US Economy: What Could Go Wrong

US Economy: What Could Go Wrong

Our Head of Corporate Credit Research and Global Chief Economist explain why they’re watching the consumer savings rate, tariffs and capital expenditures.


----- Transcript -----


Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley.

Seth Carpenter: And I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist.

Andrew Sheets: And today on this special episode of the podcast, we'll be discussing what could cause our optimistic view on the economy and credit to go wrong.

Andrew Sheets: It’s Friday, Oct 11th at 4pm in London.

Seth Carpenter: And as it turns out, I'm in London with Andrew.

Andrew Sheets: So, Seth you and your global economics team have been pretty optimistic on the economy this year. And have been firmly in the soft-landing camp. And I think we’ve seen some oscillation in the market's view around the economy over the course of the year, but more recently, we've started to see some better data and increasing confidence in that view.

So, this is actually maybe the perfect opportunity to talk about – well, what could go wrong? And so, what are some of the factors that worry you most that could derail the story?

Seth Carpenter: We have been pretty constructive all along the whole hiking cycle. In fact, we've been calling for a soft- landing. And if anything, where we were wrong with our forecast so far is that things have turned out even better than we dare hoped. But it's worth remembering part of the soft-landing call for us, especially for the US is that coming out of COVID; the economy rebounded employment rebounded, but not proportionally. And so, for a long time, up until basically now, US firms had been operating shorthanded. And so, we were pretty optimistic that even if there was something that caused a slowdown, you were not going to see a wave of layoffs. And that's usually what contributes to a recession. A slowdown, then people get laid off, laid off people spend less, the economy slows down more, and it snowballs.

So, I have to say, there is gotta be just a little bit more risk because businesses basically backfilled most of their vacancies. And so, if we do get a big slowdown for some reason, maybe there's more risk than there was, say, a year ago. So, what could that something be is a real question. I think the first one is just -- there's just uncertainty.

And maybe, just maybe, the restraint that monetary policy has imparted -- takes a little bit longer than we realized. It's a little bit bigger than we realized, and things are slowing down. We just haven't seen the full force of it, and we just slowed down a lot more.

Not a whole lot I can do about that. I feel pretty good. Spending data is good. The last jobs report was good. So, I see that as a risk that just hangs over my head, like the sword of Damocles, at all times.

Andrew Sheets: And, Seth, another thing I want to talk to you about is this analysis of the economy that we do with the data that's available. And yet we recently got some pretty major revisions to the US economic picture that have changed, you know, kind of our basic understanding of what the savings rate was, you know, what some of these indicators are.

How have those revisions changed what you think the picture is?

Seth Carpenter: So those benchmark revisions were important. But I will say it's not as though it was just a wholesale change in what we thought we understood. Instead, the key change that happened is we had information on GDP -- gross domestic product -- which comes from a lot of spending data. There's another bit of data that's gross domestic income that in some idealized economic model version of the world, those two things are the same -- but they had been really different. And the measured income had been much lower than the measured gross domestic product, the spending data. And so, it looked like the saving rate was very, very low.

But it also raised a bit of a red flag, because if the savings rate is, is really low, and all of a sudden households go back to saving the normal amount, that necessarily means they'd slow their spending a lot, and that's what causes a downturn.

So, it didn't change our view, baseline view, about where the economy was, but it helped resolve a sniggling, intellectual tension in the back of the head, and it did take away at least one of the downside risks, i.e. that the savings rate was overdone, and consumers might have to pull back.

But I have to say, Andrew, another thing that could go wrong, could come from policy decisions that we don't know the answer to just yet. Let you in on a little secret. Don't tell anybody I told you this; but later this year, in fact, next month, there's an election in the United States.

Andrew Sheets: Oh my goodness.

Seth Carpenter: One of the policies that we have tried to model is tariffs. Tariffs are a tax. And so, the normal way I think a lot of people think about what tariffs might do is if you put a tax on consumer goods coming into the country, it could make them more expensive, could make people buy less, and so you'd get a little bit less activity, a little bit higher prices.

In addition to consumer goods, though, we also import a lot of intermediate goods for production, so physical goods that are used in manufacturing in the United States to produce a final output. And so, if you're putting a tax on that, you'll get less manufacturing in the United States.

We also import capital goods. So, things that go into business CapEx spending in the United States. And if you put a tax on that, well, businesses will do less investment spending. So, there's a disruption to actual US production, not just US consumption that goes on. And we actually think that could be material. And we've tried to model some of the policy proposals that are out there. 60 per cent tariff on China, 10 per cent tariff on the rest of the world.

None of these answers are going to be exact, none of these are going to be precise, but you get something on the order of an extra nine-tenths of a percentage point of inflation, so a pretty big reversion in inflation. But maybe closing in on one and a half percentage points of a drag on GDP – if they were all implemented at the same time in full force.

So that's another place where I think we could be wrong. It could be a big hit to the economy; but that's one place where there's just lots of uncertainty, so we have to flag it as a risk to our clients. But it's not in our baseline view.

Seth Carpenter: But I have to say, you've been forcing me to question my optimism, which is entirely unfair. You, sir, have been pretty bullish on the credit market. Credit spreads are, dare I say it, really tight by historical standards.

And yet, that doesn't cause you to want to call for mortgage spreads to widen appreciably. It doesn't call for you to want to go really short on credit. Why are you so optimistic? Isn't there really only one direction to go?

Andrew Sheets: So, there are kind of a few factors the way that we're thinking about that. So, one is we do think that the fundamental backdrop, the economic forecast that you and your team have laid out are better than average for credit -- are almost kind of ideal for what a credit investor would like.

Credit likes moderation. We're forecasting a lot of moderation. And, also kind of the supply and demand dynamics of the market. What we call the technicals are better than average. There's a lot of demand for bonds. And companies, while they're getting a little bit more optimistic, and a little bit more aggressive, they're not borrowing in the kind of hand over fist type of way that usually causes more problems. And so, you should have richer than average valuations.

Now, in terms of, I think, what disrupts that story, it could be, well, what if the technicals or the fundamentals are no longer good? And, you know, I think you've highlighted some scenarios where the economic forecasts could change. And if those forecasts do change, we're probably going to need to think about changing our view. And that's also true bottom up. I think if we started to see Corporates get a lot more optimistic, a lot more aggressive. You know, hubris is often the enemy of the bond investor, the credit investor.

I don't think we're there yet, but I think if we started to see that, that could present a larger problem. And both, you know, fundamentally it causes companies to take on more debt, but also kind of technically, because it means a lot more supply relative to demand.

Seth Carpenter: I see. I see. But I wonder, you said, if our outlook, sort of, doesn't materialize, that's a clear path to a worse outcome for your market. And I think that makes sense.

But the market hasn't always agreed with us. If we think back not that long ago to August, the market had real turmoil going on because we got a very weak Non Farm Payrolls print in the United States. And people started asking again. ‘Are you sure, Seth? Doesn't this mean we're heading for a recession?’ And asset markets responded.

What happened to credit markets then, and what does it tell you about how credit markets might evolve going forward, even if, at the end of the day, we're still right?

Andrew Sheets: Well, so I think there have been some good indications that there were parts of the market where maybe investors were pretty vulnerably positioned. Where there was more leverage, more kind of aggressiveness in how investors were leaning, and the fact that credit, yes, credit weakened, but it didn't weaken nearly as much -- I think does suggest that investors are going to this market eyes wide open. They're aware that spreads are tight. So, I think that's important.

The other I think really fundamental tension that I think credit investors are dealing with -- but also I think equity investors are -- is there are certain indicators that suggest a recession is more likely than normal. Things like the yield curve being inverted or purchasing manager indices, these PMIs being below 50.

But that also doesn't mean that a recession is assured by any means. And so, I do think what can challenge the market is a starting point where people see indicators that they think mean a recession is more likely, some set of weak data that would seem to confirm that thesis, and a feeling that, well, the writing's on the wall.

But I think it's also meant, and I think we've seen this since September, that this is a real, in very simple terms, kind of good is good market. You know, I got asked a lot in the aftermath of some of the September numbers, internally at Morgan Stanley, 'Is it, is it too good? Was the jobs number too good for credit?'

And, and my view is, because I think the market is so firmly shifted to ‘we're worried about growth,’ that it's going to take a lot more good data for that fear to really recede in the market to worry about something else.

Seth Carpenter: Yeah, it's funny. Some people just won't take yes for an answer. Alright, let me, let me end up with one more question for you.

So when we think about the cycle, I hear as I'm sure you do from lots of clients -- aren't we, late cycle, aren't things coming to an end? Have we ever seen a cycle before where the Fed hiked this much and it didn't end in tears? And the answer is actually yes. And so, I have often been pointing people to the 1990s.

1994, there was a pretty substantial rate hiking cycle that doesn't look that different from what we just lived through. The Fed stopped hiking, held out at the peak for a while, and then the economy wobbled a little bit. It did slow down, and they cut rates. And some of the wobbles, for a while at least, looked pretty serious. The Fed, as it turns out, only cut 75 basis points and then held rates steady. The economy stabilized and we had another half decade of expansion.

So, I'm not saying history is going to repeat itself exactly. But I think it should be, at least from my perspective, a good example for people to have another cycle to look at where things might turn out well with the soft landing.

Looking back to that period, what happened in credit markets?

Andrew Sheets: So, that mid-90s soft-landing was in the modern history of credit -- call it the last 40 years -- the tightest credit spreads have ever been. That was in 1997. And they were still kind of materially tighter from today's levels.

So we do have historical evidence that it can mean the market can trade tighter than here. It's also really fascinating because the 1990s were kind of two bull markets. There was a first stage that, that stage you were suggesting where, you know, the Fed started cutting; but the market wasn't really sure if it was going to stick that landing, if the economy was going to be okay. And so, you saw this period where, as the data did turn out to be okay, credit went tighter, equities went up, the two markets moved in the same direction.

But then it shifted. Then, as the cycle had been extending for a while, kind of optimism returned, and even too much optimism maybe returned, and so from '97, mid-97 onwards, equities kept going up, the stock market kept rallying, credit spreads went wider, expected volatility went higher. And so, you saw that relationship diverge.

And so, I do think that if we do get the '90s, if we're that lucky, and hopefully we do get that sort of scenario, it was good in a lot of ways. But I think we need to be on the watch for those two stages. We still think we're in stage one. We still think they're that stage that's more benign, but eventually benign conditions can lead to more aggressiveness.

Seth Carpenter: I think that's really fair. So, we started off talking about optimism and I would like to keep it that you pointed out that the '90s required a bit of good luck and I would wholeheartedly agree with that.

So, I still remain constructive, but I don't remain naive. I think there are ways for things to go wrong. And there is a ton of uncertainty ahead, so it might be a rocky ride. It's always great to get to talk to you, Andrew.

Andrew Sheets: Great to talk to you as well, Seth.

And thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, leave us a review wherever you listen, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

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Who Might Benefit From Trump’s Tax Policy Proposals?

Who Might Benefit From Trump’s Tax Policy Proposals?

Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research Michael Zezas and Head of Global Evaluation, Accounting and Tax Todd Castagno discuss the market and economic implications of proposed tax extensions and tax cuts.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income Research and Public Policy Strategy.Todd Castagno: And I'm Todd Castagno, Head of Global Evaluation, Accounting and Tax.Michael Zezas: Today, we'll focus on taxes under the new Trump administration.It's Monday, February 10th, at 10am in New York.Recently, at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Trump stated his administration will pass the largest tax cut in American history, including substantial tax cuts for workers and families. He was short on the details, but tax policies were a significant focus of his election campaign.Todd, can you give us a better sense of the tax cuts that Trump's been vocal about so far?Todd Castagno: Well, there's tax cuts and tax extensions. So, I think that's an important place to set the baseline. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), under his first administration, starts to expire in 2025. And so, what we view is, the most likelihood is, an extension of those policies going forward. However, there's some new ideas, some new contours as well. So, for instance, a lower corporate rate that gets you in the 15 per cent ballpark can be through domestic tax credits, new incentives.I think there's other items on the individual side of the code that could be explored as well. But we also have to kind of step back and creating new policy is very challenging. So again, that baseline is an extension of kind of the tax world we live in today.So, Michael, looking at the broader macro picture and from conversations with our economist, how would these tax cuts impact GDP and macro in general?Michael Zezas: Well, if you're talking about extension of current policy, which is most of our expectation about what happens with taxes at the end of the year, the way our economists have been looking at this is to say that there's no net new impulse for households or companies to behave differently.That might be true on a sector-by-sector basis, but in the aggregate for the economy, there's no reason to look at this policy and think that it is going to provide a definitive uplift to the growth forecast that they have for 2026. Now, there may be some other provisions that could add in there that are incremental that we'd have to consider.But still, they would probably take time to play out or their measurable impact would be very hard to define. Things like raising the cap on the state and local tax deduction, that tends to impact higher income households who already aren't constrained from a spending perspective. And things like a domestic manufacturing tax credit for companies, that could take several years to play out before it actually manifests into spending.Todd Castagno: And you’re kind of seeing that with the prior administration's tax law, the Inflation Reduction Act. A lot of this takes years in order to actually play through the economy. So that's something that investors should consider.Michael Zezas: Yeah, these things certainly take time; and you know back in 2018 it had been a long ambition, particularly of Republican lawmakers, to reduce the corporate tax rate. They succeeded in doing that, getting it down to 21 per cent in Trump's first term. Now, Trump's talked about getting corporate tax rates lower again here. If he's able to do that, how do you think he would do that? And would that affect how you're thinking about investment and hiring?Todd Castagno: So, there's the corporate rate itself, and it's at 21 per cent currently. There is a view to change that rate, lower it. However, there's other ways you can reduce that effective tax burden through what we've just discussed. So enhanced corporate deductions, timing differences, companies can benefit from a tax system that ultimately gets them a lower effective rate, even if the corporate rate doesn't move much.Michael Zezas: And so, what sorts of companies and what sorts of sectors of the market would benefit the most from that type of reduction in the corporate tax burden?Todd Castagno: So, if you think they're mosaic of all these items, it's going to accrue to domestic companies. That might sound kind of obvious, but if you look at our economy, we have large multinationals and we have domestic companies and we have small businesses. The policies that are being articulated, I think, mostly orient towards domestic companies, industrials, for instance, R&D incentives, again powering our AI plants, energy, et cetera.Michael Zezas: Got it. And is there any read through on if a company does better under this policy – if they're big relative to being small?Todd Castagno: There are a lot of small business elements as well. So, I mentioned that timing difference, being able to deduct a piece of machinery day one versus over seven years. So, there's a lot of benefits that are not in the rate itself that can accrue through smaller businesses.Michael Zezas: YAnd what about for individual taxpayers, particularly the middle class? What particular tax cuts are on the table there?Todd Castagno: So, first and foremost is the child tax care credit. So, it’s current policy, but after COVID, it was enhanced. A higher dollar amount, different mechanism for receiving funds. And so, there is bipartisan support and President Trump as well, bringing back a version of an enhanced credit. Now, the policy is a little bit tricky, but I would say there's very good odds that that comes back. You know, you mentioned the state and local tax deduction, right? The politics are also tricky, but there could be a rate of change where that reverts back to pre-TCJA.But one of the things, Michael, is all these policies are very expensive. So, I'm just curious, in your mind, how do we balance the price tag versus the outcome?Michael Zezas: Well, I think the main constraint here to consider is that Republicans have a very slim majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and they're unlikely to get Democratic representatives crossing the aisle to vote with them on a tax package this large. So, they'll really need complete consensus on whatever tax items they extend and the deficit impact that it causes this is the type of thing that ultimately will constrain the package to be smaller than perhaps some of the president's stated ambitions.So, for example, items like making the interest payments on auto loans tax deductible, we think there might not be sufficient support for that and the budget costs that it would create. So ultimately, we think you get back to a package that's mostly about extending current cuts, adding in a couple more items like that domestic manufacturing tax credit, which is also very closely tied to Republicans larger trade ambition. And you might also see Republicans do some things to reduce the price tag, like, for example, only extend the tax cuts for a few years, as opposed to five or 10 years.Todd Castagno: Right.Michael Zezas: Todd, thanks for taking the time to talk.Todd Castagno: Great speaking with you, Mike.Michael Zezas: Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

10 Feb 7min

The Disruption in the AI Market

The Disruption in the AI Market

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur thinks that efficiency gains from Chinese AI startup DeepSeek may drive incremental demand for AI.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Today I’ll be talking about the macro implications of the DeepSeek development.It's Friday February 7th at 9 am, and I’m on the road in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.Recently we learned that DeepSeek, a Chinese AI startup, has developed two open-source large language models – LLMs – that can perform at levels comparable to models from American counterparts at a substantially lower cost. This news set off shockwaves in the equity markets that wiped out nearly a trillion dollars in the market cap of listed US technology companies on January 27. While the market has recouped some of these losses, their magnitude raises questions for investors about AI. My equity research colleagues have addressed a range of stock-specific issues in their work. Today we step back and consider the broader implications for the economy in terms of productivity growth and investment spending on AI infrastructure.First thing. While this is an important milestone and a significant development in the evolution of LLMs, it doesn’t come entirely as a shock. The history of computing is replete with examples of dramatic efficiency gains. The DeepSeek development is precisely that – a dramatic efficiency improvement which, in our view, drives incremental demand for AI. Rapid declines in the cost of computing during the 1990s provide a useful parallel to what we are seeing now. As Michael Gapen, our US chief economist, has noted, the investment boom during the 1990s was really driven by the pace at which firms replaced depreciated capital and a sharp and persistent decline in the price of computing capital relative to the price of output. If efficiency gains from DeepSeek reflect a similar phenomenon, we may be seeing early signs [that] the cost of AI capital is coming down – and coming down rapidly. In turn, that should support the outlook for business spending pertaining to AI.In the last few weeks, we have heard a lot of reference to the Jevons paradox – which really dates from 1865 – and it states that as technological advancements reduce the cost of using a resource, the overall demand for the resource increases, causing the total resource consumption to rise. In other words, cheaper and more ubiquitous technology will increase its consumption. This enables AI to transition from innovators to more generalized adoption and opens the door for faster LLM-enabled product innovation. That means wider and faster consumer and enterprise adoption. Over time, this should result in greater increases in productivity and faster realization of AI’s transformational promise.From a micro perspective, our equity research colleagues, who are experts in covering stocks in these sectors, come to a very similar conclusion. They think it’s unlikely that the DeepSeek development will meaningfully reduce CapEx related to AI infrastructure. From a macroeconomic perspective, there is a good case to be made for higher business spending related to AI, as well as productivity growth from AI.Obviously, it is still early days, and we will see leaders and laggards at the stock level. But the economy as a whole we think will emerge as a winner. DeepSeek illustrates the potential for efficiency gains, which in turn foster greater competition and drive wider adoption of AI. With that premise, we remain constructive on AI’s transformational promise.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.DISCLAIMERIn the last few weeks… (Laughs) It’s almost like the birds are waiting for me to start speaking.

7 Feb 4min

Chinese Airlines Breaking Through Turbulence

Chinese Airlines Breaking Through Turbulence

Our Hong Kong/China Transportation & Infrastructure Analyst Qianlei Fan explains why a resurgence in air travel is leading China’s emergence from deflation.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Qianlei Fan, Morgan Stanley’s Hong Kong/China Transportation Analyst. Chinese airlines are at a once-in-a-decade inflection point, and today I’ll break down the elements of this turnaround story.It’s Thursday, Feb 6th at 10am in Hong Kong.Last week, hundreds of millions of people across Asia gathered to celebrate the lunar new year with their families. I was one of them and took a flight back to my hometown Nanjing. Airports were jam-packed for days, with air travel expected to exceed 90 million trips.It’s all indicative of Chinese airlines making a comeback after a seven-year run of underperformance. In fact, we believe Airlines will be one of the first industries to emerge from China's deflationary pressures this year. And this has implications for the country's broader economy.Although COVID impacted Airlines globally, other regions have since recovered. In China, the earnings recovery is just beginning. Since 2018, Chinese Airlines have experienced demand hits from the trade tension, currency depreciation, COVID-19, and post-COVID macro headwinds.It’s been two years since Chinese borders lifted restrictions and air travelers are returning in force. Excess capacity has now been digested. Slower deliveries of aircrafts continue to limit supply, and it is more difficult for airlines to get new aircraft and increase their available seats. Passenger load factors will continue to strengthen this year, which means the airlines are running close to full capacity. This will increase Airlines' pricing power within the next 6 to 12 months, feeding through to earnings.If we put that in a global context, China’s airlines industry handled around 700 million passengers in 2024, 8 per cent of global air passengers; but that 700 million passengers only account for half of China’s population. In the US, air passenger numbers can be three times its population.Chinese airlines have just reached break-even in the past year, while many of their global peers have already generated robust profits. Chinese Airlines’ earnings and valuations have lagged global peers in both absolute and relative terms. But now, with a turnaround coming into view, Chinese Airlines have a longer runway for stronger earnings growth and share price performance than global peers.What’s more, the August 2024 turnaround in US airlines offers several key takeaways for China. US Airlines’ share prices recovered last year, following a long period of underperformance post COVID. The wait before the inflection was long, but share prices moved up quickly once the turning point was reached, and valuation expanded ahead of earnings recovery. Big US airlines outperformed smaller players during the most recent rally. We think all these are relevant to the Chinese Airlines story.If we look at earnings – Chinese Big Three airlines reached breakeven in 2024, making a small profit in 2025, and that profit will double in 2026. But that’s not yet the peak of the cycle; peak cycle earnings could again double the 2026 level, probably in 2027 to 2028. That’s the reason why we think Chinese airlines are on the path to doubling share prices.To sum up, Chinese Airlines represent a once-in-a-decade opportunity for investors. With strengthened passenger load factors and a positive demand outlook, coupled with significant potential for earnings growth, this industry looks ready for takeoff.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today. For those who celebrate – 新春快乐,恭喜发财!

6 Feb 4min

Trump 2.0 and the Latest on Tariffs

Trump 2.0 and the Latest on Tariffs

Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research & Public Policy Strategy Michael Zezas discusses the potential economic outcomes of a shifting North American trade policy.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley’s Global Head of Fixed Income Research and Public Policy Strategy. Today – the latest on tariffs and potential outcomes of a shifting North American trade policy. It’s Wednesday, February 5, at 10am in New York. In a series of last-minute phone calls on Monday, President Trump reached a deal with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. President Trump agreed to delay the announced 25 percent tariffs on Mexico and Canada for a month – citing their intention to do more on their borders against migration and drug trafficking. But President Trump’s 10 percent tariffs on all Chinese products went into effect yesterday morning. China responded promptly with its own countermeasures, which are not expected to take effect until Monday, February 10, leaving room for potential negotiations. These developments don’t come as a surprise. We had been assuming – one – that Canada and Mexico could avoid tariffs by making border concessions, which they did. And – two – that the US would craft a tariff policy related to China independent from its considerations around Mexico and Canada. If the underlying goal is to transform its trade relationship with China, then the US has an interest in preserving an alignment with Canada and Mexico. Given all of that, our base case of “fast announcements, slow implementation” looks intact. We expect tariffs on China and some products from Europe to ramp up through the end of the year, putting downward pressure on economic growth into 2026. If tariffs on Mexico and Canada are avoided or delayed further, there would be no change to our broader economic outlook. The U.S. dollar could weaken as it prices out some tariff risk. Within U.S. equities, consumer discretionary as well as broader cyclical stocks could lead. If, however, we're wrong and tariffs do go up on Mexico and Canada after this one-month pause, then we expect some rise in inflation, growth to slow, and the U.S. dollar and Treasuries to outperform equities; at least for a time as the U.S. gets to work rewiring its global trade relationships. Tariffs are likely to dominate news headlines in the days and months to come. We'll keep tracking the topic and bring you updates. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

5 Feb 2min

Trump 2.0 and the Future of Energy

Trump 2.0 and the Future of Energy

Our analysts Ariana Salvatore, Stephen Byrd and Devin McDermott discuss President Trump’s four executive orders around energy policy and how they could reshape the sector.----- Transcript -----Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Public Policy Strategist.Stephen Byrd: And I'm Stephen Byrd, Morgan Stanley's Head of Research Product for the Americas and Global Head of Sustainability Research.Devin McDermott: And I'm Devin McDermott, Head of North American Energy Research.Ariana Salvatore: Our topic today looms large in investors minds. We'll be digging into how the new policies proposed under President Trump's administration will fundamentally reshape energy markets.It's Tuesday, February 4th at 10am in New York.On his first day in office, President Trump declared a national energy emergency. He issued four key executive orders, setting out a sweeping plan to maximize oil and gas production. All of this on top of stepping back in tangible ways from the Biden administration's clean energy plans. We think these orders can have a significant impact on the future of energy, one of Morgan Stanley's four key themes for 2025.So, Stephen, let's start there. One of the biggest questions is which segments of the power and AI theme stand to benefit the most, and which ones will be the most challenged?Stephen Byrd: Yeah, Ariana, I'd say the two biggest beneficiaries will be natural gas and nuclear, probably in that order. And in terms of challenges, I do think, wind, especially offshore wind, will be quite challenged. So, when I think about natural gas, it's very clear that we have an administration that's very pro natural gas.And natural gas is also going to need to be part of the power mix for data centers. It's flexible. It could be built relatively quickly. There are a lot of locational options that are perfect here. So, I do think natural gas is a winner.On nuclear, we do think Republicans broadly, and also many Democrats, firmly support nuclear power. Nuclear is quite helpful, especially for larger data centers or supercomputers. They're large, there's a lot of land at these nuclear plants. And so, I would expect to see some very large data centers built at operational nuclear plants. And we do think the Trump administration will work hard to make that – from a regulatory point of view – make that happen.I also think we'll see a lot of support at the federal level for new nuclear power plant construction, as well as bringing the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle back to the U.S. So those are a few of the areas that I would expect to do well.Ariana Salvatore: Devin, same question for you on the energy sector. How are you thinking about the impacts?Devin McDermott: Yeah, it's a good question, and there's a lot in these executive orders. I mean, some of the key things that we're focused on as impacting the sector include encouraging federal lands development and leasing for oil and gas activity, with a specific focus on Alaska. Resuming LNG permit authorizations, which lifts the ban that's been in place for the last year. Eliminating EV targets, including pausing some IRA funds tied to EVs. Broad support for infrastructure permitting, including pipelines. And then a broader review of environmental regulations, including some recent headlines that point to rolling back fuel efficiency and emission standards for cars and trucks – something that the prior Trump administration did as well.The near-term financial impact to the industry of all this is fairly limited. But there are two key longer-term considerations. First, on the oil side, rolling back fuel efficiency standards and other environmental regulations doesn't stop the transition to lower carbon alternatives, but it does slow it. And in particular, it moderates the longer-term erosion of gasoline and diesel demand; and creates a backdrop where incumbent energy players have a longer runway to harvest cash from these legacy businesses and time to scale up profitable low carbon growth, which is still progressing, despite the policy changes.And then second, gas is the biggest winner, building on some of Stephen's comments. The policy initiatives that we're seeing here are likely to support more LNG exports and more gas power generation relative to the status quo.Ariana Salvatore: So, Devin, one of the things you mentioned there is regulation, and we think that's specifically reflected in this theme of unleashing American energy that Trump likes to talk about. It seems that this would set the stage for looser regulation and more supportive policy for oil and gas development.Do you expect any meaningful changes in near-term investment levels or production growth across the industry?Devin McDermott: It's an easy one, Ariana. No. The reality is the majority of U.S. oil and gas investment activity occurs on state or privately held lands. It's regulated at the state level. And the amount of investment that occurs across presidential election cycles really doesn't change all that much. And, in fact, some of the highest growth years ever for the U.S. oil and gas sector occurred under the Obama administration and also the most recent Biden term where production of both commodities actually hit all time highs.So, when your baseline is things really aren't that bad, it's tough to do much that really accelerates the throttle and causes companies to add more activity or add more oil or gas drilling rigs. And the last thing I just say on this point is the sector is not funding constrained. There's adequate free cash flow; there's adequate investment capacity. And that also is another limiting factor on doing anything that positively influences willingness to spend capital.In the end, it's really more about price – and where oil prices specifically goes as it relates to oil and gas investment – rather than policy.Stephen Byrd: So, Ariana, let me move from Devin's thoughts on price back to policy – and if you take a step back, a key question that we often get asked is: Will the President's executive orders be fully implemented? What do you think?Ariana Salvatore: Well, it's always necessary to frame these policy proposals in terms of their feasibility, right? So, we're still parsing through all of the details of these executive orders. But we already feel higher conviction in some areas over others, where we think the president has clear and present authority to make policy changes.For example, President Trump can pretty easily unilaterally decide to move away from Biden's clean energy targets, but he's going to have a much harder time rescinding money that has already been appropriated, dispersed, or obligated towards these ends. For example, through the Inflation Reduction Act. We think that process is going to be much longer and likely result in a very targeted repeal as opposed to a broad-based claw back of funds.Stephen Byrd: Just thinking about sequencing, can you talk more about, sort of, the potential specific sequencing of these policies?Ariana Salvatore: There are a few different balls in the air right now, so to speak, as we noted in the run up to the inauguration. We expected President Trump to focus first on the areas that are more within his unilateral control as president. So, that really comes down to tariffs and trade policy more broadly, as well as immigration.I would also put deregulation in that bucket, but more on a sector specific basis. So, as we've talked about, we think there's clear deregulatory tailwinds for the energy sector. It's also clear in financials. But across the board, these are going to have more limited success in the energy complex.But Stephen, back to you, given everything that we've been talking about, how do you see the future of clean energy, renewables, EVs – all these elements that make up the Inflation Reduction Act and the broader energy transition?Stephen Byrd: Yeah, as I think about the areas that are most at risk, I think it's very clearly electric vehicles as well as wind power. Both have been, the subject of direct criticism and we would expect a high risk of elimination or reduction of support there. So that will cause some issues. I would say especially offshore wind faces multiple issues and we think the growth outlook is now very challenged.Now that said, onshore wind is often, for example, done on private land rather than public land, and the economics in many locations for both wind and solar remain quite favorable. And I think a big area of underappreciated upside would be AI itself – in the sense that the hyperscalers have very significant zero carbon emissions goals. So, what we see happening is we think these hyperscalers over time as they build out more and more data centers, which do have very high carbon footprints, we do think these hyperscalers are going to engage in power contracts with new renewable projects. So that is a boost to demand that I think the market is really not well appreciating.Ariana Salvatore: And finally, let's consider the issue of powering data centers. Devin, you've spoken about your positive outlook for natural gas. Do you think natural gas is going to play a bigger role in powering large U.S. data centers?Devin McDermott: Yeah, we do, and there's been an uptick in natural gas related announcements as it relates to data center growth in the U.S. over the last few months. And more recently, we've actually seen some very large deals; plus carbon capture which addresses some of the emissions concerns that Stephen was mentioning before – that the hyperscalers have longer term.It's important to contextualize this, though, with the broader growth backdrop for natural gas. The market here domestically is on the cusp of what we see as a structural growth cycle driven really by two key pillars. The first of which is that rise in LNG exports that I was alluding to before, where we're on track to roughly double U.S. export capacity over the next five years. And the second pillar is power. And power has a lot of different subsets to it. It's onshore manufacturing, it's this broader trend of electrification, like more electric appliances, a little bit from EVs. Some underlying industrial activity growth and then data centers in AI.So that is meaningful. That's a lot of gas, but there's also a lot more in all the other buckets I talked about.Ariana Salvatore: Stephen, pivoting back to you, beyond natural gas, how do you see this theme of powering AI developing more broadly under the new Trump energy policies?Stephen Byrd: Yeah, you know, I think broadly what we see is that a number of debottlenecking technologies are going to become very important. We cannot get enough power for data centers that we need really over the next several years. So, we're going to need to be very creative.One option will be to build data centers at large nuclear power plants. I think we'll definitely see that. We will also, I think, see converting bitcoin sites into data centers. That's going to be quite popular. And then lastly, I do think electric transmission will see excellent growth. That is certainly one way to try to debottleneck the grid – is to increase the grid itself.That takes many years, but I do think there will be more and more willpower. Both at the federal and state level to provide incentives for electric transmission. So that's an asset class that's definitely a winner.Ariana Salvatore: Last question for both of you, Stephen. I know we're going to hear from you in an upcoming episode about the implications of DeepSeek, but just to get a little bit of a sneak peek here. I'd love a quick take on how you're thinking about DeepSeek.Stephen Byrd: It's really quite jarring in a week to go from a $500 billion U.S. AI plan to a LLM with a reported price tag of just $6 million. I come away bullish on power demand, and let me walk through why that is. You know, I think that as the cost of inference drops, and we're seeing many signs of that – not just DeepSeek, but many other developments. As that happens, the absolute demand for inference compute goes up, and that compute requires a lot of electricity, so I'm quite bullish there.Also on AI training, I think the market has gotten too negative. I think that what we'll see is continued LLM R&D to go to the next level of capability. And there are at least five U.S. companies who are going to spend in the tens of billions, possibly into the hundreds of billions of dollars each on training the next generation of Large Language Models, which could be much, much more capable than the current generation. So, I'm actually quite bullish on the outlook for power demand from AI.Ariana Salvatore: Devin?Devin McDermott: The news drove a big dislocation across the gas value chain and pullback in many exposed stocks. And we think those types of dips are a buying opportunity because the gas setup is constructive or compelling for many reasons. Power is one of them, but you're not paying for power in the stock prices today.Ariana Salvatore: Stephen, Devin, thanks for taking the time to talk. And to our listeners, thanks for tuning in. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

4 Feb 11min

Tariffs and Tech Challenge Stocks

Tariffs and Tech Challenge Stocks

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson explains why U.S. stocks took a hit that is likely to sustain through the first half of 2025.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist. Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing tariffs, recent developments in AI and what it means for stocks.It's Monday, Feb 3rd at 11:30am in New York. So, let’s get after it.While 2024 was a strong year for many stocks, it was mostly a second half story. With recession fears peaking last summer and a Fed that remained on hold due to still elevated inflation, markets were essentially flat year-to-date in early August.But then everything changed. The Fed surprised markets with a 50 basis points cut to show its commitment to keeping the economy out of recession. This was followed by better labor data and two more 25 basis points cuts from the Fed. Investors took this as a green light to add more equity to portfolios—the riskier the better. It also became clear to markets and many observers that President Trump was likely going to win the election, with a rising chance of a Republican sweep in Congress. Given the more pro-growth agenda proposed by candidate Trump and his track record during his first term as President, he made investors even more bullish. Finally, given all the concern about a hung election, the fact that we got such definitive results on election night only added fuel to the equation. Hedges were swiftly removed and even reversed to long positions as both asset managers and retail investors chased performance for fear of falling behind, or missing out. In October, I suggested the S&P 500 would likely trade to 6100 on a clean election outcome. After promptly hitting that level in early December, stocks had a very weak month to finish the year with deteriorating breadth. The S&P 500 started the year soft before rallying sharply into inauguration day, essentially re-testing that 6100 level once again. The difference this time is that the re-test occurred on much lower breadth with high quality resuming its leadership role. Tariffs were always on the agenda, as was immigration enforcement, both of which are growth negative in the short-term.In my view, investors simply got complacent about these risks and are now dealing with them in real time. This also fits with our view that the first half of the year was likely to be tougher for stocks as equity negative policies would be implemented immediately before the equity positive policies like de-regulation, tax extensions and reduced government spending had time to play out in the form of less crowding out and lower interest rates. At the Index level, I expect the S&P 500 to trade in a range between 5500 to 6100 for the next 3 to 6 months, with our fourth quarter price target at 6500 remaining intact. Since we have been expecting tariffs to be implemented, this realization only furthers our preference for consumer services over goods. It also supports our preference for financials and other domestically geared businesses that have limited currency or trade exposures. In addition to rising political uncertainty, we also saw the release of DeepSeek’s latest AI chat bot last week. This added another level of uncertainty for investors that could have lasting implications at both the stock and index level given the importance of this investment theme. On one hand it could also accelerate the adoption of AI technologies if it truly lowers the cost – but many portfolios will need to adjust for this shift if that’s the case. We think it further supports our ongoing preference for software and media over semiconductors. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, leave us a review wherever you listen, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

3 Feb 3min

Big Debates: Who Will Be the Trade Winners Under Trump?

Big Debates: Who Will Be the Trade Winners Under Trump?

Morgan Stanley Research analysts Michelle Weaver, Chris Snyder and Nik Lippmann discuss U.S.-Mexico trade and the future of reshoring and near-shoring under the Trump administration.----- Transcript -----Michelle Weaver: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michelle Weaver, U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist at Morgan Stanley.Christopher Snyder: I’m Chris Snyder, US Multi-Industry Analyst.Nikolaj Lippmann: And I'm Nik Lippmann, Chief Latin America Equity Strategist.Michelle Weaver: On this episode of our special mini-series covering Big Debates, we'll talk about the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship and the key issues around reshoring and nearshoring.It's Friday, January 31st at 10am in New York.The imposition of tariffs back in 2018 under the first Trump administration and the COVID pandemic put a severe strain on global supply chains and catalyzed reshoring and nearshoring in North America. But with inflation and supply chain concerns no longer front and center, investors are questioning whether the U.S. reshoring momentum can continue.Chris, what's your view here?Christopher Snyder: I think it's in the very early innings. You know, if you look at the history of U.S. manufacturing, the country really started ceding share in about 2000 when China joined the World Trade Organization. So, it's been going on for 25 years; we've been giving share back to the world. I think the process of taking share back is probably slower and ultimately is a multi-decade opportunity.But you're absolutely right. The supply chain concerns are no longer like they were three to four years ago. But what I think has persevered since the pandemic is this heightened focus on operational durability and resiliency; and really shortening supply chains and getting closer to the end user, which I'm sure we'll hear more from Nick about, on the Mexico side.But, you know, if you kind of look back at global supply chains and manufacturing, it's really been a chase to find low-cost labor for the last 45 years. And while that's always important, we think going forward, capital and proximity to end users will increasingly dictate that regional allocation of CapEx. I mean, those parameters are very supportive for the U. S.You know, one thing I would like to kind of, you know, make sure is known on our U.S. reshoring view is that, you know, oftentimes it's thought of that we're shutting down a factory in China and reopening the same factory in the United States, and that's really a very rare example.Our view is that the world, and very specific industries need to add capacity. And we just simply think that the U.S. is better positioned to get that incremental factory relative to any point in the last 45 years, due to the combination of structural tech diffusion, but also this focus on resiliency. And one thing that I really do think is underappreciated is that global manufacturing grows 4 to 5 per cent a year. In the U.S. it's been more in the 1 to 2 percent range because we're constantly ceding share. But even if the U.S. just stops giving back share, you could see the growth profile of U.S. industrials double.Michelle Weaver: How would you size the reshoring opportunity? Do you have a dollar amount on what that could be worth?Christopher Snyder: Yeah, we’ve sized it at $10 trillion. You know, and it's been a combination of the CapEx, the fixed asset investment that's needed to build these factories, then ultimately the production, you know, opportunity that will come to those factories thereafter.Michelle Weaver: And you've argued that the U.S. reshoring flame was really lit in 2018 with the first wave of the Trump tariffs. It seems clear that trade policies by the new administration will continue to support reshoring. What's your outlook there?Christopher Snyder: Yeah, you're absolutely right. Prior to 2018, there wasn't really a thought process. If you need an incremental factory, you most likely just put it in China. And I think the tariffs, back in 2018 or [20]19 really started, or kickstarted boardroom conversations around global supply chains. So, I think a Trump presidency absolutely adds duration to this theme via protectionism or tariffs that the administration will implement.If you go back to the Trump 1.0 tariffs, supply chains reacted to the change in cost structures very quickly. We didn't see a huge wave of investment back into the United States. We just saw production exit China and move to broader Asia, because the focus was tariff avoidance.Now, we think the focus is around building operational, resiliency and durability which better positions the U.S. to get that incremental factory. And one thing that I think is underappreciated here is just how much leverage U.S. politicians have. The U.S. is the best demand region in the world. The U.S. accounts for about 30 per cent of global goods consumption. That's equal to the E.U. and China combined. It's also the best margin region in the world, not only for U.S. companies; but most international companies do their best margins in the United States. So, you can raise the cost to serve the U.S. market, and no one is turning away from the region that has the best demand and the best margins.Michelle Weaver: So, of course, tariffs in the pandemic have been major catalysts for U.S. reshoring. Have there been any other drivers like tech diffusion?Christopher Snyder: Yeah. I view the pandemic as the catalyst, and I view tech diffusion as the structural tailwind for U.S. manufacturing. Over time, we will continue to figure out ways to squeeze labor out of the manufacturing cost profile. It's hard to kind of pinpoint it, but I think if we look out over any 5- or 10-year window, we will see that. That's a structural talent for the United States, given the high labor costs. And really what it will help do is just narrow the cost delta, between low cost producing regions. I also think as we kind of extend this tech diffusion into GenAI; I also think what's going on is, will fuel another round of protectionism. So, you know, kind of further keeping that cycle going.Michelle Weaver: Nick, of course the big question investors are asking is how will the Trump trade agenda impact Mexico? Contrary to the prevailing market view, you've argued that Mexico can actually win big with Trump. How's this possible?Nikolaj Lippmann: That's right, Michelle. Look, we recently upgraded Mexico to equal weight, from underweight. And while some of the news we see around the administration seems a bit like a sequel, there are other things that are just very different.We're not talking about ripping apart the USMCA but actually bringing forward renegotiations from [20]26 to [20]25. It's a much more constructive message. It's a very young deal, and yet I think the world we live in today is quite different from the world of 2018. When we look at what are some of the things where Mexico could actually end up winning big, we look at the regionalism that appears to be a number one agenda.We look at the – how difficult it would be for the United States to de-risk from China. And from Mexico simultaneously. And also, fundamentally at that integration across the border, the industrial integration. It's clear that there's a need for calibration. There's a need for calibration in terms of a lot of the trade policy. There's been talks about maybe a customs union and I think that's far out in the future. But there's a need to try to figure out how to calibrate trade. And also, you know, there are things that Mexican policy makers can do to deal with the non-trade related issues, such as immigration or the cartels. And I think frankly, it's in Mexico's interest to deal with some of these issues.Michelle Weaver: Where are we in the whole Mexico as a China bridge versus China buffer debate?Nikolaj Lippmann: Right. That's another good question, Michelle. And one thing that we've been writing a lot about. The key difference from where we were, in Trump 1.0 and now is just how different the relationship with China really is. And I think one area where we've been scratching our head a little bit with regards to the – how Mexican policymakers have reacted after signing the USMCA deal is really just around that. That relationship with China. Well, I think that might have – they might have misread or underestimated just how much times have changed.We've seen a big increase in import from China. There have been very specific manufacturing ecosystems. And we've also seen increased investments by China and Mexico. Now, this has caused Mexico's trade deficit with China to go up a lot – almost double. And we've also seen an increase in the trade deficit between Mexico and the United States, in Mexico's favor.Now, that could imply that it's all the China bridge, I think that's far from the truth. But, you know, Mexico is probably two-third or a little more above. It's really that integration that I think policy makers in Mexico need to understand. And then you need to manage that these emerging elements of being a bridge. This is not in Mexico's interest; it's not in the U.S. interest to simply just be a bridge.We have done a lot of surveys with corporates around the world; and the way the European, and American companies in particular view Mexico is completely different from the way Asian and in particular Chinese companies view Mexico. The Chinese companies view Mexico much more as a place of assembly – whereas Americans think of Mexico as an integrated part of the manufacturing value chain.Michelle Weaver: Finally, how will the Mexico nearshoring theme develop from here?Nikolaj Lippmann: This is a great debate, I think. And one that's going to be – I think we're going to be writing a lot with Chris about, and with you guys around, about. Also, with the U.S. policy team. We laid out in 2022 this hypothesis that onshoring, nearshoring was about to happen. In terms of Mexico, it would imply $150 billion over five years. And very importantly, it was going to be – it could happen so fast because it was brownfield.It was more to the same. Where you already had manufacturing ecosystems, you could add to that. We saw very little evidence that you could do greenfield. But now that the world has evolved, we're looking at some of these greenfield manufacturing ecosystems that are really not present in North America, not in the United States, not in Canada, not in Mexico, such as EV batteries or IT hardware, some of the things that are starting to emerge around the big chip investments.And we're wondering what are going to be the policy objectives pertaining to these very specific manufacturing ecosystems that in many cases are quite important for national security. If that is to happen, I think it's going to happen slower, much like what Chris laid out, but it's going to be much more impactful. So, I'm sure we're going to be working closely on these debates.Michelle Weaver: Nick, Chris, thank you for taking the time to talk. And to our listeners, thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen to the show and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

31 Jan 10min

Managing Fiscal Policy Uncertainty Under Trump 2.0

Managing Fiscal Policy Uncertainty Under Trump 2.0

Our Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research, Michael Zezas, and Global Head of Macro Strategy, Matt Hornbach, discuss how the Trump administration’s fiscal policies could impact Treasuries markets.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Fixed Income and Public Policy Research.Matthew Hornbach: And I'm Matthew Hornbach, Global Head of Macro Strategy.Michael Zezas: Today, we'll talk about U.S. fiscal policy expectations under the new Trump administration and the path for U.S. Treasury yields.It's Thursday, January 30th at 10am in New York.Fiscal policy is one of the four key channels that have a major impact on markets. And I want to get into the outlook for the broader path for fiscal policy under the new administration. But Matt, let's start with your initial take on this week's FOMC meeting.Matthew Hornbach: So, investors came into the FOMC meeting this week with a view that they were going to hear a message from Chair Powell that sounded very similar to the message they heard from him in December. And I think that was largely the outcome. In other words, investors got what they expected out of this FOMC meeting. What did it say about the chance the Fed would lower interest rates again as soon as the March FOMC meeting? I think in that respect investors walked away with the message that the Fed’s baseline view for the path of monetary policy probably did not include a reduction of the policy rate at the March FOMC meeting. But that there was a lot of data to take on board between now and that meeting. And, of course, the Fed as ever remains data dependent.All of that said, the year ahead for markets will rely on more than just Fed policy. Fiscal policy may feature just as prominently. But during the first week of Trump's presidency, we didn't get much signaling around the president's fiscal policy intentions. There are plenty of key issues to discuss as we anticipate more details from the new administration.So, Mike, to set the scene here. What is the government's budget baseline at the start of Trump's second term? And what are the president's priorities in terms of fiscal policies?Michael Zezas: You know, I think the real big variable here is the set of tax cuts that expire at the end of 2025. These were tax cuts originally passed in President Trump's first term. And if they're allowed to expire, then the budget baseline would show that the deficit would be about $100 billion smaller next year.If instead the tax cuts are extended and then President Trump were able to get a couple more items on top of that – say, for example, lifting the cap on state and local tax deduction and creating a domestic manufacturing tax credit; two things that we think are well within the consensus of Republicans, even with their slim majority – then the deficit impact swings from a contraction to something like a couple hundred billion dollars of deficit expansion next year. So, there's meaningful variance there.And Matt, we've got 10-year Treasury yields hovering near highs that we haven't seen since before the global financial crisis around 10 years ago. And yields are up around a full percentage point since September. So, what's going on here and to what extent is the debate on the deficit influential?Matthew Hornbach: Well, I think we have to consider a couple of factors. The deficit certainly being one of them, but people have been discussing deficits for a long time now. It's certainly news to no one that the deficit has grown quite substantially over the past several years. And most investors expect that the deficit will continue to grow. So, concerns around the deficit are definitely a factor and in particular how those deficits create more government bonds supply. The U.S. Treasury, of course, is in charge of determining exactly how much government bond supply ends up hitting the marketplace.But it's important to note that the incoming U.S. Treasury secretary has been on the record as suggesting that lower deficits relative to the size of the economy are desired. Taking the deficit to GDP ratio from its current 7 per cent to 3 per cent over the next four years is desirable, according to the incoming Treasury secretary. So, I think it is far from conclusive that deficits are only heading in one direction. They may very well stabilize, and investors will eventually need to come to terms with that possibility.The other factor I think that's going on in the Treasury market today relates to the calendar. Effectively we have just gone through the end of the year. It's typically a time when investors pull back from active investment, but not every investor pulls back from actively investing in the market. And in particular, there is a consortium of investors that trade with more of a momentum bias that saw yields moving higher and invested in that direction; that, of course, exacerbated the move.And of course, this was all occurring ahead of a very important event, which was the inauguration of President Trump. There was a lot of concern amongst investors about exactly what the executive orders would entail for key issues like trade policy. And so there was, I think, a buyer's strike in the government bond market really until we got past the inauguration.So, Mike, with that background, can you help investors understand the process by which legislation and its deficit impact will be decided? Are there signposts to pay attention to? Perhaps people and processes to watch?Michael Zezas: Yeah, so the starting point here is Republicans have very slim majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. And extending these tax cuts in the way Republicans want to do it probably means they won't get enough Democratic votes to cross the aisle in the Senate to avoid a filibuster.So, you have to use this process called budget reconciliation to pass things with a simple majority. That's important because the first step here is determining how much of an expected deficit expansion that Republicans are willing to accept. So, procedurally then, what you can expect from here, is the House of Representatives take the first step – probably by the end of May. And then the Senate will decide what level of deficit expansion they're comfortable with – which then means really in the fall we'll find out what tax provisions are in, which ones are out, and then ultimately what the budget impact would be in 2026.But because of that, it means that between here and the fall, many different fiscal outcomes will seem very likely, even if ultimately our base case, which is an extension of the TCJA with a couple of extra provisions, is what actually comes true.And given that, Matt, would you say that this type of confusion in the near term might also translate into some variance in Treasury yields along the way to ultimately what you think the end point for the year is, which is lower yields from here?Matthew Hornbach: Absolutely. There's such a focus amongst investors on the fiscal policy outlook that any volatility in the negotiation process will almost certainly show up in Treasury yields over time.Michael Zezas: Got it.Matthew Hornbach: On that note, Mike, one more question, if I may. Could you walk me through the important upcoming dates for Congress that could shed light on the willingness or ability to expand the deficit further?Michael Zezas: Yeah, so I'd pay attention to this March 14th deadline for extending stopgap appropriations because there will likely be a lot of chatter amongst Congressional Republicans about fiscal expectations. And it's the type of thing that could feed into some of the volatility and perception that you talked about, which might move markets in the meantime.I still think most of the signal we have to wait for here is around the reconciliation process, around what the Senate might say over the summer. And then probably most importantly, the negotiation in the fall about ultimately what taxes will be passed, what that deficit impact will be. And then there's this other variable around tariffs, which can also create an offsetting impact on any deficit expansion.So still a lot to play for despite that near term deadline, which might give us a little bit of information and might influence markets on a near term basis.Matthew Hornbach: Great. Well Mike, thanks for taking the time to talk.Michael Zezas: Matt, great speaking with you. And as a reminder, if you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

30 Jan 9min

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