S9 Ep25: Rebalancing the Chinese economy

In 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao warned that China's growth model was unbalanced between supply and demand, over-reliant on investment and exports. More than 20 years later, the imbalance is smaller — but China is vastly larger. What its economy produces and exports now moves global markets. The argument about China's external surplus is no longer just a spat between Beijing and Washington.

Yiping Huang, Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University, has written a chapter in the fourth Paris Report, published jointly by CEPR and Bruegel, examining China's structural imbalances from the inside. His argument: the same policies that powered 45 years of growth also suppressed household income and consumption. Factor market distortions, especially artificially low interest rates, kept the cost of capital down and subsidised state-owned enterprises; decentralised GDP-target competition pushed local governments toward investment and industrial expansion rather than services and household support.

The result was a powerful supply side with a persistently weak domestic demand side. When you produce more than you can sell at home and you are a small economy, you export the rest. When you are the world's second largest economy, the world notices.

China's consumption share of GDP rose from around 50% in 2010 to 57% in 2024, still well below the mid-seventies average of comparable economies, and two fresh crises complicate the path.

The property market has been contracting since mid-2021 and it is now a drag on local government finances, household wealth, and bank balance sheets. Local government subsidies have created overcapacity in new industries such as electric vehicles and batteries. Huang's conclusion is that rebalancing is necessary and achievable, but it requires the government stepping back from direct resource allocation, the private sector and market taking on larger roles in innovation, and a significant strengthening of social protection to give households both the income and the confidence to spend.

The report discussed in this series of episodes:

Rey, Hélène, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (eds). 2026. The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Free to download at cepr.org.

The chapter discussed in this episode:

Huang, Yiping. 2026. "Rebalancing of the Chinese economy: Challenges and policy options." In Rey, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (eds), The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel.

To cite this episode:

Phillips, Tim, and Yiping Huang. 2026. “Rebalancing the Chinese Economy”. VoxTalks Economics (podcast).

Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.

About Paris Report 4

The fourth Paris Report, The New Global Imbalances, is a joint publication of CEPR and Bruegel. It was edited by Hélène Rey (London Business School and CEPR), Beatrice Weder di Mauro (Geneva Graduate Institute and CEPR, and President of CEPR), and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Bruegel and CEPR). The report examines how, in a high-debt and fragmented world, excess savings, rising surpluses, and rising deficits pose a risk to stability and undermine the global trading system. It is free to download at cepr.org.

About the guest

Yiping Huang is Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University. [verify URL before publishing] He is one of China's leading macroeconomists, with research spanning China's economic transition, financial reform, and the political economy of development. He has advised Chinese policymakers and international institutions including the IMF and the Asian Development Bank on issues of growth, financial reform, and structural change.

Research cited in this episode

Asymmetric liberalization is Yiping Huang's term for the approach China took when reforming its economy from the 1980s onward. Rather than the shock therapy adopted by former Soviet economies — privatising state-owned enterprises overnight and hoping markets would fill the gap — China used a dual-track approach. It opened the economy to private firms and foreign investors while maintaining state-owned enterprises in parallel, accepting some inefficiency in exchange for stability in output, employment, and growth. To subsidise the SOEs without direct fiscal transfers, the government kept factor markets, particularly financial markets, partially distorted: deposit and lending rates were held below market-clearing levels, reducing funding costs and effectively transferring income from savers and households to producers. The result was a very strong supply side and a structurally weak domestic demand side, which Huang identifies as the root cause of China's persistent external surpluses.

Involution (Chinese: 内卷, nèijuǎn) is a term in wide use in China to describe a particular form of competitive overextension: effort that intensifies without producing proportional gains in quality, efficiency, or welfare. In the economic policy context Huang uses it, involution refers to the overcapacity problem in China's newer industries, including electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels. Local governments, motivated by GDP targets and decentralised competition, have subsidised capacity expansion in these sectors without requiring corresponding advances in technology or product quality. The result is high-volume, low-margin competition that can suppress prices globally while leaving firms unable to earn sustainable returns domestically. Huang distinguishes this from the property market crisis, which has a different structure and cause.

New quality productive forces is the term used in China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030) to describe the supply-side transformation the government is aiming for: a shift away from labour-intensive, low-value-added manufacturing toward high-technology, innovation-driven sectors. It reflects the recognition that the industries China dominated in its first decades of reform — low-cost assembly, commodity manufacturing — are no longer competitive given rising domestic wages and costs, and that the next stage of growth has to be driven by productivity and technology rather than factor accumulation.

The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030) is China's current medium-term planning document. Huang identifies two key anchors: the development of new quality productive forces on the supply side, and a shift toward domestic demand — particularly private consumption — on the demand side. The plan signals a different role for government, more focused on providing social infrastructure, basic research, and protection for households, and less focused on direct resource allocation and industrial project selection. Huang describes the two anchors as a circuit: if supply-side innovation and demand-side consumption can be connected efficiently, the Chinese economy can sustain growth for much longer without relying on external demand.

The Japan comparison is used by Huang to set expectations for China's consumption rebalancing. Japan's private consumption share of GDP was at its lowest in 1970 and did not reach the average of comparable advanced economies — around the mid-seventies — until around 2010: a process of roughly forty years. China's consumption share is currently around fifty-seven percent, still well below that average. Huang acknowledges the parallel but expresses hope that China can close the gap faster than Japan did; the point of the comparison is that raising household consumption is a structural, decades-long process, not a policy lever that can be pulled in a single plan cycle. It requires sustained growth in household income and improvement in the social safety net to reduce precautionary saving.

China's current account surplus peaked at 9.8% of GDP in 2007, immediately before the global financial crisis. Huang notes that significant adjustment has already taken place: the average surplus between 2018 and the mid-2020s was below two percent of GDP, and the investment share of GDP fell from a peak of forty-seven percent in 2011 to forty-one percent in 2024. The surplus rose to 3.7% of GDP in 2024 partly as a result of weak domestic demand following the property market correction. Huang's argument is that the external imbalance and the internal consumption shortfall are the same problem viewed from different angles; fixing one requires fixing the other.

More VoxTalks Economics episodes

This is the third episode in our series on Paris Report 4. In the first episode, Maurice Obstfeld of the Peterson Institute for International Economics examines the history of global imbalances and what previous episodes can teach today's policymakers. In the second episode, Gilles Moëc, Chief Economist at AXA, explains why the US government is so keen to promote stablecoins and the risks they may pose to the financial system.

For an interview with two of the report's editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, on the problem of global imbalances, listen to The Sound of Economics, Bruegel's podcast. Available at bruegel.org.