation has entered an institutionalized and stable stage, and we don't expect new, aggressive measures any longer. Although China's growth is expected to be strong in 2023, it is off a low base and it will take time for private sentiment to come back. So we expect fiscal easing to continue at least through the first half of 2023. As for monetary policy, the People's Bank of China may continue to provide targeted support towards economic recovery while private demand gets on a surer footing. As growth becomes more self-sustaining in the second half of 2023, cyclical policy could start to normalize, but not turn to outright tightening. Against this macro backdrop, we believe that services such as tourism, transportation and food services will drive the recovery. During the pandemic, mobility restrictions and social distancing policies caused a much more serious drag on services compared to good producers- and China is no exception to this pattern. But the services versus goods distinction is also key for assessing the global implications of China's reopening. Investors often ask to what extent China's reopening will translate into higher economic growth elsewhere. Historically, the China economic acceleration typically acts as a demand shock to the global economy. China's higher aggregate demand means higher exports to China from the rest of the world and greater economic activity globally. And more global growth coming from a demand push usually contributes to higher commodity prices, a weaker dollar and potential higher risk appetite leading to lower interest rates in emerging markets. This, of course, is good news, especially for EM. But the devil is in the details, and China's recovery being primarily driven by services is a key factor. One perhaps underappreciated by the market. It's important to keep in mind that services are less tradable and therefore less relevant to international trade. If China's acceleration were to be goods driven, Asia and LatAm commodity exporters would be clear beneficiaries, particularly economies like Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. But the situation is different when services lead the way, and the relative advantage of manufacture-intensive Asian economies is less obvious in this case. Ultimately, our work suggests a more services driven rebound in China would be less relevant for the global economy. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

10 Apr 20233min

Ellen Zentner: The Lagging Effects of Loan Growth

Ellen Zentner: The Lagging Effects of Loan Growth

While banking conditions seem to have stabilized for now, tighter credit conditions could still hit U.S. economic growth.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ellen Zentner, Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist. Along with my colleagues bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll discuss how recent developments in the banking sector could impact the U.S. economy. It's Thursday, April 6, at 10 a.m. in New York. Events over the past several weeks have led to disruptions in the financial system that we believe will leave a mark on the real economy. Our banking analysts here at Morgan Stanley Research see permanently higher funding costs for banks going forward, and that will likely lead to tighter credit conditions beyond what was already embedded in our previous baseline for the economy. At its March meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee explicitly added a reference to tightening credit conditions and the effects on growth and inflation. But in the press conference, Chair Powell also highlighted wide uncertainty around the magnitude of tightening. The lack of visibility into the extent and persistence of current bank funding pressures, as well as the banking systems response, are contributing to this uncertainty. Our banking analysts believe that higher operating costs should drive tougher standards for new loans and higher loan spreads. These drivers set the stage for an even sharper deceleration in credit growth over the course of this year. Put simply, when it's more difficult or expensive for businesses and consumers to borrow money, it creates challenges for economic growth. While our baseline forecast for the U.S. economy already included a meaningful slowdown in loan growth over the coming months, further tightening in lending standards and greater pullback in bank lending will weigh further on GDP. That said, our modeling shows the effects are likely to take some time to build, with a meaningful slowing starting in the third quarter of this year and the largest impact occurring across the fourth quarter of 2023, and the first quarter of 2024. We think the impact of tighter credit on consumption and business investment is roughly equal, though we expect that the effects on business investment will likely peak in the fourth quarter of this year, one quarter ahead of consumption. On the back of this analysis, we've lowered our forecast for U.S. GDP growth this year and now look for 0.3% growth on a Q4 over Q4 basis. That's 1/10 lower than where we had it prior to the emergence of these new bank funding pressures. For next year we took our GDP forecast down by 2/10 to just 1%. Again, because it takes time for the cumulative impacts to build, we see the largest impacts as we're moving into 2024. So to sum up, the risk to the U.S. economic growth outlook and the labor market are large and two sided. A quicker resolution of financial system troubles could help keep the economy on solid footing, in line with recent monthly payroll data, which has been resilient. On the other hand, more volatile financial conditions from here could see a larger and more rapid deterioration in growth and the labor market. For now, banking conditions seem to have stabilized, which has given investors a bit of relief. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

6 Apr 20233min

Michael Zezas: What the ‘X-Date’ Means for Investors

Michael Zezas: What the ‘X-Date’ Means for Investors

With the deadline to raise the debt ceiling looming closer, will recent banking challenges reduce Congress's willingness to take risks with the economy?----- Transcript -----Welcome to the Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Global Head of Fixed Income research for Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, I'll be talking about the debt ceiling and financial markets. It's Wednesday, April 5th at 9 a.m. in New York. Markets have focused in recent weeks on key long term debates, such as sizing up the long term effects of Fed policy and bank liquidity challenges. But investors should be aware that there may be at least a temporary interruption for focus on the debt ceiling in the coming weeks. That's because tax receipts will soon start rolling in, which should give the government and markets a clearer assessment of the timing of the x-date, that's the date after which the Treasury no longer has cash on hand to pay all its bills as they come due. Said differently, it's the date that investors would focus on as a potential deadline for raising the debt ceiling in order to avoid a government bond default, or a messy workaround to such a default that could rattle markets. Some clients have suggested to us that there should be less concern about Congress raising the debt ceiling in a timely manner ahead of that x-date, the reason being that recent banking challenges and resulting economic fears may have reduced Congress's willingness to take risks with the economy. We disagree, and still expect Congress will at least take this negotiation down to the wire, perhaps even going past the x-date, which, to be clear, wouldn't necessarily cause a default, but it would up the risk meaningfully. So what's the basis for our argument? First, remember, Republicans have a very slim majority in the House, meaning only a handful of objectors to any legislation could potentially create gridlock. There was already public reticence by Republicans about raising the debt ceiling unless paired with spending cuts, something Democrats have not been interested in. That position appears unchanged, despite recent bank issues, with some Republicans linking government spending to banking sector challenges, drawing a line from spending to the increase in interest rates that drove mark-to-market losses in bank portfolios. And second, some lawmakers have publicly speculated that the Fed and Treasury's reassurances that the U.S will not default suggest that they would step in in any emergency. This dynamic of a perceived safety net could incentivize Congress to debate the debt ceiling for an uncomfortably long amount of time for markets. Where would such stress first show up? We’d watch the T-bills market, where recent history suggests that the shortest maturity Treasuries would come under above normal selling pressures as investors try to steer clear of maturities closest to the x-date. We'll of course be tracking this, and the broader debt ceiling dynamic carefully and keep you updated. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague, or leave us a review on Apple Podcasts. It helps more people find the show.

5 Apr 20232min

Seth Carpenter: China’s Impact on Global Growth

Seth Carpenter: China’s Impact on Global Growth

As the economic growth spread between Asia and the rest of the world widens, China’s reopening is unlikely to spur growth that spills over globally.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, today I'll be talking about the outlook for global economic growth. It's Tuesday, April 4th at 10 a.m. in New York. How is the outlook evolving after one quarter of 2023? The key trends in our year ahead outlook remain, but they're changing. The spread between Asian growth and the rest of the world is actually a bit wider now. And within developed market economies, downgrades to the U.S. forecast largely on the back of banking sector developments and upgrades to the euro area, largely on the back of stronger incoming data, now have Europe growing faster than the U.S. in 2023. In China, the data continue to reinforce our bullish call for about 5.7% GDP growth this year, and if anything, there are risks to the upside, despite the official growth target from Beijing coming in at about 5%. Had it not been for the banking sector dominating the market narrative, I suspect that China reopening would still be the most important story. But China's recovery has always had a critical caveat to it. We've always said that the rebound would be much more domestically focused than in the past and more weighted towards services than industry in the past. We don't think you can apply historical betas, that is the spillover from Chinese growth to the rest of the world, the way you could in the past. I want to highlight a recent piece that quantifies how China's global spillovers are different this time. Two main points deserve attention. First, the industrial economy never contracted as much as the services economy in China did, and that means that the rebound will be much bigger in services than it could be in the industrial economy. And second, we do try to estimate those betas, as they're called for the spillover from China to the global economy, excluding China. And what we conclude is that the effect is smaller the more important the services economy in China is for growth. Put differently, the three percentage point acceleration from last year to this year will not carry the same punch for the rest of the world that a three percentage point acceleration would have done years ago. The modest upgrade we've made to the euro area growth is not as a result supported by the China reopening, but instead is coming from stronger incoming data that we think reflect lower energy prices and more sustained fiscal impetus. The modestly stronger outlook, though, doesn't change the fact that the distribution of likely outcomes over the next year, it's skewed to the downside. Seven months from now Europe will be starting the beginning of another winter and with it the risk of exhausting gas inventories, and with core inflation in the euro area not yet at its peak, stronger real growth is simply a reason for more hiking from the ECB. In contrast, we have nudged down our already soft forecast for the U.S. for 2023. Funding costs for banks are higher, the willingness to lend is almost surely lower than before, but that restriction in loan supply is coming at a time where we are already expecting material slowing in the U.S. economy and therefore falling demand for credit. So the net effect is negative, but banks willingness to lend matters a lot less if there are fewer borrowers around. So where does this all leave us? The EM versus DM theme we have been highlighting continues and if anything it's a bit stronger. The China reopening story remains solid and the U.S. is softening. Within DM the stronger growth within Europe compared to the U.S. is notable both for its own sake, but also because it will mean that the ECB hiking will look closer to the Fed's hiking than we had thought just three months ago. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy this show, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share thoughts on the market with a friend or colleague today.

4 Apr 20233min

Mike Wilson: Not All Bank Reserves Are Created Equal

Mike Wilson: Not All Bank Reserves Are Created Equal

Recent increases in the Fed’s balance sheet may not have the same impact on money supply, growth and equities as in previous cycles.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Chief Investment Officer and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist for Morgan Stanley. Along with my colleagues, bringing you a variety of perspectives, I'll be talking about the latest trends in the financial marketplace. It's Monday, April 3rd at 11:30 a.m. in New York. So let's get after it. Over the past month, market participants have been focused on how the government will deal with the stress in the banking system and whether the economy can withstand this latest shock. After a rough couple of weeks, especially for regional banks, the major indices appear to be shrugging off these risks. Many are interpreting the sharp increase in bank reserves as another form of quantitative easing and are exhibiting the Pavlovian response that such programs are always good for equity prices. As we discussed in prior podcasts, we do not think that's the right interpretation of this latest increase in the Fed's balance sheet. In our view, all bank reserves are not created equal. True money supply as a function of reserves and the velocity of money which is difficult to measure in real time. As a comparison, inflation did not appear after the first wave of quantitative easing used during the great financial crisis because the velocity of money simultaneously collapsed. This was despite the fact that the percentage increase in the Fed's balance sheet dwarfed what we experienced during COVID. The primary difference was that the increase in reserves during the great financial crisis was simply filling holes left on bank balance sheets from the housing crisis. Therefore, the increase in reserves did not lead to a material increase in true money supply in the real economy. In contrast, during COVID, the increase in reserves are pushed directly into the economy via stimulus checks, PPP loans and other programs to keep the economy from shutting down. However, these fiscal programs were overdone and the result was money supply moved sharply higher because the velocity of money remained stable and even increased slightly. During this latest increase in Fed balance sheet reserves, the total liabilities in the US banking system have continued to fall. This suggests to us that the velocity of money is falling quite rapidly, more than offsetting the increase in bank reserves. In fact, these bank liabilities are falling at a rate of 7% year-over-year, the biggest decline in more than 60 years. Even during the Great Financial Crisis, money supply growth never went into negative territory. The kind of contraction we are witnessing today suggests this is not anything like the QE programs experienced during COVID or the 2009 to 2013 period. Secondarily, it also means that both economic and earnings growth are likely to remain under pressure until money supply growth reverses. This leads me to the second part of this podcast. Year to date, major U.S. stock indices have performed well, led by technology heavy NASDAQ. This is partially due to the snap back from such poor performance last year, led by the NASDAQ. But it's also the view that unlevered, high quality growth stocks are immune from the potential oncoming credit crunch. It's important to note that the rally to date in U.S. stocks has been very narrow, with just eight stocks accounting for 80% of the entire returns in the NASDAQ 100. Meanwhile, only ten stocks have accounted for 95% of the entire returns in the S&P 500, with all ten of those stocks being technology-related businesses. Such an erroneous performance is known as bad breadth, and it typically doesn't bode well for future prices. The counterargument is that technology already went through its own recession last year and it's taken its medicine now with respect to cost reductions and layoffs. Therefore, these stocks can continue to recover and carry the overall market, given their size. We would caution on such conclusions, given the increased risk of a credit crunch that suggests the risk of a broader economic recession is far from extinguished. Recessions are bad for technology companies, which are generally pro cyclical businesses. Instead, we continue to prefer more defensive sectors like consumer staples and health care.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us on the Apple Podcast app. It helps more people to find the show.

3 Apr 20233min

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