Who’s Disrupting — and Funding — the AI Boom

Who’s Disrupting — and Funding — the AI Boom

Live from Morgan Stanley’s European Tech, Media and Telecom Conference in Barcelona, our roundtable of analysts discusses tech disruptions and datacenter growth, and how Europe factors in.

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----- Transcript -----


Paul Walsh: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Paul Walsh, Morgan Stanley's European Head of Research Product.

Today we return to my conversation with Adam Wood. Head of European Technology and Payments, Emmet Kelly, Head of European Telco and Data Centers, and Lee Simpson, Head of European Technology.

We were live on stage at Morgan Stanley's 25th TMT Europe conference. We had so much to discuss around the themes of AI enablers, semiconductors, and telcos. So, we are back with a concluding episode on tech disruption and data center investments.

It's Thursday the 13th of November at 8am in Barcelona.

After speaking with the panel about the U.S. being overweight AI enablers, and the pockets of opportunity in Europe, I wanted to ask them about AI disruption, which has been a key theme here in Europe. I started by asking Adam how he was thinking about this theme.

Adam Wood: It’s fascinating to see this year how we've gone in most of those sectors to how positive can GenAI be for these companies? How well are they going to monetize the opportunities? How much are they going to take advantage internally to take their own margins up? To flipping in the second half of the year, mainly to, how disruptive are they going to be? And how on earth are they going to fend off these challenges?

Paul Walsh: And I think that speaks to the extent to which, as a theme, this has really, you know, built momentum.

Adam Wood: Absolutely. And I mean, look, I think the first point, you know, that you made is absolutely correct – that it's very difficult to disprove this. It's going to take time for that to happen. It's impossible to do in the short term. I think the other issue is that what we've seen is – if we look at the revenues of some of the companies, you know, and huge investments going in there.

And investors can clearly see the benefit of GenAI. And so investors are right to ask the question, well, where's the revenue for these businesses?

You know, where are we seeing it in info services or in IT services, or in enterprise software. And the reality is today, you know, we're not seeing it. And it's hard for analysts to point to evidence that – well, no, here's the revenue base, here's the benefit that's coming through. And so, investors naturally flip to, well, if there's no benefit, then surely, we should focus on the risk.

So, I think we totally understand, you know, why people are focused on the negative side of things today. I think there are differences between the sub-sectors. I mean, I think if we look, you know, at IT services, first of all, from an investor point of view, I think that's been pretty well placed in the losers’ buckets and people are most concerned about that sub-sector…

Paul Walsh: Something you and the global team have written a lot about.

Adam Wood: Yeah, we've written about, you know, the risk of disruption in that space, the need for those companies to invest, and then the challenges they face. But I mean, if we just keep it very, very simplistic. If Gen AI is a technology that, you know, displaces labor to any extent – companies that have played labor arbitrage and provide labor for the last 20 - 25 years, you know, they're going to have to make changes to their business model.

So, I think that's understandable. And they're going to have to demonstrate how they can change and invest and produce a business model that addresses those concerns. I'd probably put info services in the middle. But the challenge in that space is you have real identifiable companies that have emerged, that have a revenue base and that are challenging a subset of the products of those businesses. So again, it's perfectly understandable that investors would worry. In that context, it's not a potential threat on the horizon. It's a real threat that exists today against certainly their businesses.

I think software is probably the most interesting. I'd put it in the kind of final bucket where I actually believe… Well, I think first of all, we certainly wouldn't take the view that there's no risk of disruption and things aren't going to change. Clearly that is going to be the case.

I think what we'd want to do though is we'd want to continue to use frameworks that we've used historically to think about how software companies differentiate themselves, what the barriers to entry are. We don't think we need to throw all of those things away just because we have GenAI, this new set of capabilities. And I think investors will come back most easily to that space.

Paul Walsh: Emett, you talked a little bit there before about the fact that you haven't seen a huge amount of progress or additional insight from the telco space around AI; how AI is diffusing across the space. Do you get any discussions around disruption as it relates to telco space?

Emmet Kelly: Very, very little. I think the biggest threat that telcos do see is – it is from the hyperscalers. So, if I look at and separate the B2C market out from the B2B, the telcos are still extremely dominant in the B2C space, clearly. But on the B2B space, the hyperscalers have come in on the cloud side, and if you look at their market share, they're very, very dominant in cloud – certainly from a wholesale perspective.

So, if you look at the cloud market shares of the big three hyperscalers in Europe, this number is courtesy of my colleague George Webb. He said it's roughly 85 percent; that's how much they have of the cloud space today. The telcos, what they're doing is they're actually reselling the hyperscale service under the telco brand name.

But we don't see much really in terms of the pure kind of AI disruption, but there are concerns definitely within the telco space that the hyperscalers might try and move from the B2B space into the B2C space at some stage. And whether it's through virtual networks, cloudified networks, to try and get into the B2C space that way.

Paul Walsh: Understood. And Lee maybe less about disruption, but certainly adoption, some insights from your side around adoption across the tech hardware space?

Lee Simpson: Sure. I think, you know, it's always seen that are enabling the AI move, but, but there is adoption inside semis companies as well, and I think I'd point to design flow. So, if you look at the design guys, they're embracing the agentic system thing really quickly and they're putting forward this capability of an agent engineer, so like a digital engineer. And it – I guess we've got to get this right. It is going to enable a faster time to market for the design flow on a chip.

So, if you have that design flow time, that time to market. So, you're creating double the value there for the client. Do you share that 50-50 with them? So, the challenge is going to be exactly as Adam was saying, how do you monetize this stuff? So, this is kind of the struggle that we're seeing in adoption.

Paul Walsh: And Emmett, let's move to you on data centers. I mean, there are just some incredible numbers that we've seen emerging, as it relates to the hyperscaler investment that we're seeing in building out the infrastructure. I know data centers is something that you have focused tremendously on in your research, bringing our global perspectives together. Obviously, Europe sits within that. And there is a market here in Europe that might be more challenged. But I'm interested to understand how you're thinking about framing the whole data center story? Implications for Europe. Do European companies feed off some of that U.S. hyperscaler CapEx? How should we be thinking about that through the European lens?

Emmet Kelly: Yeah, absolutely. So, big question, Paul. What…

Paul Walsh: We've got a few minutes!

Emmet Kelly: We've got a few minutes. What I would say is there was a great paper that came out from Harvard just two weeks ago, and they were looking at the scale of data center investments in the United States. And clearly the U.S. economy is ticking along very, very nicely at the moment. But this Harvard paper concluded that if you take out data center investments, U.S. economic growth today is actually zero.

Paul Walsh: Wow.

Emmet Kelly: That is how big the data center investments are. And what we've said in our research very clearly is if you want to build a megawatt of data center capacity that's going to cost you roughly $35 million today.

Let's put that number out there. 35 million. Roughly, I'd say 25… Well, 20 to 25 million of that goes into the chips. But what's really interesting is the other remaining $10 million per megawatt, and I like to call that the picks and shovels of data centers; and I'm very convinced there is no bubble in that area whatsoever.

So, what's in that area? Firstly, the first building block of a data center is finding a powered land bank. And this is a big thing that private equity is doing at the moment. So, find some real estate that's close to a mass population that's got a good fiber connection. Probably needs a little bit of water, but most importantly needs some power.

And the demand for that is still infinite at the moment. Then beyond that, you've got the construction angle and there's a very big shortage of labor today to build the shells of these data centers. Then the third layer is the likes of capital goods, and there are serious supply bottlenecks there as well.

And I could go on and on, but roughly that first $10 million, there's no bubble there. I'm very, very sure of that.

Paul Walsh: And we conducted some extensive survey work recently as part of your analysis into the global data center market. You've sort of touched on a few of the gating factors that the industry has to contend with. That survey work was done on the operators and the supply chain, as it relates to data center build out.

What were the key conclusions from that?

Emmet Kelly: Well, the key conclusion was there is a shortage of power for these data centers, and…

Paul Walsh: Which I think… Which is a sort of known-known, to some extent.

Emmet Kelly: it is a known-known, but it's not just about the availability of power, it's the availability of green power. And it's also the price of power is a very big factor as well because energy is roughly 40 to 45 percent of the operating cost of running a data center. So, it's very, very important. And of course, that's another area where Europe doesn't screen very well.

I was looking at statistics just last week on the countries that have got the highest power prices in the world. And unsurprisingly, it came out as UK, Ireland, Germany, and that's three of our big five data center markets. But when I looked at our data center stats at the beginning of the year, to put a bit of context into where we are…

Paul Walsh: In Europe…

Emmet Kelly: In Europe versus the rest. So, at the end of [20]24, the U.S. data center market had 35 gigawatts of data center capacity. But that grew last year at a clip of 30 percent. China had a data center bank of roughly 22 gigawatts, but that had grown at a rate of just 10 percent. And that was because of the chip issue. And then Europe has capacity, or had capacity at the end of last year, roughly 7 to 8 gigawatts, and that had grown at a rate of 10 percent.

Now, the reason for that is because the three big data center markets in Europe are called FLAP-D. So, it's Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam, Paris, and Dublin. We had to put an acronym on it. So, Flap-D. Good news. I'm sitting with the tech guys. They've got even more acronyms than I do, in their sector, so well done them.

Lee Simpson: Nothing beats FLAP-D.

Paul Walsh: Yes.

Emmet Kelly: It’s quite an achievement. But what is interesting is three of the big five markets in Europe are constrained. So, Frankfurt, post the Ukraine conflict. Ireland, because in Ireland, an incredible statistic is data centers are using 25 percent of the Irish power grid. Compared to a global average of 3 percent.

Now I'm from Dublin, and data centers are running into conflict with industry, with housing estates. Data centers are using 45 percent of the Dublin grid, 45. So, there's a moratorium in building data centers there. And then Amsterdam has the classic semi moratorium space because it's a small country with a very high population.

So, three of our five markets are constrained in Europe. What is interesting is it started with the former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. The UK has made great strides at attracting data center money and AI capital into the UK and the current Prime Minister continues to do that. So, the UK has definitely gone; moved from the middle lane into the fast lane. And then Macron in France. He hosted an AI summit back in February and he attracted over a 100 billion euros of AI and data center commitments.

Paul Walsh: And I think if we added up, as per the research that we published a few months ago, Europe's announced over 350 billion euros, in proposed investments around AI.

Emmet Kelly: Yeah, absolutely. It's a good stat. Now where people can get a little bit cynical is they can say a couple of things. Firstly, it's now over a year since the Mario Draghi report came out. And what's changed since? Absolutely nothing, unfortunately. And secondly, when I look at powering AI, I like to compare Europe to what's happening in the United States. I mean, the U.S. is giving access to nuclear power to AI. It started with the three Mile Island…

Paul Walsh: Yeah. The nuclear renaissance is…

Emmet Kelly: Nuclear Renaissance is absolutely huge. Now, what's underappreciated is actually Europe has got a massive nuclear power bank. It's right up there. But unfortunately, we're decommissioning some of our nuclear power around Europe, so we're going the wrong way from that perspective. Whereas President Trump is opening up the nuclear power to AI tech companies and data centers.

Then over in the States we also have gas and turbines. That's a very, very big growth area and we're not quite on top of that here in Europe. So, looking at this year, I have a feeling that the Americans will probably increase their data center capacity somewhere between – it's incredible – somewhere between 35 and 50 percent. And I think in Europe we're probably looking at something like 10 percent again.

Paul Walsh: Okay. Understood.

Emmet Kelly: So, we're growing in Europe, but we're way, way behind as a starting point. And it feels like the others are pulling away. The other big change I'd highlight is the Chinese are really going to accelerate their data center growth this year as well. They've got their act together and you'll see them heading probably towards 30 gigs of capacity by the end of next year.

Paul Walsh: Alright, we're out of time. The TMT Edge is alive and kicking in Europe. I want to thank Emmett, Lee and Adam for their time and I just want to wish everybody a great day today. Thank you.

(Applause)

That was my conversation with Adam, Emmett and Lee. Many thanks again to them. Many thanks again to them for telling us about the latest in their areas of research and to the live audience for hearing us out. And a thanks to you as well for listening.

Let us know what you think about this and other episodes by living us a review wherever you get your podcasts. And if you enjoy listening to Thoughts on the Market, please tell a friend or colleague about the podcast today.

Episoder(1504)

Finding Opportunity in an Uncertain U.S. Equity Market

Finding Opportunity in an Uncertain U.S. Equity Market

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategy Mike Wilson suggests that stock, factor and sector selection remain key to portfolio performance.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief US Equity Strategist. Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing equities in the context of higher rates and weaker earnings revisions. It's Tuesday, Feb 18th at 11:30am in New York. So let’s get after it.Since early December, the S&P 500 has made little headway. The almost unimpeded run from the summer was halted by a few things but none as important as the rise in 10-year Treasury yields, in my view. In December, we cited 4 to 4.5 percent as the sweet spot for equity multiples assuming growth and earnings remained on track. We viewed 4.5 percent as a key level for equity valuations. And sure enough, when the Fed leaned less dovish at its December meeting, yields crossed that 4.5 percent threshold; and correlations between stocks and yields settled firmly in negative territory, where they remain. In other words, yields are no longer supportive of higher valuations—a key driver of returns the past few years. Instead, earnings are now the primary driver of returns and that is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. While the Fed was already increasingly less dovish, the uncertainty on tariffs and last week’s inflation data could further that shift with the bond market moving to just one cut for the rest of the year. Our official call is in line with that view with our economists now just looking for just one cut–in June. It depends on how the inflation and growth data roll in. Our strategy has shifted, too. With the S&P 500 reaching our tactical target of 6100 in December and earnings revision breadth now rolling over for the index, we have been more focused on sectors and factors. In particular, we’ve favored areas of the market showing strong earnings revisions on an absolute or relative basis.Financials, Media and Entertainment, Software over Semiconductors and Consumer Services over Goods continue to fit that bill. Within Defensives, we have favored Utilities over Staples, REITs and Healthcare. While we’ve seen outperformance in all these trades, we are sticking with them, for now. We maintain an overriding preference for Large-cap quality unless 10-year Treasury yields fall sustainably below 4.5 percent without a meaningful degradation in growth. The key component of 10-year yields to watch for equity valuations remains the term premium – which has come down, but is still elevated compared to the past few years. Other macro developments driving stock prices include the very active policy announcements from the White House including tariffs, immigration enforcement, and cost cutting efforts by the Department of Government Efficiency, also known as DOGE. For tariffs, we believe they will be more of an idiosyncratic event for equity markets. However, if tariffs were to be imposed and maintained on China, Mexico and Canada through 2026, the impact to earnings-per-share would be roughly 5-7 percent for the S&P 500. That’s not an insignificant reduction and likely one of the reasons why guidance this past quarter was more muted than fourth quarter results. Industries facing greater headwinds from China tariffs include consumer discretionary goods and electronics. Lower immigration flow and stock is more likely to affect aggregate demand than to be a wage cost headwind, at least for public companies. Finally, skepticism remains high as it relates to DOGE’s ability to cut Federal spending meaningfully. I remain more optimistic on that front, but realize greater success also presents a headwind to growth before it provides a tailwind via lower fiscal deficits and less crowding out of the private economy—things that could lead to more Fed cuts and lower long-term interest rates as term premium falls. Bottom line, higher backend rates and growth headwinds from the stronger dollar and the initial policy changes suggest equity multiples are capped for now. That means stock, factor and sector selection remains key to performance rather than simply adding beta to one’s portfolio. On that score, we continue to favor earnings revision breadth, quality, and size factors alongside financials, software, media/entertainment and consumer services at the industry level. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

18 Feb 4min

Trump 2.0 and the Potential Economic Impact of Immigration Policy

Trump 2.0 and the Potential Economic Impact of Immigration Policy

Our Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research, Michael Zezas, joins our Chief U.S. Economist, Michael Gapen, to discuss the possible outcomes for President Trump’s immigration policies and their effect on the U.S. economy.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research.Michael Gapen: And I'm Michael Gapen, Chief U.S. Economist for Morgan Stanley.Michael Zezas: Our topic today: President Trump's immigration policy and its economic ramifications.It's Friday, February 14th at 10am in New York.Michael, migration has always been considered an important feature of the global economy. In fact, you believe that strong immigration flows were an important element in the supply side rebound that set the stage for a U.S. soft landing. If we think back to the time before President Trump took office almost a month ago, how would you categorize immigration trends then?Michael Gapen: So, we saw a very sharp increase in immigration coming out of the pandemic. I would say, if you look at longer term averages, say the 20 years leading up to the pandemic, normally we'd get about a million and a half immigrants, per year into the United States. A lot of variation around that number, but that was the long-term average.In 2022 through 2024, we saw immigration surge to about 3 million per year. So about twice as fast as we saw normally. And that happened at a very important time. It allowed for very significant and rapid growth in the labor force, just at a time when the economy was emerging from the pandemic and demand for labor was quite high.So, it filled that labor demand. It allowed the economy to grow rapidly, while at the same time helping to keep wages lower and inflation starting to come down. So, I do think it was a major underpinning force in the ability of the U.S. economy to soft land after several years of above target inflation.Michael Zezas: Got it. And so now, with a second President Trump term, are we set up for a reversal of this immigration driven boost to the economy?Michael Gapen: Yeah, I think that's the key question for the outlook, and our answer is yes. That if we are going to significantly restrict immigration flows, the risk here is that we reverse the trends that we've just seen in the previous year.So, I certainly believe one of the main goals of the Trump administration is to harden the border and initiate greater deportations. And these steps in my mind come on the back of steps that the Biden administration already took around the middle of last year that began to slow immigration flows.So yes, I do think we should look for a reversal of the immigration driven boost to the economy. But Mike, I would actually throw this question back to you and say on the first day of his presidency, Trump issued a series of executive orders pertaining to immigration. Where are we now in that process after these initial announcements? And what do you expect in terms of policy implementation?Michael Zezas: Well, I think you hit on it. There's two levers here. There's stepped up deportations and removals and there's working with Mexico on border enforcement. Things like the remain in Mexico policy where Mexico agrees to keep those seeking asylum on their side of the border; and to facilitate that, they've stepped up their military presence to do that.Those are really kind of the two levers that the U.S. is pushing on to try and reduce the flow of migrants coming into the U.S. Still to be determined how much these actually have an impact, but I think that's the direction of policy travel.Michael Gapen: And are there any catalysts specifically that you're watching for? I mean, recently the administration proposed tariffs on Mexico and Canada around border control, but those have been delayed. Is there anything on the horizon we should look for this time around?Michael Zezas: Yeah. So obviously the president tied the potential for tariffs on Mexico and Canada to the idea that there should be some improvement on border enforcement. It's going to be difficult for investors, I think, to assess in real time how much progress has been made there. Mostly it's a data challenge here. There are official government statistics which have a good amount of detail about removals and folks stopped at the border and demographics in terms of age and, and whether or not they were working. That might really kind of help us piece together the story in terms of whether or not there's going to be future tariffs – and Michael, probably for you, to what extent there's an impact on the economy if folks are already in the labor force.But that data is on a lag, it'll be really difficult to tell what's happening now for at least several months. Maybe we're going to get some hints about what's going on for comments coming in earnings calls, for example, from companies that deal in construction and food service and hospitality. But I don't know that those anecdotes would be sufficient to really draw substantial conclusions. So, I think we're a bit in a fog for the next couple months on exactly what's happening.But based on all this, Michael, what's your outlook for immigration this year and beyond?Michael Gapen: Yeah, so we, as I mentioned, we were getting about 3 million immigrants per year between 2022 and 2024; long run averages before the pandemic were more like a million and a half a year. Our outlook is that immigration flows should slow below pre- COVID averages to about 1 million this year and about 500,000 in 2026. And again, that would be the well below the long run average of about a million and a half per year.Now, as you mentioned, understanding these flows in real time is hard and there's a lot of uncertainty around this and how effective policies may be. So, I think people should consider ranges around this baseline, if you will. On one hand, we could see a reduction in unauthorized immigration replaced by more authorized immigration. So maybe there's a benign scenario where immigration slows back to its one and a half million per year. But it's more through legal and formal channels than unauthorized channels.Alternatively, it could be the case that some of the policies, you mentioned in terms of, say, stepped up deportations or other measures, and maybe there's a chilling effect. That there's just like an externality on immigration behavior. And in fact, we slow maybe to about 500,000 this year and see a decline in about 250,000 next year.So, I think there's a lot of uncertainty about it. We think immigration slows below its longer run averages, which would represent a major shift from what we've seen over the last three years.Michael Zezas: Got it. So, lots of crosscurrents here, about how the actual labour supply is impacted. But bottom line, if we do arrive at a point where there’s a significant reduction in immigration, what’s the expectation about what that means for the U.S. economy?Michael Gapen: Yeah, so a lot of cross currents here. Number one, I think with a high degree of confidence, we can say reduced immigration should lead to slower potential growth, right? So, a slower growth in the labor force should mean slower growth in trend hours, right? Potential GDP is really only the sum of growth in trend hours and trend productivity.So, the surge in immigration we saw really boosted potential growth up to 2.5 per cent to 3 per cent in recent years. So, if we reduce immigration, potential growth should slow. I think back towards, say, 2 per cent this year, maybe even 1 to 1.5 per cent next year. So, you slow down growth in the labor force, potential should moderate.Second, and I think the more difficult question is, well, okay, if you also reduce growth in the labor force, you're going to get less employment, and that's a demand side effect. So, which dominates here, the supply side or the demand side? And here, I think to go back to your first question – yeah, I do think we're going to get a reversal of the outcome that we just saw.So, I think it'll moderate both potential and actual growth. So, I think actual growth slows. The amount of employment we see should decline and soften. We're not saying the level of employment will decline, but the growth rate of employment should slow. But it should coincide with a low unemployment rate, so it's going to be a very different labor market. A lot less employment growth, but still a tight labor market in terms of low unemployment.That should keep wages firm, particularly in the service sector where a lot of immigrants work, and we think it'll also help keep inflation firm. So, it could keep the Fed on the sideline for a significant period of time, for example.And I'd just like to close, Mike, by saying I think this is an underappreciated risk for financial markets. I think investors have digested trade policy uncertainty, but I'm not convinced that risks around immigration and their effect on the economy are well understood.Michael Zezas: Got it. Well Michael, thanks for taking the time to talk.Michael Gapen: Thank you.Michael Zezas: Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen to podcasts and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

14 Feb 9min

How Do Tariffs Affect Currencies?

How Do Tariffs Affect Currencies?

Our Head of Foreign Exchange & Emerging Markets Strategy James Lord discusses how much tariff-driven volatility investors can expect in currency markets this year.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m James Lord, Morgan Stanley’s Head of Foreign Exchange & Emerging Markets Strategy. Today – the implications of tariffs for volatility on foreign exchange markets. It’s Thursday, February 13th, at 3pm in London. Foreign exchange markets are following President Trump’s tariff proposals with bated breath. A little over a week ago investors faced significant uncertainty over proposed tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China. In the end, the U.S. reached a deal with Canada and Mexico, but a 10 per cent tariff on Chinese imports went into effect. Currencies experienced heightened volatility during the negotiations, but the net impacts at the end of the negotiations were small. Announced tariffs on steel and aluminum have had a muted impact too, but the prospect of reciprocal tariffs are keeping investors on edge. We believe there are three key lessons investors can take away from this recent period of tariff tension. First of all, we need to distinguish between two different types of tariffs. The first type is proposed with the intention to negotiate; to reach a deal with affected countries on key issues. The second type of tariff serves a broader purpose. Imposing them might reduce the U.S. trade deficit or protect key domestic industries.There may also be examples where these two distinct approaches to tariffs meld, such as the reciprocal tariffs that President Trump has also discussed. The market impacts of these different tariffs vary significantly. In cases where the ultimate objective is to make a deal on a separate issue, any currency volatility experienced during the tariff negotiations will very likely reverse – if a deal is made. However, if the tariffs are part of a broader economic strategy, then investors should consider more seriously whether currency impacts are going to be more long-lasting. For instance, we believe that tariffs on imports from China should be considered in this context. As a result, we do see sustained dollar/renminbi upside, with that currency pair likely to hit 7.6 in the second half of 2025. A second key issue for investors is going to be the timing of tariffs. April 1st is very likely going to be a key date for Foreign Exchange markets as more details around the America First Trade Policy are likely revealed. We could see the U.S. dollar strengthen in the days leading up to this date, and investors are likely to consider where subsequently there will be a more significant push to enact tariffs. A final question for investors to ponder is going to be whether foreign exchange volatility would move to a structurally higher plane, or simply rise episodically. Many investors currently assume that FX volatility will be higher this year, thanks to the uncertainty created by trade policy. However, so far, the evidence doesn’t really support this conclusion. Indicators that track the level of uncertainty around global trade policy did rise during President Trump's first term, specifically around the period of escalating tariffs on China. And while this was associated with a stronger [U.S.] dollar, it did not lead to rising levels of FX volatility. We can see again, at the start of Trump's second term, that rising uncertainty over trade policy has been consistent with a stronger U.S. dollar. And while FX volatility has increased a bit, so far the impact has been relatively muted – and implied volatility is still well below the highs that we’ve seen in the past ten years. FX volatility is likely to rise around key dates and periods of escalation; and while structurally higher levels of FX volatility could still occur, the odds of that happening would increase if tariffs resulted in more substantial macro economic consequences for the U.S. economy.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or a colleague today.

13 Feb 4min

The Credit Upside of Market Uncertainty

The Credit Upside of Market Uncertainty

The down-to-the-deadline nature of Trump’s trade policy has created market uncertainty. Our Head of Corporate Credit Research Andrew Sheets points out a silver lining. ----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley. Today I’m going to talk about a potential silver lining to the significant uptick in uncertainty around U.S. trade policy. It's Wednesday, February 12th at 2pm in London. One of the nuances of our market view is that we think credit spreads remain tight despite rising levels of corporate confidence and activity. We think these things can co-exist, at least temporarily, because the level of corporate activity is still so low, and so it could rise quite a bit and still only be in-line with the long-term trend. And so while more corporate activity and aggression is usually a negative for lenders and drives credit spreads wider, we don’t think it’s quite one yet. But maybe there is even less tension in these views than we initially thought. The first four weeks of the new U.S. Administration have seen a flurry of policy announcements on tariffs. This has meant a lot for investors to digest and discuss, but it’s meant a lot less to actual market prices. Since the inauguration, U.S. stocks and yields are roughly unchanged. That muted reaction may be because investors assume that, in many cases, these policies will be delayed, reversed or modified. For example, announced tariffs on Mexico and Canada have been delayed. A key provision concerning smaller shipments from China has been paused. So far, this pattern actually looks very consistent with the framework laid out by my colleagues Michael Zezas and Ariana Salvatore from the Morgan Stanley Public Policy team: fast announcements of action, but then much slower ultimate implementation. Yet while markets may be dismissing these headlines for now, there are signs that businesses are taking them more seriously. Per news reports, U.S. Merger and Acquisition activity in January just suffered its lowest level of activity since 2015. Many factors could be at play. But it seems at least plausible that the “will they, won’t they” down-to-the-deadline nature of trade policy has increased uncertainty, something businesses generally don’t like when they’re contemplating big transformative action. And for lenders maybe that’s the silver lining. We’ve been thinking that credit in 2025 would be a story of timing this steadily rising wave of corporate aggression. But if that wave is delayed, debt levels could end up being lower, bond issuance could be lower, and spread levels – all else equal – could be a bit tighter. Corporate caution isn’t everywhere. In sectors that are seen as multi-year secular trends, such as AI data centers, investment plans continue to rise rapidly, with our colleagues in Equity Research tracking over $320bn of investment in 2025. But for activity that is more economically sensitive, uncertainty around trade policy may be putting companies on the back foot. That isn’t great for business; but, temporarily, it could mean a better supply/demand balance for those that lend to them. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

12 Feb 3min

The Rising Risk of Trade Tensions in Asia

The Rising Risk of Trade Tensions in Asia

Our Chief Asia Economist Chetan Ahya discusses the potential impact of reciprocal U.S. tariffs on Asian economies, highlighting the key markets at risk.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Asia Economist. Today: the possibilities of reciprocal tariffs between the U.S. and Asian economies. It’s Tuesday, February 11, at 2pm in Singapore.President Trump’s recent tariff actions have already been far more aggressive than in 2018 and 2019. And this time around, multiple trade partners are simultaneously facing broad-based tariffs, and tariffs are coming at a much faster pace. The risk of trade tensions escalating has risen, and the latest developments may have kicked that risk up another notch. The U.S. president is pushing a sweeping tariff of 25 per cent on all foreign steel and aluminum products. Trump has also indicated that he would propose reciprocal tariffs on multiple countries – to match the tariffs levied by each country on U.S. imports. This potential reciprocal tariff proposal suggests that Asia ex China may be more exposed to possible tariff hikes. As of now, Asia’s tariffs on US imports are, for the most part, slightly higher than US tariffs on Asian imports. And based on [the] latest available data, six economies in Asia do impose [a] higher weighted average tariff on the U.S. than the U.S. does on individual Asia economies. The tariff differentials are most pronounced for India, Thailand, and Korea. These three economies may face a risk of a hike in tariffs by 4 to 6 percentage points on a weighted average basis, if the U.S. imposes reciprocal tariffs. Individual products may yet face higher tariffs rates but we think [the] overall impact from steel, aluminum and reciprocal tariffs will be manageable. But look, trade tensions may still rise further given that 7 out of 10 economies with the largest trade surplus with the U.S. are in Asia. Against this backdrop, policy makers may have to look for ways to address the demands from the U.S. administration. For instance, Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba has committed to increasing investment in the U.S. and is looking to raise energy imports from the U.S. This is seen as a positive step to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. Meanwhile, ahead of the meeting between President Trump and India’s Prime Minister Modi later this week, India has already taken steps to lower tariffs on the U.S., and may propose [an] increase in imports of oil and gas, defense equipments and aircrafts to narrow its trade surplus with the U.S. However, as regards China is concerned, the wide scope of issues in the bilateral relationship suggests that [the] U.S. administration would cite a variety of reasons for expanding tariffs. As things stand, China has been the only economy so far where tariff hikes have stayed in place. Indeed, the recent 10 percent increase in tariffs has already matched the increase in the weighted average tariffs that transpired in 2018 and 2019. And we still expect that tariffs on imports from China will continue to rise over the course of 2025. To sum it up, there has been a constant stream of tariff threats from the U.S. administration. While the direct effects of [the] tariffs appear manageable, the bigger concern for us has been that this policy uncertainty will potentially weigh on corporate sector confidence, CapEx and growth cycle.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

11 Feb 4min

Who Might Benefit From Trump’s Tax Policy Proposals?

Who Might Benefit From Trump’s Tax Policy Proposals?

Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research Michael Zezas and Head of Global Evaluation, Accounting and Tax Todd Castagno discuss the market and economic implications of proposed tax extensions and tax cuts.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income Research and Public Policy Strategy.Todd Castagno: And I'm Todd Castagno, Head of Global Evaluation, Accounting and Tax.Michael Zezas: Today, we'll focus on taxes under the new Trump administration.It's Monday, February 10th, at 10am in New York.Recently, at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Trump stated his administration will pass the largest tax cut in American history, including substantial tax cuts for workers and families. He was short on the details, but tax policies were a significant focus of his election campaign.Todd, can you give us a better sense of the tax cuts that Trump's been vocal about so far?Todd Castagno: Well, there's tax cuts and tax extensions. So, I think that's an important place to set the baseline. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), under his first administration, starts to expire in 2025. And so, what we view is, the most likelihood is, an extension of those policies going forward. However, there's some new ideas, some new contours as well. So, for instance, a lower corporate rate that gets you in the 15 per cent ballpark can be through domestic tax credits, new incentives.I think there's other items on the individual side of the code that could be explored as well. But we also have to kind of step back and creating new policy is very challenging. So again, that baseline is an extension of kind of the tax world we live in today.So, Michael, looking at the broader macro picture and from conversations with our economist, how would these tax cuts impact GDP and macro in general?Michael Zezas: Well, if you're talking about extension of current policy, which is most of our expectation about what happens with taxes at the end of the year, the way our economists have been looking at this is to say that there's no net new impulse for households or companies to behave differently.That might be true on a sector-by-sector basis, but in the aggregate for the economy, there's no reason to look at this policy and think that it is going to provide a definitive uplift to the growth forecast that they have for 2026. Now, there may be some other provisions that could add in there that are incremental that we'd have to consider.But still, they would probably take time to play out or their measurable impact would be very hard to define. Things like raising the cap on the state and local tax deduction, that tends to impact higher income households who already aren't constrained from a spending perspective. And things like a domestic manufacturing tax credit for companies, that could take several years to play out before it actually manifests into spending.Todd Castagno: And you’re kind of seeing that with the prior administration's tax law, the Inflation Reduction Act. A lot of this takes years in order to actually play through the economy. So that's something that investors should consider.Michael Zezas: Yeah, these things certainly take time; and you know back in 2018 it had been a long ambition, particularly of Republican lawmakers, to reduce the corporate tax rate. They succeeded in doing that, getting it down to 21 per cent in Trump's first term. Now, Trump's talked about getting corporate tax rates lower again here. If he's able to do that, how do you think he would do that? And would that affect how you're thinking about investment and hiring?Todd Castagno: So, there's the corporate rate itself, and it's at 21 per cent currently. There is a view to change that rate, lower it. However, there's other ways you can reduce that effective tax burden through what we've just discussed. So enhanced corporate deductions, timing differences, companies can benefit from a tax system that ultimately gets them a lower effective rate, even if the corporate rate doesn't move much.Michael Zezas: And so, what sorts of companies and what sorts of sectors of the market would benefit the most from that type of reduction in the corporate tax burden?Todd Castagno: So, if you think they're mosaic of all these items, it's going to accrue to domestic companies. That might sound kind of obvious, but if you look at our economy, we have large multinationals and we have domestic companies and we have small businesses. The policies that are being articulated, I think, mostly orient towards domestic companies, industrials, for instance, R&D incentives, again powering our AI plants, energy, et cetera.Michael Zezas: Got it. And is there any read through on if a company does better under this policy – if they're big relative to being small?Todd Castagno: There are a lot of small business elements as well. So, I mentioned that timing difference, being able to deduct a piece of machinery day one versus over seven years. So, there's a lot of benefits that are not in the rate itself that can accrue through smaller businesses.Michael Zezas: YAnd what about for individual taxpayers, particularly the middle class? What particular tax cuts are on the table there?Todd Castagno: So, first and foremost is the child tax care credit. So, it’s current policy, but after COVID, it was enhanced. A higher dollar amount, different mechanism for receiving funds. And so, there is bipartisan support and President Trump as well, bringing back a version of an enhanced credit. Now, the policy is a little bit tricky, but I would say there's very good odds that that comes back. You know, you mentioned the state and local tax deduction, right? The politics are also tricky, but there could be a rate of change where that reverts back to pre-TCJA.But one of the things, Michael, is all these policies are very expensive. So, I'm just curious, in your mind, how do we balance the price tag versus the outcome?Michael Zezas: Well, I think the main constraint here to consider is that Republicans have a very slim majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and they're unlikely to get Democratic representatives crossing the aisle to vote with them on a tax package this large. So, they'll really need complete consensus on whatever tax items they extend and the deficit impact that it causes this is the type of thing that ultimately will constrain the package to be smaller than perhaps some of the president's stated ambitions.So, for example, items like making the interest payments on auto loans tax deductible, we think there might not be sufficient support for that and the budget costs that it would create. So ultimately, we think you get back to a package that's mostly about extending current cuts, adding in a couple more items like that domestic manufacturing tax credit, which is also very closely tied to Republicans larger trade ambition. And you might also see Republicans do some things to reduce the price tag, like, for example, only extend the tax cuts for a few years, as opposed to five or 10 years.Todd Castagno: Right.Michael Zezas: Todd, thanks for taking the time to talk.Todd Castagno: Great speaking with you, Mike.Michael Zezas: Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

10 Feb 7min

The Disruption in the AI Market

The Disruption in the AI Market

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur thinks that efficiency gains from Chinese AI startup DeepSeek may drive incremental demand for AI.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Today I’ll be talking about the macro implications of the DeepSeek development.It's Friday February 7th at 9 am, and I’m on the road in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.Recently we learned that DeepSeek, a Chinese AI startup, has developed two open-source large language models – LLMs – that can perform at levels comparable to models from American counterparts at a substantially lower cost. This news set off shockwaves in the equity markets that wiped out nearly a trillion dollars in the market cap of listed US technology companies on January 27. While the market has recouped some of these losses, their magnitude raises questions for investors about AI. My equity research colleagues have addressed a range of stock-specific issues in their work. Today we step back and consider the broader implications for the economy in terms of productivity growth and investment spending on AI infrastructure.First thing. While this is an important milestone and a significant development in the evolution of LLMs, it doesn’t come entirely as a shock. The history of computing is replete with examples of dramatic efficiency gains. The DeepSeek development is precisely that – a dramatic efficiency improvement which, in our view, drives incremental demand for AI. Rapid declines in the cost of computing during the 1990s provide a useful parallel to what we are seeing now. As Michael Gapen, our US chief economist, has noted, the investment boom during the 1990s was really driven by the pace at which firms replaced depreciated capital and a sharp and persistent decline in the price of computing capital relative to the price of output. If efficiency gains from DeepSeek reflect a similar phenomenon, we may be seeing early signs [that] the cost of AI capital is coming down – and coming down rapidly. In turn, that should support the outlook for business spending pertaining to AI.In the last few weeks, we have heard a lot of reference to the Jevons paradox – which really dates from 1865 – and it states that as technological advancements reduce the cost of using a resource, the overall demand for the resource increases, causing the total resource consumption to rise. In other words, cheaper and more ubiquitous technology will increase its consumption. This enables AI to transition from innovators to more generalized adoption and opens the door for faster LLM-enabled product innovation. That means wider and faster consumer and enterprise adoption. Over time, this should result in greater increases in productivity and faster realization of AI’s transformational promise.From a micro perspective, our equity research colleagues, who are experts in covering stocks in these sectors, come to a very similar conclusion. They think it’s unlikely that the DeepSeek development will meaningfully reduce CapEx related to AI infrastructure. From a macroeconomic perspective, there is a good case to be made for higher business spending related to AI, as well as productivity growth from AI.Obviously, it is still early days, and we will see leaders and laggards at the stock level. But the economy as a whole we think will emerge as a winner. DeepSeek illustrates the potential for efficiency gains, which in turn foster greater competition and drive wider adoption of AI. With that premise, we remain constructive on AI’s transformational promise.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.DISCLAIMERIn the last few weeks… (Laughs) It’s almost like the birds are waiting for me to start speaking.

7 Feb 4min

Chinese Airlines Breaking Through Turbulence

Chinese Airlines Breaking Through Turbulence

Our Hong Kong/China Transportation & Infrastructure Analyst Qianlei Fan explains why a resurgence in air travel is leading China’s emergence from deflation.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Qianlei Fan, Morgan Stanley’s Hong Kong/China Transportation Analyst. Chinese airlines are at a once-in-a-decade inflection point, and today I’ll break down the elements of this turnaround story.It’s Thursday, Feb 6th at 10am in Hong Kong.Last week, hundreds of millions of people across Asia gathered to celebrate the lunar new year with their families. I was one of them and took a flight back to my hometown Nanjing. Airports were jam-packed for days, with air travel expected to exceed 90 million trips.It’s all indicative of Chinese airlines making a comeback after a seven-year run of underperformance. In fact, we believe Airlines will be one of the first industries to emerge from China's deflationary pressures this year. And this has implications for the country's broader economy.Although COVID impacted Airlines globally, other regions have since recovered. In China, the earnings recovery is just beginning. Since 2018, Chinese Airlines have experienced demand hits from the trade tension, currency depreciation, COVID-19, and post-COVID macro headwinds.It’s been two years since Chinese borders lifted restrictions and air travelers are returning in force. Excess capacity has now been digested. Slower deliveries of aircrafts continue to limit supply, and it is more difficult for airlines to get new aircraft and increase their available seats. Passenger load factors will continue to strengthen this year, which means the airlines are running close to full capacity. This will increase Airlines' pricing power within the next 6 to 12 months, feeding through to earnings.If we put that in a global context, China’s airlines industry handled around 700 million passengers in 2024, 8 per cent of global air passengers; but that 700 million passengers only account for half of China’s population. In the US, air passenger numbers can be three times its population.Chinese airlines have just reached break-even in the past year, while many of their global peers have already generated robust profits. Chinese Airlines’ earnings and valuations have lagged global peers in both absolute and relative terms. But now, with a turnaround coming into view, Chinese Airlines have a longer runway for stronger earnings growth and share price performance than global peers.What’s more, the August 2024 turnaround in US airlines offers several key takeaways for China. US Airlines’ share prices recovered last year, following a long period of underperformance post COVID. The wait before the inflection was long, but share prices moved up quickly once the turning point was reached, and valuation expanded ahead of earnings recovery. Big US airlines outperformed smaller players during the most recent rally. We think all these are relevant to the Chinese Airlines story.If we look at earnings – Chinese Big Three airlines reached breakeven in 2024, making a small profit in 2025, and that profit will double in 2026. But that’s not yet the peak of the cycle; peak cycle earnings could again double the 2026 level, probably in 2027 to 2028. That’s the reason why we think Chinese airlines are on the path to doubling share prices.To sum up, Chinese Airlines represent a once-in-a-decade opportunity for investors. With strengthened passenger load factors and a positive demand outlook, coupled with significant potential for earnings growth, this industry looks ready for takeoff.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today. For those who celebrate – 新春快乐,恭喜发财!

6 Feb 4min

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